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Abstract
With the recent increases in bandwidth available to home users, traffic rates for
commercial national networks have also been increasing rapidly. This presents
a problem for any network monitoring tool as the traffic rate they are expected
to monitor is rising on a monthly basis. Security within these networks is para-
mount as they are now an accepted home of trade and commerce. Core networks
have been demonstrably and repeatedly open to attack; these events have had
significant material costs to high profile targets.
Network monitoring is an important part of network security, providing in-
formation about potential security breaches and in understanding their impact.
Monitoring at high data rates is a significant problem; both in terms of processing
the information at line rates, and in terms of presenting the relevant information
to the appropriate persons or systems.
This thesis suggests that the use of summary statistics, gathered over a num-
ber of packets, is a sensible and effective way of coping with high data rates. A
methodology for discovering which metrics are appropriate for classifying signi-
ficant network events using statistical summaries is presented. It is shown that
the statistical measures found with this methodology can be used effectively as
a metric for defining periods of significant anomaly, and further classifying these
anomalies as legitimate or otherwise. In a laboratory environment, these metrics
were used to detect DoS traffic representing as little as 0.1% of the overall network
traffic.
The metrics discovered were then analysed to demonstrate that they are ap-
propriate and rational metrics for the detection of network level anomalies. These
metrics were shown to have distinctive characteristics during DoS by the analysis
of live network observations taken during DoS events.
This work was implemented and operated within a live system, at multiple
sites within the core of a commercial ISP network. The statistical summaries
are generated at city based points of presence and gathered centrally to allow for
spacial and topological correlation of security events.
The architecture chosen was shown to be flexible in its application. The system
was used to detect the level of VoIP traffic present on the network through the
implementation of packet size distribution analysis in a multi-gigabit environment.
It was also used to detect unsolicited SMTP generators injecting messages into
the core.
ii
Monitoring in a commercial network environment is subject to data protec-
tion legislation. Accordingly the system presented processed only network and
transport layer headers, all other data being discarded at the capture interface.
The system described in this thesis was operational for a period of 6 months,
during which a set of over 140 network anomalies, both malicious and benign were
observed over a range of localities. The system design, example anomalies and
metric analysis form the majority of this thesis.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Summary
Security over the Internet is becoming increasingly important. Consumers are re-
lying on the Internet for much of their shopping [1], demonstrating increasing trust
from the general populous in the technology. Financial institutions increasingly
rely on the Internet for trading of equities and commodities, replacing the more
traditional methods of dedicated leased lines.
There are many threats to the security of the Internet, some involving the
privacy of data, some involving the security of hosts, others the infrastructure of
the networks themselves.
Towards home user security, recent advances in most current operating systems
allow the automatic patching of potential vulnerabilities, in many cases without
any direct user intervention. The deployment of firewalls by default in operating
systems has become common and the use of anti-virus software has become more
pervasive. Recent operating systems deploy strategies such as making memory seg-
ments writable or executable, but not both. In the UK, consumer ISP connectivity
is often achieved via routers which perform NAT for a household, preventing direct
inbound Internet access.
Business users often employ layered sophisticated commercial firewalls, filter-
ing all traffic which is present on their network. Most businesses employ admin-
istrators who will ensure that security on business hosts is in agreement with the
appropriate policies.
While the security offered on single hosts and local networks is strengthened in
line with their changing use, the security offered in core networks has not moved
in line with this. The infrastructure the Internet employs has been demonstrably
vulnerable to attack, even for major corporations hosting in distributed environ-
ments. Filtering of packets is often limited to simple metrics such as application
1
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layer port numbers.
Response times to denial of service attacks on major hosts have led to changes
in the way that major targets are hosted. There is a sizeable body of research
on coping with, and mitigating denial of service; however, much of this research
requires action from core routers, which ISPs are slow to implement. ISPs are
generally reluctant to increase the load on core routers, as the increase in load will
incur a cost in performance and therefore bandwidth. Attacks are still common,
even for high profile sites [2].
Dealing with these attacks is problematic because:
• The data rates in core networks preclude stateful packet inspection
• Processing on core network devices is extremely limited
• Expert analysis is required to determine the sources of attacks
• Mitigation of these attacks is difficult to achieve at the receiver
The research described in this thesis attempts to provide a low cost (in pro-
cessing terms), practical network anomaly detector. The potentially huge costs
of processing packets and flows at full line rate were avoided, instead inferring
activity from summarised data.
This research can be divided into several major activities as outlined here.
Initial studies were undertaken to investigate the viability of traffic capture and
analysis at high data rates using relatively cheap hardware (discussed in section
3.2).
A fundamental issue with research of this nature, is the validation of results. In
a live network situation, it is impossible1 to ascertain the accuracy of classification.
This is due to the lack of availability of any independent method of corroboration
(traditional IDS systems were of limited use due to their dependence on the packet
data, inability to classify at line rate, and inherent fallibility). To combat this,
verification was attempted via two mechanisms; firstly a laboratory emulation
was constructed in order to generate network misuse in a controlled environment
(discussed in section 6.2.6), secondly results were compared (and shown to be
consistent) with internal tools used by the ISP networking analysts, which do
have access to higher levels of information.
Data mining tools and methodologies were used at several levels of abstrac-
tion to investigate relationships between network events and the laboratory data,
allowing for careful feature selection for use with the live implementation.
1Given reasonable resource limitations
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 3
Once deployed, a database of training events was built from live data, classified
by manual inspection and informed by the laboratory investigation, alongside
general literature and experience in the field.
Data mining was again employed to investigate relationships in the data, lead-
ing to automated classifiers, which were run in real time to classify data on a
pseudo real time basis.
1.2 Original Research Contribution
This work contributes to the network security monitoring field in several ways.
It adds to the body of research proving the use of statistical summaries to be an
effective and scalable way of monitoring for security purposes. It demonstrates
a method for determining what these summaries should contain, and how they
should be applied. This is a novel contribution, as it applies feature selection
to live data taken from a core network, where previously only metrics based on
domain knowledge had been used. This is applied in a data sensitive2 environment,
forcing the use of header values. Header values are used by the network at different
layers to move messages about the network, and are therefore considered non-
sensitive information. The header values were summarised into distributions for
analysis purposes. These statistical summaries are combined with techniques to
utilise them in a live and operational system. This research was conducted on a
live national network, which gives it strength due to its practical nature, but also
introduces challenges due to the lack of control over the data.
Given the fact the network that was operated on was data sensitive, finger-
printing of packet data is extremely difficult. To this end, the development of
fingerprinting using the TCP checksum is also a novel contribution. This mechan-
ism has applications for fast full packet fingerprinting via the checksum calculation
being done on the NIC. This is particularly useful for its ability to operate without
the data field, allowing for its application in environments where the data field is
not available (such as the environment in which this research was conducted).
During the course of the work, there was a contribution to the field of unso-
licited SMTP traffic detection, via IP profiling at the sender site. This concept
breaks from the normal methods for dealing with unsolicited SMTP in that in
does not filter at the receiver. The privileged data set which this research has
access to, allows detection of spam at the source in a configurable manner. This
research has already been published [3] and is a potential area for further future
study; in particular the effort to distinguish further groups of SMTP generators,
2The core of an ISP network is subject to privacy laws, and therefore packet data may not
be examined by a third party
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such as legitimate mail servers and mailing lists. This work is not the focus of
this thesis, but is discussed in Section 6.6. A copy of the published paper may be
found in appendix A.
1.3 Structure of the Thesis
In Chapter 2 the general field of network monitoring is discussed in its varying
scales and coverage. Chapter 3 presents the associated research from the most
recent years in the area. This is grouped into three categories; network monitoring
in a broad context, monitoring and prevention for security applications, and finally
data mining in a network context.
Chapter 4 describes the system with which the data used in the research was
captured and analysed. This section is split into hardware, software and system
design sections.
Chapter 5 brings in the concept of data mining, and how it has been used in
the research. This looks at both the development of appropriate metrics for the
detection of criminal activity, and their application.
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 describe and discuss the data which has been collated
and the patterns, relationships and types of activity that have been found in the
data. Two example anomalies and their analysis are shown. The features which
are selected are further investigated to demonstrate their appropriateness.
Chapter 9 draws some conclusions from the work, and discusses the possibility
for further investigation.
Chapter 2
An Overview of Network
Monitoring
Chapter 2 offers an overview of network monitoring with an emphasis on its applic-
ation to network security. Of particular relevance to the research are the sections
on monitoring at over one thousand Mbit/s and detection through anomaly.
Because of the security focus of the monitoring, this chapter begins by describ-
ing how the monitoring undertaken fits into an overall security model and within
network monitoring as a whole.
Monitoring differing information, at differing data rates and in differing loca-
tions is discussed. The chapter then moves onto monitoring in a security context
grouped by detection mechanisms, learning mechanisms and analysis techniques.
It then describes the stimulus for network attackers using the honeynet project’s
‘MEECES’ [4] acronym which provides a survey of motivating factors for the par-
ticipation in illegal network activity.
This leads onto looking at mitigation techniques, grouped by topology and by
the action taken. Finally it discusses data processing and characterisation.
Monitoring communication networks is a topic in which there has been consid-
erable research over a considerable length of time. The networks being monitored
have increased in size (both geographical and numerical) and data rate by orders
of magnitude and the importance of accurate data has increased proportionately.
Network monitoring is a useful source of information for network managers,
planners, security managers, marketing personnel and others. Information is
gathered at many scales, from individual host usage to core networks with hun-
dreds of thousands of hosts.
5
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2.1 Monitoring as Part of Network Security
and Information Assurance
Information Assurance is a wide ranging term, used to encompass confidentiality,
integrity, authentication, availability and non-repudiation.
• Confidentiality
The definition for confidentiality from ISO17799 [5] is ”ensuring that inform-
ation is accessible only to those authorised to have access”. In computer
security this is most often achieved through the use of cryptography.
• Integrity
In terms of data integrity, this means that data is only modified with proper
authorisation. This is not limited to the intentional alteration of data by
a non-trusted party, but includes errors introduced through degradation of
data. Examples would be a fire which caused the loss of data, or undetected
network errors leading to corrupt data [5].
• Authentication
This is the process by which users, or information is identified. Authentica-
tion allows this to be done in a way which prevents the information, or user
from being forged or invented.
• Availability
For data to be useful, it must be available in some form. This requires that
the information, and a method to access it, is available to an authenticated
and authorised user [5].
• Non-repudiation
This is closely tied with Integrity, in that non-repudiation requires that all
parties are aware of the state of the transaction. Once sent, it should not
be possible to deny sending a transaction, nor possible to deny receiving a
transaction, once received.
A reasonable example of these features in action would be an online banking
transaction. In this example, authentication (via SSL certificates), confidentiality
(via RSA cryptography) and integrity (via TCP’s re transmission and checksum
algorithms 1) are all provided through the widespread use of the HTTPS protocol.
1These are not full-proof
CHAPTER 2. AN OVERVIEW OF NETWORK MONITORING 7
Non-repudiation is handled at the application, and availability is handled by the
individual infrastructure of the banking organisation.
The research undertaken here was primarily interested in DoS, which falls
within the remit of availability. A threat to the network is a threat to the ability of
a user to access information over it. A DoS attack is explicitly aimed at impairing
the availability of information or of a service. For example, when a DoS attack
is performed against a website, the intent is to prevent legitimate access to this
resource, limiting its availability.
Network security is a very broad topic, and ranges from the physical security of
devices through to vulnerabilities in protocols. In [6] the authors describe network
security as divisible into three ‘D’s.
• Defense
Defence is the most obvious of the forms of network security. Employing
network defences reduces the chances of degradation of network performance
or the compromise of other assets. Traditional network defences include
devices such as firewalls, router access lists, spam and/or virus filters.
• Deterrence
Deterrence is described as the second mode of security and involves redu-
cing the frequency of security compromises by providing some unfavourable
consequence resulting from a security compromise. Examples of deterrents
would be national laws and company acceptable use policies.
• Detection
The third ‘D’ is detection. Detection allows the severity of security com-
promises to be limited. In the absence of detection, security compromises
could continue to do damage for an unlimited duration. Examples of detec-
tion based security would include IDS, log files and others. A very recent
example of the importance of this type of security would be the compromise
of a Sony Entertainment data base containing considerable amounts of cus-
tomer data [7], which has been painstakingly analysed to identify potential
breaches of privacy.
The research in this thesis is primarily concerned with detection, with the
potential for expansion into defence. As such, most of the functionality falls
within the remit of network monitoring, the next section of this chapter deals
with network monitoring in differing categories.
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2.2 Monitoring as Part of Network
Management
FCAPS is the ISO Telecommunications Management Network model and frame-
work for network management [8]. It defines five areas of interest, these are:
• Fault Management
In the context of network management, a fault is an event which has a neg-
ative impact on the network. The role of fault management is to, where
possible, predict these events. Where prediction and prevention is not pos-
sible, fault management locates and mitigates the cause of the fault.
• Configuration Management
Configuration management involves auditing existing network devices, track-
ing changes made to configuration and to allow planning for future develop-
ment.
• Accounting Management
In the context of this research, accounting management refers to the man-
agement of users in terms of the provisioning of authorisation,authentication
and backup.
• Performance Management
Performance management involves measuring metrics such as utilisation,
error rate and response times for existing infrastructure. Ongoing monitoring
of metrics such as these allow for capacity planning for future requirements.
• Security Management
Security management is primarily concerned with controlling access to the
devices on the network, and to the network itself.
Packet capture can provide information for fault, configuration, performance
and security management. However, the research presented here is primarily con-
nected with fault and security management. DoS attacks and worm threats cer-
tainly affect performance but in an indirect manner.
2.3 Monitoring Grouped by Data Used
The research described in this thesis utilises data from packets collected on ISP
networks. In this section the different types of data available to monitors and their
uses are described.
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Information can be gained from either data directly contained in the packets
contents, or data about them. The data can also be gained from the routers,
switches, firewalls, proxies, load balancers and other devices present on the net-
work. In this thesis, the data will be split into two categories. It is possible to
record the layer 3 protocol from the IP protocol field; it is also possible to record
the time of the packet’s arrival. This section has subdivided monitoring by these
types of data, which are here named ‘Packet’ and ‘Meta’ data respectively.
2.3.1 Packet Data
Packet data can be used for identifying more detailed information such as which
applications are present on a network. In a security context packet data is often
used as a ‘signature’ to detect malicious packets.
Tools such as TCPDump [9] and Ethereal (and later Wireshark) [10] are pop-
ular for the capture and analysis of packet level data. At higher data rates tools
like NetFlow [11] allow sub sampling of packets to provide detailed information
without storing huge quantities of traffic. Packet data has the potential to reveal
many details about communication on a network. This ranges from the obvi-
ous, such as the application flow data, through to the more abstract, such as the
operating systems, load levels on the hosts involved etc., 2.
Packet data is often applied in scenarios such as intrusion detection, where
particular packet signatures are potentially interesting. Monitoring packet level
data can have large overheads, which is discussed later in this chapter.
2.3.2 Meta Data
The term ‘meta data’ is used in this thesis to define data which is inferred from
data, rather than packet fields directly. Examples would include delay, loss and
inter-arrival times, which while they are data about packets, they are not contained
in the packets themselves.
One of the most obvious examples of meta data monitoring is the use of the
classic ‘ping’ program to gauge delay across network paths using the ICMP echo
request and reply mechanism. The application has become widespread in its
distribution and application [12].
Routing information can be extracted from a network using tools such as
traceroute and tcptraceroute, which use the TTL feature in IP to have packets
dropped at each layer three device on the network3.
2Operating systems can be inferred from TTL, and load levels can be inferred from IP iden-
tification numbers in many stack implementations
3Some administrators view this type of topology discovery as a security vulnerability in itself,
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Other examples of the use of meta data would include bandwidth monitoring
and loss statistics taken both passively and actively.
2.4 Monitors Grouped by Data Rate
The system developed in this research eventually monitored data rates in excess
of 6GBit/s. In this section monitoring networks at varying rates is discussed.
The requirement for monitoring of links has meant that with the increase in
bandwidth in the core, a commensurate increase in the capability to monitor
bandwidth has been needed. Commercial products are available for the purposes
of capturing traffic from links at 10Gbit and above. Monitoring at these varying
data rates in more detail here is described.
2.4.1 Monitoring up to 100 Mbit/s
Monitoring at low data rates with current hardware allows a comprehensive level
of processing to be undertaken on the traffic with even modest processing power.
Full traffic records can be stored, containing all data within packets over significant
periods of time.
Simply storing all of the packets at one hundred Mbit/s gives around forty-five
gigabytes of data per hour. Standard PC architectures now house hundreds of
gigabytes of hard disk space; therefore even on cheap hardware the whole data
portion of packets can be stored for many hours at this data rate, however, even
with large storage arrays, uncompressed data would be difficult to store for exten-
ded periods of time.
2.4.2 Monitoring up to 1000 Mbit/s
Monitoring at gigabit rates can cause problems for off the shelf PC hardware. The
problems that IDS systems face at these rates has been discussed in [13], where
the authors discuss the load in terms of memory associated with maintaining
state on connections, the potential for packet drops due to network load and the
potential for exhausting the available CPU resources. These problems are non-
trivial to circumvent, and often result in compromises between system resources
and detection rates. Common problems of interrupt rates are also discussed in
section 4.2.2.
The issues of storing data increase by an order of magnitude moving from
100Mbit/s to 1Gbit/s. As presented in the previous section, storing all packets
and accordingly prevent layer 3 devices from sending the ICMP TTL exceeded message responses
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at 100Mbit/s leads to forty-five gigabytes of data per hour. At 1000Mbit/s this
figure is four hundred and fifty gigabytes per hour.
2.4.3 Monitoring at over 1000 Mbit/s
With the introduction of 10Gbit core network links, the requirement to monitor
at this speed has developed. Monitoring at these rates is usually limited to meta
data analysis except in specialised applications [14].
10Gbit NICs are commonly available even for consumer desktop computers,
however, these cards are often not capable of coping with the full data rate on a
10Gbit link, and are instead simply compatible with the standard. Commercial
specialist monitoring interfaces are available, which give the ability to perform
large amounts of processing and filtering on the interface, reducing the load on
the monitoring host. Companies such as Endace and Napatech offer products
which give very strong capture performance at these data rates [15][16].
2.5 Monitors Grouped by Topology
The system described in this thesis monitored an ISP network in a distributed
manner, gathering data and collating it at a centralised point. This section char-
acterises different methods of data collection in terms of topology.
It is possible to monitor at one or more sites on a network. The topology of the
monitoring system needs to be matched with the type of data which the system
designer intends to extract. The types of possible topology and their prime uses
are explained here.
2.5.1 Monitoring at a Single Point
In a situation where packets are broadcast at layer 2, as with a hub, it is possible to
monitor multiple hosts on a network from a single point. However, most modern
layer 2 devices switch packets, preventing passive monitors from intercepting traffic
which is not directed to them.
In a switched environment where monitoring is being performed on the host
which is of interest, no extra work is required; however, if this is not the case, it is
often necessary to create a span port, mirror port or in the case of fibre, an optical
tap [17].
Port spanning generally refers to traffic from multiple switch ports being copied
to a signal ‘span’ port. Port mirroring generally refers to traffic from a single port
being replicated to a ‘mirror’ port. Port spanning would generally be performed on
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specific VLANs or ports. Consideration has to be given to the data rates involved,
as spanning several 1Gbit ports to a single 1Gbit monitoring session may lead to
dropped messages. Even in the case where a single port is spanned, the duplex
nature of Ethernet may lead to frames being dropped. A port tap is a physical
device which in the case of fibre, splits a proportion of the traffic to a secondary
cable, leading to a reduction in signal strength on the original line.
2.5.2 Monitoring by Traffic Splitting
In situations where traffic rates are high (or where redundancy is desirable), it
can be desirable to split traffic streams to allow multiple hosts to analyse the
data. Often devices such as load balancers can be used. If configured intelligently,
load balancers can ensure that related traffic is consistently fed to the relevant
monitoring host. This is commonly achieved through ‘sticky’ session addresses
(or SSL certificate, or other method), where a balancer will remember which way
a particular host has been forwarded for a certain period of time. This ensures
that there is some consistency in which devices receives the data from specific
hosts [18].
2.5.3 Distributed Monitoring
On many networks, it is not sensible to monitor all the required traffic at any
single point.
Figure 2.1: Example Network Topology
In figure 2.1 monitoring between the firewall and internet would give all traffic
flowing on and off the network but not, for example, traffic from the web servers
to the database servers. In this type of situation, it is often desirable to monitor
at multiple points on the network, to provide coverage of relevant information.
Distributed monitoring comes with additional problems; multiple copies of
the same packet may be captured, leading to confusion in analysis alongside the
increase in the storage requirement.
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2.6 Monitoring For Security Purposes
The data gathered in this research was analysed to attempt the detection of ma-
licious activity across the network monitored. This was achieved via anomaly
detection through statistical analysis of summarised data. In this section, net-
work security monitoring in a broader context is outlined.
As usage of networks has become more focused on commercial interests, the
importance of security has increased. The application of network monitoring to
detect network misuse has formed a large part of the body of network monitoring
research.
2.6.1 Security Monitoring Grouped by Detection Type
While the system eventually developed in this research was primarily anomaly
based, there were several potential alternative options available. This section
describes some of these options.
NIDSs are designed to monitor a network, host or both and detect events
which it classifies as an intrusion. These systems are often closely linked with
IPSs which provide some form of mitigation in addition to detection. Intrusion
Detection systems are traditionally subdivided into two main categories, those of
signature detectors and anomaly detectors [19].
2.6.1.1 Detection Through Signature
Signature based systems are built on knowledge of the behaviour of the intrusions
they attempt to detect. This knowledge maybe about the types of process activity
the intrusion will exhibit, or perhaps a particular string pattern present in a packet.
A good example of this type of detector would be the open source IDS ‘Snort’ [20].
Signature based systems traditionally provide good detection rates, but require
prior knowledge of the misuse they detect, making them weak at detecting new
attacks. Certain types of attack, such as polymorphic worms, try to make this
type of detection more difficult, though still possible [21].
2.6.1.2 Detection Through Anomaly
Anomaly based systems utilise an understanding of normal behaviour for a host,
network or both, to define deviations from this normal as potential intrusions.
The definition for normal activity used by the system can be gained via prior
knowledge or via machine learning over time.
Analogies can be drawn with credit card processing, where spending patterns
undergo similar analysis, and where anomalies are found, payments are stopped.
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As with credit card processing, network anomaly detection is prone to false pos-
itives and negatives; however, unlike signature detection, it is less vulnerable to
issues in detecting newer attacks [19].
2.6.1.3 Composite Detection
Composite detectors can provide more information than a purely signature or
anomaly based system, and are often in practice systems which provide a better
measure of the quality of the alarm. These detectors are in essence simply both
anomaly and signature detector based systems. They suffer, and benefit from all
the strengths and weaknesses of their component parts.
2.6.2 Security Monitoring Grouped by Learning
Mechanism
The system developed in this research used a combination of self learning and
taught mechanisms to classify network traffic. In this section describe these mech-
anisms are explained.
2.6.2.1 Self Learning
Self Learning systems are based on anomaly detection, and over time build a
statistical model of normality, they then spot significant deviations from this nor-
mality. As these systems are self learning they have the potential for alerts to be
generated for innocuous events.
In situations where systems are entirely unsupervised, extreme care must be
taken with the input data, and the handling of alerts. In practice, few systems
are entirely unsupervised in a network monitoring context.
2.6.2.2 Taught
Training of IDS systems can be achieved in several ways. In the case of anomaly
based systems, this is often achieved through pre-classified data-sets, where the
system is taught to classify along a similar line to the training set.
In the case of signature based detection, the teaching is often considerably more
direct. Often exact patterns are specified to the system, which then attempts to
find them and classify appropriately.
Systems which are programmed can positively generate alerts, as in the case
of signature detectors, or negatively generate them in the case of anomaly based
systems.
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2.6.3 Security Monitoring Grouped by Analysis
Technique
This research used summarised information to analyse the data present on the
network, however, many systems use other mechanisms. This section describes
some of the available options.
Where and what a system is designed to monitor is linked with the level of data
available to a system. One of the more intensive tasks when monitoring network
data is real-time flow reconstruction. This is both in terms of the memory required
to store the connections and associated data, and in terms of the processing re-
quired to match packets to connections. The majority of traffic on the network
monitored for this research was TCP/IP traffic, which is split into flows by IP:Port
pairs. The server port is normally static, with a randomly chosen ephemeral client
port.
Flow reconstruction is the process in which packet streams are turned into
communication streams. Packets are assigned to particular flows, normally by IP
address, Port (in the case of TCP or UDP traffic), sequence numbers and other
variables. This can be hardware intensive in terms of both memory and processing
requirements as the packet and flow rate increases.
There are two main types of monitor in this category, ‘state aware’ and ‘state-
less’ detectors [19].
2.6.3.1 State Aware Detection
State aware detectors monitor the flow information contained within the network
traffic. This allows a level of information suitable to find connection based an-
omalies. A good example of this would be the Synchronise Packet exploit within
many TCP stack implementations [22], used as a mechanism within a Denial of
Service attack. The state monitoring would then be aware of many half open
connections.
State Aware detection can analyse entire flows of data, and is therefore able to
detect sensitive information which is contained over several packets. A mechanism
to avoid detection in a non-state aware system would be to set the MTU for a
connection to something very small, forcing all data to be split into small sections,
avoiding detection from non-connection aware systems. This could be achieved by
settings within the operating system of the attacker’s machine.
State aware systems may monitor meta data about connections; an example
may be to monitor the inter arrival time of packets within a telnet session, which
may enable the differentiation between human and scripted input.
It is also possible (and indeed common) to reconstruct connections at an even
CHAPTER 2. AN OVERVIEW OF NETWORK MONITORING 16
higher level e.g., looking at http headers or ftp transfers.
2.6.3.2 Stateless Detection
Stateless detectors do not keep track of flows, and treat each packet as an in-
dividual entity. This allows for higher throughput, at the cost of information
availability. In some cases this type of detection is unable to correctly identify
attacks; these cases include polymorphic worms and encrypted connections.
2.7 Network Threats
Network Threats (which are also referred to as malicious network events) are the
primary focus of the detection in this research. This section describes different
types of network threat.
Network threats are varied and numerous, covering a range of activities, from
password security on a single host to hundreds of thousands of hosts being involved
in single attacks at a target.
To provide a bounded summary, the review of network security threats is
limited here, discussions of physical site security at router housing would be in-
appropriate. Instead the emphasis on threats is with regards to networks rather
than hosts. The relevant threats are placed into the following headings.
2.7.1 Worm Threats
A computer Virus refers to code which replicates itself. A worm is an extension
of this, and contains a mechanism to spread between hosts.
Worms can be characterised by their ability to propagate from one host to
another either directly or indirectly, through their own mechanism, or by means
of an existing one such as e-mail [23]. Worms can be classified as having the
following stages:
1. Target Discovery
This can be done through means of active scanning, passively (where the
host waits for contact from a vulnerable host) or pre-generated lists either
on or off the infected host. It is worth noting that some worms have no target
discovery mechanism, and simply transmit to randomly generated targets.
2. Transmission
Transmission of the worm is achieved either by using some known vulner-
ability on a target host, using its own transmission mechanism, and gaining
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some level of privilege on the target host or by some existing communication
mechanism, such as email. Some worms use a secondary channel to transfer
the worm code such as blaster [24].
3. Execution (Activation)
Execution of the worm can be achieved via direct human action, indirect
human action (such as a machine reboot), via scheduled process activity or
via self execution.
Worm behaviour is sometimes classified as ‘direct’ or ‘indirect’. Direct worms
are defined by their use of their own transmission mechanism. They are normally
self executing, leading to potentially high infection rates. Direct worms are per-
haps the most threatening to a network as they can produce large traffic volumes
with indirect DoS type effects on a network.
Indirect worms are in contrast defined by their use of a secondary communic-
ation channel such as email or a peer to peer file transfer, and their use of human
based activation.
2.7.2 Trust Abuse Threats
Trust based abuse does not fall directly under the remit of this research. Due to
its characteristics it does not have a great impact on network performance. Trust
based attacks are in essence informational attacks. These attacks attempt to gain
some information of value from a user and are often referred to as phishing. This is
most commonly through email. Common target information includes credit card
details and passwords for valuable accounts such as eBay [25].
2.7.3 Denial of Service
In a denial of service attack, a malicious user exploits the connectivity
of the Internet to cripple the services offered by a victim site [26].
DoS attacks can be costly to victims, perhaps the most famous example being
an attack in February 2000, where a large scale Distributed Denial of Service attack
was launched against several high profile targets, including www.Amazon.com and
www.eBay.com.
The attacks can be varied in many ways; they can use genuine or spoofed
addresses, any number of hosts in any control topology, they can use varying data
rates and can last from minutes to weeks [22].
The attacks may be grouped by the method in which the DoS is achieved.
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2.7.3.1 Flood Based Attacks
Flood based attacks rely on consuming resources through the transmission of
large amounts traffic. The crudest form of this is simply sending enough UDP
packets (or indeed any protocol, UDP floods were the most common form of
attack observed during the research) that the target hosts bandwidth is completely
consumed, preventing other legitimate traffic from arriving. This is depicted in
figure 2.2, as can been seen, if the proportion of the total traffic represented by
DoS is sufficiently high then legitimate traffic is statistically much less likely to
be delivered [22]. In this first case, mitigation is relatively simple provided there
is sufficient bandwidth available further up stream. Blocking all traffic from the
attacker address destined for the victim would allow normal service levels to be
resumed.
Figure 2.2: A simple flood based DoS attack
This attack can be made harder to mitigate through the use of IP spoofing.
Spoofing is a colloquial term meaning forging. A host which spoofs its IP ad-
dresses, places another host’s IP address in the source IP field of its outgoing IP
packets, making them appear to have been sent by a different host. This is shown
in figure 2.3.
2.7.3.2 Multiplier Based Attacks
Multiplier attacks are an extension of flooding attacks whereby the attacker utilises
some method of increasing the load on the target via a secondary mechanism. An
example of this would be to send a broadcast ICMP echo request with a source
CHAPTER 2. AN OVERVIEW OF NETWORK MONITORING 19
Figure 2.3: A spoofed flood based DoS attack
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address spoofed to that of the target. All hosts receiving the echo request would (if
not disabled) reply to the target, generating a potentially large multiplier. With
a potentially modest amount of traffic sent by an attacker, huge volumes of traffic
may be generated, flooding the available bandwidth for the victim.
2.7.3.3 Service Vulnerability Attacks
Service vulnerability attacks make use of some potential multiplier within a service.
The classic example of this is the connection limit within most TCP based servers.
If a TCP based server allows 15 concurrent connections, and each connection has
a timeout of 3 seconds, then by sending 5 ‘synchronise’ TCP packets per second
at the target, and not responding past that packet, the connection limit will be
permanently reached [22]. Another example of this would be repeatedly calling a
processor intensive server side operation within a web server, effectively denying
processor time to legitimate users.
2.8 Motivation
Network and host vulnerabilities can provide a wide range of possibilities for crim-
inal individuals and groups. What they gain from this activity gives insight into
their likely patterns and targets.
The Honeynet project was n group of people sharing a common interest, which
originated in America, who used interactive network monitors to observe and track
illegitimate activity on the internet.
From their research they determined a set of motivational factors for which
they use the acronym ‘MEECES’ (a play on the FBI’s MICE) [4]. The acronym
is made up as follows:
• Money
Financial gain, whether through extortion or though more direct means such
as credit card details.
• Ego
Hacking remote machines can give a feeling of self-importance to the offend-
ers.
• Entertainment
Individuals sometimes gain satisfaction by causing embarrassment or turmoil
which others (often system administrators) have to attempt to recover.
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• Cause
Some groups have particular interests to advance. There have been attacks
directed toward corporations, governments and individuals.
• Entrance to social group
Most hacker communities are meritocracies and therefore hacking a difficult
target is a primary source of social capital.
• Status
Similar to the entrance to social group motivator, in that social capital is
gain through the demonstration of technical skill. While this set may be
somewhat limited, and only briefly discussed here, it is more than sufficient
for the purposes of this thesis.
While this set may be somewhat limited, and only briefly discussed here, it is
more than sufficient for the purposes of this thesis.
2.9 Mitigation Techniques
There are various means by which security threats may be detected and mitigated
against. Mitigation techniques are particularly successful where the behaviour of
malicious activities are clearly defined, consistent, and filterable. Where attacks
are polymorphic (in the case of worms), large scale or widely distributed mitigation
is more difficult. This thesis will progress to discussion on how data mining and
packet summaries may be used to inform packet filters, allowing useful dropping
of DoS traffic.
A primary concern with mitigating against malicious activity on the Internet
lies in the changing threat landscape. At the instantiation of this research, direct
worms were considered by many to be the biggest threat to the Internet as a whole.
Since this date the main sources of computer infections have moved toward indirect
threats such as mass mailing worms[27]. A botnet is a series of compromised
computers, with a mechanism for disseminating control between them. Many
botnets now exist, some comprising of millions of individual computers[28][29].
Some of these botnets are used for generating spam email. A description of the
Statcheldraht botnet tool is given in section 5.2.6.1.
2.9.1 Mitigation Grouped by Action
There are a multitude of mechanisms to mitigate against a multitude of threats,
here the techniques are split into ‘proactive’ and ‘reactive’.
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2.9.1.1 Proactive Mitigation
A good example of proactive DoS mitigation was highlighted in the national
press[30]. In this case a business website was targeted through DoS for extor-
tion purposes. The owner of the site refused to pay the demanded fee, and risked
further DoS attacks. Following a series of emails, the ransom was increased to
$50,000 (£28,000) Instead of paying the ransom, the owner of the site had his
traffic routed through a third party, specialising in the filtering of DoS traffic.
Spoofed based attacks can be actively prevented via ingress (sometimes called
egress) filtering[31]. This technique prevents traffic with a source address which
does not belong to a network from leaving that network. It requires an altruistic
stance from network operators, and is not universally deployed.
Another example of proactive mitigation occurred when the blaster worm tar-
geted Microsoft’s automatic updates server. The worm was captured and the
target noted. Microsoft removed the DNS record for windowsupdate.com on Au-
gust 15th, 2003 [32] preventing the worm from being able to resolve the intended
target to a reachable network address.
2.9.2 Reactive Mitigation
The traditional methods for dealing with DoS often involve tracing the sources
manually and administrators filtering the traffic out at source. This can be both
time consuming and costly, and therefore is only a solution for corporate scale
organisations.
Port blocking is a common method of preventing the spread of worm traffic,
though it is not always possible4. The network that was monitored in this research
has blocked inbound traffic on the following ports 135 (TCP), 137 (UDP), 138
(UDP), 139 (TCP), 445 (UDP and TCP), 593 (TCP), 1433 (TCP), 1434 (UDP)
and 27374 (TCP); all in response to vulnerabilities and potential vulnerabilities
in services which by default host on these ports 5. It is perhaps worth noting
that some of these ports were blocked pro-actively, an example being ports used
for Windows local file sharing, which then later prevented worm spread when
exploitation techniques were discovered on those services.
2.9.3 Mitigation Grouped by Location
Mitigation of certain activities requires the technique to be applied at a particular
position in the network. In this section some common mitigation locations are
4 Blocking port 80 on a commercial broadband network would in all probability be unpopular
amongst the customer base.
5For a full description of the monitored network, see Section 4.2.1
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detailed.
2.9.3.1 Single Host Mitigation
Mitigation of DoS attacks such as simple flooding can be impossible on-host.
Some protection from service vulnerability attacks can be possible through tuning
options in software. As an example, it is possible to reduce the default TCP
connection time-out, making the host less vulnerable to Syn floods.
Mitigation of worm traffic is normally achieved via a combination of host based
firewalls and anti-virus software. The most readily available host based firewalls
function by blocking unused ports, which is of limited use defending against attacks
against a service.
More sophisticated firewalls use techniques as described in section 2.9 to block
specific packets or connections.
2.9.3.2 Local Area Network Mitigation
Local networks were traditionally designed with a model of ‘crunchy on the outside,
chewy in the middle’ [33]. This is in reference to the fact most local area mitigation
is achieved at a gateway. While it may seem a fallacy to only protect a network
at a single point, the traditional view of network threats originates outside the
local network. It made sense historically to defend a network at the single point of
access, thereby protecting all machines while only having to secure at one point.
With the increase of laptop use and the increase of secondary attacks (attackers
entering networks via email and other conduits) this method of network defence
is becoming less effective.
2.9.3.3 Wide Area Network (WAN) Mitigation
Due to the larger data rates in WAN networks, many carriers consider themselves
simply carriers. This means they do not take responsibility for the data which is
present on their network. Consequently, their interests lie in mitigating potential
threats to the network itself. WAN mitigation is extremely limited.
2.10 Summary
This chapter has presented an overview of network monitoring, describing the
application of network monitoring to management and security. It has discussed
the various topologies and data rates which may be encountered, and discussed the
challenges associated with monitoring at high bandwidth sites. Various network
threats have been described alongside some of the common methods for detecting
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and mitigating against them. This chapter described how DoS attacks vary in
terms of target, vulnerability and mechanism.
The next chapter will present research into the problems associated with net-
work security monitoring, with a focus on the detection and mitigation of DoS.
Chapter 3
Related Work
In this section other related research in the field is examined, and the implications
are discussed. Security network monitoring has become a broad research field,
drawing from many related subjects. This chapter presents some of the research
most relevant to the thesis.
Much of the research can be allocated into one of four categories; denial of
service, feature detection, traffic capture / processing and mitigation.
This research was heavily involved with capturing traffic from a high data rate
network. There is a large body of research in this field, section 2.4 outlines some
of the major concepts.
3.1 Denial of Service
Denial of Service is one of the most common threats to network resources. Research
into Denial of Service became focussed in February 2000, when several high profile
targets such as Yahoo, Amazon, Buy, CNN and others were hit with traffic rates
of around 1GB/sec.
In [22] the authors classify DoS attack using several metrics. These classifica-
tions are shown in figure 3.1.
In 2006 Moore et al. investigated how common DoS activity was on the
Internet[34], this was achieved by monitoring IP space for responses from DoS
victims to spoofed DoS attacks. They show that the number of DoS attacks
with short durations is significant which corroborates the results presented in this
thesis; the number of attacks observed by Moore et al. was around 20-40 unique
victim IP addresses per hour. The research was limited to detecting spoofed DoS,
which becomes less common as ingress (sometimes egress) filtering is applied by
more network devices.
Flood based attacks are becoming more sophisticated; In [35] the authors de-
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Figure 3.1: DoS Classifications. Figure taken from [22]
scribe the use of intermediary, unwitting hosts to generate traffic directed at a
victim. This was achieved by spoofing the address of the victim, and sending
traffic to a ‘reflector’ host, which in turn replies to the victim’s IP. This can been
seen in 3.2.
Ingress filtering is a good counter measure to this type of attack, as spoofing
of the source addresses becomes much more limited. The authors note that there
may be the possibility of application level reflectors, but that these would be easier
to filter.
Wireless networks present a particular challenge due to their inherent broadcast
nature. In [36] the authors present a survey of DoS attacks on common public
WiFi locations such as airports, coffee shops and university campuses. They also
discuss some of the countermeasures available.
Denial of service is not limited to the Internet. There has been interest in the
potential damage caused by DoS attacks in sensor networks [37] and the potential
risks specific to them. More recently D. Raymond et al examined the attacks
specific to sensor networks, which target their susceptibility to denial of sleep style
attacks [38]. Sensor networks have limited resources, as with all systems, but unlike
many networks they are battery powered. This leads to unique vulnerabilities.
DoS provides differing challenges for differing areas of networking. Voice Over
IP (VOIP) has become a recent area of interest, and has its own vulnerabilities to
resource based DoS. VOIP uses the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP), and in [39]
the authors examine the potential attack vectors present in the protocol.
DoS is not limited to traditional computer networks. Attacks have been dis-
covered utilising vulnerabilities in mobile phone 3G technology. In [40] the author
describes an attack against the IMS (IP Multimedia Subsystem) framework, ef-
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Figure 3.2: Reflector Attacks. Figure taken from [35]
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fectively rendering networks using it alongside SIP (Session Initiation Protocol)
unusable, with relatively small volumes of input traffic.
Tools for generating DoS are many and varied. The tool used to generate DoS
traffic in this research was Stacheldraht, the authors of [41] compare several dis-
tributed DoS (or DDOS) generating tools. The tools examined were Trinoo, TFN
(Tribe Flood Network), Stacheldraht and Mstream. Each tool uses a hierarchical
topology, containing one or more attackers, a sent of handlers and potentially large
amounts of agents. The agents are responsible for generating the attack traffic.
Control of the handlers is achieved by a variety of methods, including telnet style
terminals through to blowfish [42] encrypted ICMP commands. A more thorough
examination of the DDOS tool used in this research can be found in [43].
3.2 Traffic Capture and Processing
There are many topologies at many scales present in the Internet today. The
desired data defines where in this set of topologies we should monitor traffic.
The differing locations for monitoring can be thought of as following one of two
branches, Core monitoring and Local monitoring. The main distinctions between
core and local branches are data rates and heterogeneity.
The problems of dealing with high data rates, especially when in relation to
IDS type applications have been at length by several sources; Holger Dreger et
al. describe trading off resource against detection rates, and the problems with
memory and processor management in differing applications [13]. They discuss
difficulties in several areas; firstly in dealing with the large number of packets per
second. Secondly, in coping with the traffic diversity found in high volume net-
works, and thirdly, attempting to maintain state for the monitored connections.
They name the primary difficulty for stateless IDS systems as the processor con-
sumption, and for stateful IDS systems, the memory management. They further
present several strategies for compromising detection rates to improve the ability
to cope with the rate of data.
These problems have been addressed in many different ways. Sometimes
through summarisation, sometimes, as with [44] it is done by splitting the traffic
intelligently to allow processing by current hardware. The key research in the
traffic splitting methodology is to maintain the consistency of the data between
‘slices’. This technology is similar to that of a load balancer, which are often
deployed in other environments.
H. Song et al. develop an FGPA based solution to signature detection, and ap-
ply the novel use of a bit-vector algorithm [45]. The signatures were taken from the
snort database [20], and therefore classification accuracy was commensurate with
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snort’s performance, more importantly though, signature detection was achieve at
rates of a gigabit per second; the authors suggest that through improved hardware
10Gbit/s could be achieved.
In [46] the authors use a variety of capture mechanisms (Endace cards, standard
NICs and FPGA based solutions) which allow for sampling or filtering of the
data. This approach has been used in applications such as IDS and probabilistic
IP traceback. Network cards produced by Endace and Napatech allow for high
data rate capture by mapping the network card memory directly into user space.
This technique has also been implemented by the open source driver modification
pf ring [47], where the community have achieved competitive packet capture rates
with commodity hardware.
3.3 Feature Selection and Intrusion Detection
In local monitoring, signature detection is used as an effective way of generating
very high classification rates, with low false positive results. The strength of
signature detection rests on the consistency and the accuracy of the definition of
the signature. Developing signatures can be a time consuming tasks, even for the
most skilled network analysts. This problem has been addressed by the authors
in[48] through the use of honeypot data and associated processing, to generate
accurate signatures without interaction from network administrators.
K. Wang et al. use the probabilities of specific payloads occurring for a given
application to derive an effective measure for detecting network abuse [49]. They
show impressive detection rates when applied to the DARPA IDS evaluation data
set.
The theme of feature reduction is taken up by the authors in [50] where vari-
ous statistical methods are used to determine which features should be used for
classification.
T. Lekie et al. have examined the use of metadata to detect misuse in an
encrypted environment [51]. This shows the possibility of using abstract data to
infer misuse in a network. It is primarily aimed at detection on a local network
level. Similarly, Seong Soo Kim et al. have described the use of wavelet ana-
lysis as a tool for the detection of denial of service activity from aggregate packet
headers [52]. This research again shows the potential for using non-traditional
algorithms, dependent on higher level information to detect misuse. Recently sig-
nificant research has made use of PCA (principle component analysis) to detect
anomalies in network traffic statistics. This has been applied to NetFlow statist-
ics to detect various types of anomalies including DoS, Flash crowds and worm
activity [53].
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In 2008 the authors of [54] discussed the issues with using traditional Netflow
for the detection of events such as DoS. They propose changes to the Netflow soft-
ware to allow the graceful degradation of sampling levels to mitigate the increasing
flow rates associated with such events.
S. Zanero et al. develop a system using clustering purely based on unsupervised
learning. This is unusual as it considers the payload [55]. Related to this research
is an overview of feature selection given by I. Guyion, where she discusses the
problems and solutions for handling data mining in fields where the number of
variables is very large [56].
Seong Soo Kim et al. present a system analysing egress traffic on a network.
They use develop several metrics which indicate the presence of DoS traffic. They
use destination IP address and port numbers as potential indicators, and discuss
the possibility of using other header variables [52].
A significant problem for network analysts is dealing with the potentially large
set of alarms generated by IDS systems deployed on the network. Some of these
alarms require action, others do not. The authors in [57] use data mining principles
applied to the alarms generated by IDS systems from previous investigations to
determine the appropriate actions needed for new ones. This was primarily used
to filter false positive results.
The authors in [58] use Kolmogorov complexity as a metric for DoS detection.
They conclude that metrics such as this are favourable to packet counting as they
are insensitive to background legitimate traffic.
G. Carl et al examine the effectiveness of several methods for DoS detection
in [59]. They evaluate common methods, but of most interest to us here, they look
at wavelet-based signal analysis. They conclude that the methods in isolation are
insufficient to completely address the issues.
3.4 Intrusion Prevention
Maintaining service during a DoS attack is still a challenge; many approach the
problem from the receiver end, filtering the traffic from legitimate requests. This
allows the host to sustain availability providing the bandwidth is available to
prevent excessive loss of legitimate traffic. In the case of [60], this is done via
identifying legitimate traffic via an http redirect and authentication code (formed
from the client IP) and then providing a QoS system implemented upstream of
the victim firewalls.
A method for determining the source of spoofed DoS traffic was suggested by
S. Savage et al [61]. In this system packets are statistically marked by routers.
Over time spoofed traffic can be traced back to the nearest router to the source.
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This is useful as it allows the offending traffic to be blocked closer to the source,
meaning less legitimate traffic would be affected.
Jelena Mirkovic et al. present a system to filter DoS at the source, via informing
router policies to drop DoS before it reaches the target host [62]. In [63] the authors
take a similar approach using a congestion policing feedback mechanism to flow
the filtering of traffic to access routers.
A example of a concept is employed by R. Mahajan [64] where routers may
detect offending traffic and limit its flow. The routers may inform upstream routers
of this, and those routers can then apply a similar rule, leading to the traffic being
dropped closer to source, and therefore with less impact on the target.
Some researchers have used overlay networking principles to help filter denial
of service attacks as with [65] and more recently [66]. In this research the authors
use an overlay to abstract the location of the victim, such that the attacker cannot
directly access it. Instead they must go through one of several entry points onto
the network. These entry points filter traffic by validating the incoming messages.
Due to the distributed nature of the access points onto the overlay, an effective
DoS attack would either need to locate the actual IP address of the victim, or
flood all access points onto the network, a potentially difficult undertaking.
Some researchers have advocated an approach using micro payment topologies
as a defence for DoS [67]. In this paper they describe the use of Client Brokers
and Server Brokers sitting between Attacker and Victim. These brokers pass a
micro payment transaction when the attacker wishes to connect with the victim,
effectively acting as an authentication proxy. The aim of this research was more
social engineering than software, in that the aim would be to give the owners a
vested interest in ensuring their machines are not taking part in DoS or other
unwanted activity by linking all use to a financial cost.
3.5 Summary
This chapter has presented a selection of research connected with network attacks,
the processing and capture of data at high bandwidths, the application of intrusion
detection to network traffic and the mitigation of attacks on a network. The
research related to traffic capture and processing covers the challenges associated
with memory and processor consumption along with potential ways to address
these problems such as FPGA based hardware and traffic coalescence.
The research presented in this thesis takes the concept of traffic summerisation,
and attempts to provide a mechanism for determining appropriate summerisation
metrics. The next chapter will describe the architecture deployed for the purposes
of this research, and discuss the various choices made in order to address the
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significant and varied problems encountered.
Chapter 4
An Infrastructure for Data
Capture
As discussed in Chapter 2, gathering data in high bandwidth environments is
a challenge. In order to provide statistics in a distributed, scalable manner an
architecture needed to be developed. This system would need to capture up to
12Gbit of data per second, across 6 remote points of presence. There would also
need to be a mechanism for grouping and analysing data from disparate sites.
In this section the hardware, software and system implementation used to
capture and process data is described. The system has been implemented within
the core of a National network and began operating in June 2005. This thesis
considers data in the period from September 2005 and April 2006.
4.1 System Design
4.1.1 Introduction
This work presents a novel approach to detecting significant network anomalies
using summarised data gathered from the header portions of packets. There are
two distinct difficulties when monitoring network traffic in the core. The first
relates to the hardware and system structure required to monitor at the high data
rates found in Wide Area Networks. This issue has been discussed in chapters 2
and 3, and there are many approaches to addressing the issue of high data rates.
The second concerns legal issues that may be encountered when monitoring
communications. This area of law is largely untested in the courts and is a complex
issue because of the international nature of the Internet. A discussion of these
issues can be found in [68]. The guidelines followed by the researcher for the
purposes of this work, suggested that privacy laws may preclude the use of the
data portion of packets,
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”The United Kingdom, however, took a more restrained view and ex-
amined whether the data user could actually link the information to a
specific person.”
[68]
4.1.2 Architecture Overview
Figure 4.1: System Topology
Figure 4.1 shows an abstract topological view of the system. It can be split
into two major components; gatherers and a central processor. The gatherers are
spread throughout the network, while the central processor sits at a single site.
The system data gathering is distributed to access the data in its natural path.
This is to avoid unnecessary network load in re-routing the data elsewhere.
The physical locations of these devices (as shown in Figure 4.2) were
• Bromley
• Brighton
• Colchester
• Northampton
• Oxford
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• Southampton
Figure 4.2: Geographic System Topology
To effectively monitor in a core network the traffic needs to be directed to the
interface where the capture will take place. In some cases this can be non-trivial,
especially when dealing with optical links1.
The capture of traffic for the purposes of this project was achieved via port
spanning mechanisms. Specific VLANs were spanned to a switch port which our
gatherers monitored. This allowed us some control over the level of traffic observed
in the early stages of the project. Once the gatherers had been fully established,
all non-management traffic VLANs were spanned.
1When splitting an optical line, there is an inherent loss of signal strength (this can be
compensated for by boosting the signal), which may, or may not be significant for a specific
path. Any optical splitting would also require a link to be unavailable for a time.
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The software on the gatherers’ pipes summarised statistical data back to the
central processor where it was stored in a database and classified. It was essential
that the summerisation be carried out on the local gatherers, as the load of trans-
ferring traffic, and the load of processing it, is an unrealistic overhead for both the
network, and the central processor.
4.1.3 Data Rate
The research described in this thesis involved monitoring at significant data rates,
incorporating a large numbers of hosts. At the inception of the project, monitoring
at 1Gbit rates was a technical challenge in itself. Therefore careful consideration
was necessary to determine what hardware and software was necessary to monitor
potentially up to 12Gbit/s distributed across a network2.
4.1.4 Data Availability and Permissibility
While it was technically possible to capture the entire contents of a packet within
the core a wide area network3, there were restrictions that needed to be taken into
account. A key consideration was the legality of capturing the data portion of the
packet. The data contained in the packets traversing the network are subject to
UK data protection and privacy laws. Although this is a relatively grey area as no
case law exists on the use of this data, advice given by the ISP involved was that
for third party monitoring, only the fields of a packet required by the network
to route it are legally acceptable for inspection by a third party. In this case,
the third party refers to a body who is not the user, the recipient or the network
operator. The information this describes would include all IP header information,
TCP header information, and for instance the SMTP ‘RCPT TO’ field, but not
the SMTP ‘Subject field’4. This is enough information to allow the various devices
involved in routing the messages to deliver them to the intended service on the
intended host. Due to obvious sensitivity in monitoring a commercial network,
it was perceived as necessary to store the minimum information possible, while
still meeting the requirements of the research. This minimum was taken to be the
headers at layers 2, 3 and 4 (OSI). The metrics chosen are covered in detail in
Chapter 5.
2There were 6 sites, each with two gigabit links, leading to a maximum rate of 12GBit/s
3Disk space may require this to be stored only for short periods of time.
4Interestingly it is currently considered acceptable to store the ‘Mail From’ field even though
technically it is not needed to deliver the mail.
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4.2 Hardware Design and Testing
In this section we look at the requirements and solutions found in dealing with
the potentially high data rates, and their effect on the hardware used. This re-
search was based on a relationship with a major UK ISP, and a modest budget
(considering the scale of the task). With this in mind the architecture was based
on standard server PC hardware.
4.2.1 Network Context
There were 6 points of presence (PoPs) within the monitored network, with data
rates ranging from 500Mbits/s per second to 1.4Gbits/s with around 20-30 TB,
and 100,000,000 connection attempts being processed per site daily. When the
project began these data rates were considerably lower; some sites had peak rates
of 200Mbit/s. It is a testament to the changing landscape of network monitoring
that the data rates have increase by as much as a factor of 3 within a 2 year period.
The network monitored was a commercial home broadband network with
around 30,000 hosts per site visible on the network at any one time. Under DoS
conditions the number of concurrent5 separate IP addresses reached hundreds of
thousands.
4.2.2 Data Rates
Monitoring at rates of a Gigabit per second can require specialised hardware, as
with many of the systems described in section 3.2. Given that the focus of this
research was to use lightweight summarisation, the hardware requirements needed
to be examined. The main problems for hardware involves bus transfer rates
and interrupt coalescence. The software problems lay in handling memory and
processing requirements in a feasible way. Data rates of one Gigabit per second
equate to approximately 160,000 packets per second, assuming an average size
of 750 bytes6. Consequently, any inline per packet processing must be carefully
considered. One of the first activities undertaken was to determine the capture
rates that could be achieved with off-the-shelf server PC architectures. Some
simple testing was done in the laboratory using a number of 3GHz Intel Xeon
servers with Intel Pro 1000 network interface cards. To discover what packet rates
the system would be capable of dealing with, a machine was set up to generate
5In this context concurrent is taken to mean within the current summary window, which is
usually 2 to 3 seconds.
6A poor assumption given the operation of TCP, however, for the purposes of ‘ball park’
calculations, not unreasonable.
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UDP packets of a fixed size while another machine ran the libpcap based pro-
gram TCPDump to capture the packets. TCPDump had been compiled with the
PCAP FRAMES = max option to give it the maximum buffer available in the
kernel, this had been found to give the optimal results in previous tests. The IP
packet sizes ranged from 1500 Bytes (1472 Bytes of UDP Data, with 28 Bytes
between UDP and IP headers, this does not include the Ethernet Header) to 2507
Bytes, and the number sent and received were counted.
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Figure 4.3: Data rate against packet size
As can be seen from figure 4.3, at higher packet sizes the send and receive rates
are close to the one Gigabit mark, and are equal. When the packet sizes reduce,
and therefore the number of packets increases, the sending and receiving machines
struggle to maintain the high traffic rates (Figures 4.3 and 4.4).
Further tests were done using equal numbers of smaller and larger packets,
averaging to defined rates. These tests showed favourable results when compared
with the single packet size ones, a brief table of these is shown below.
The issues on the network card are clearly caused by packet rate, rather than
data rate. Each time a packet enters the network card an interrupt message is
generated, requiring the processor to spend time copying the packet from memory
7Smaller packet sizes were produced, but lead to much lower data transmission rates (I.e.,
the machine generating the traffic could not produce packets quickly enough) and therefore were
excluded from further analysis.
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Figure 4.4: Packet count against packet size
Table 4.1: Data Transmit and Receive Rate
Average Packet Size Sent Received Send Rate Receive Rate
850 1460395 1460395 0.993069 0.993069
600 1678911 1678855 0.805877 0.80585
450 1797681 1782958 0.647165 0.641865
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on the card into kernel space. In situations where there are many packets ar-
riving per second, the processor can enter a state sometimes known as interrupt
thrashing.
Figure 4.5: Interrupt Thrashing
Figure 4.5 shows the concept of interrupt thrashing pictorially. In the first
situation the packet inter arrival time is sufficiently great that the processor has
time to make the memory copy before the next packet arrives. In the second
scenario the packet inter arrival time is too small to make this copy, and therefore
the processor does not complete the handling of the first packet before the second
arrives. If this packet rate continues the processor never has the time to recover
and process any packets at all.
It is possible to mitigate this type of scenario. Many network card drivers
utilise coalescence of packets on the network card when packet rates pass certain
thresholds. This allows single interrupts to be generated for several packets, giving
a single copy operation. For the purposes of this research, the latency between a
packet’s arrival and processing was not as critical as in most applications. Modify-
ing the RxInt parameter provided as part of the Intel e1000g driver family allowed
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for the tuning of the interrupts to reduce the context switches required to move
the packets from the network card into user space.
Since the release of the 2.4.20 Linux kernel, the network subsystem now uses
NAPI - a system where data is handled per device, rather than per packet.
Through the use of this and the open source pf ring library it is now possible
to use direct NIC memory mapping to bypass kernel intervention. These recent
developments allow for considerable performance increases over the technology
available at the time this research was instigated.
There is a clear plateau region in both Figures 4.3 and 4.4. This appears to
be due to automatic interrupt coalescence present in the card driver. In the live
implementation of this system, the values for interrupt coalescence were adjusted
to match the live data rate. As latency was not an issue here, the values in the
live system for the maximum wait time, and buffer values were matched to the
data rates.
It is important to match the packet inter arrival time, and the size of the
network interface card buffer so as to avoid unnecessary packet loss.
It was believed from the above simple experimentation that standard PC hard-
ware would be capable of providing the processing that was needed, and therefore
a more expensive solution would be unnecessary.
The system implemented was based on 6 Dual 3GHz Xeon servers with 1GB of
RAM 300GB IDE hard drives, with 1 dual 3GHz Xeon server with 6GB of RAM
and dual raid 0 configured 360GB SCSI hard drive. Each machine had two one
gigabit streams spanned from an ISP router, giving a potential two gigabits per
second data rate per machine.
These machines generated statistical summaries of all the header information
collected within each summary period, and transmitted these to a centralised
database where it was classified and stored.
4.3 Software Design
In this final section of the design analysis, the software capture implementation is
described, including the issues faced by it and the solutions found. The research
made use of the Clementine data mining package (now IBM SPSS Modeller) as
both a tool for investigating data relationships and as a run-time classifier. For
more information about Clementine, see [69].
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4.3.1 Proprietary Software
As previously mentioned, discussions with the ISP and the potential legal issues
associated with data portions of packets preclude the use of standard signature
based packet analysis to signature detect misuse. Instead summaries are built
using meta-data from the packets and misuse is detected by variances in these
summaries. This is an anomaly based approach, which has the advantages and
limitations described in section 2.6.1.2.
The use of summaries is advantageous for several reasons. Firstly, the per
packet processing involved in generating summaries is trivial when compared with
that of pattern matching techniques. Secondly, by definition, large scale network
events will affect the network at large, and should therefore result in statistical
variances in the summary data, provided the summaries are of appropriate in-
formation.
The architecture chosen relies on fast packet statistic gathering with a pseudo
real time summary generator. These two processes run independently, allowing
the program to cope with high load by the manual adjustment of the size of the
summaries gathered. The process works as follows:
The gatherer has a set of counters, which are incremented in relation to incom-
ing packet variables. This is a memory intensive, processor trivial task, allowing
the system to cope with significant numbers of packets in real time. The summary
generator uses the counters from the gatherer to create the statistical measures
needed to detect misuse. The design, while heavy on memory usage, has statically
assigned volumes. This prevents the system from becoming bound by available
memory.
Taking port usage as an example of this; in memory there are two arrays of
216 elements each, corresponding to source and destination port numbers. When
a TCP or UDP packet is received, the array elements corresponding to the source
and destination ports are incremented. Periodically the array is processed into a
summarised form, and reset.
This array counter approach was applied to packet length, IP ID, IP Flags, IP
TTL, IP Protocol, IP addresses, transport layer port amongst others.
It is worth mentioning that while this same concept is applied to the IP ad-
dresses, only the 24 least significant bits are monitored due to the memory de-
mands of a 232 element array. This could potentially lead to a loss in accuracy, as
two separate IP addresses may appear identical within a summary period. How-
ever, this will rarely occur, having a negligible effect on the summary statistics.
This may be calculated as
Let pA be the probability that at least one incorrect IP address collision
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occurs
Let pB be the probability that a collision would not occur for a 2 given IP
addresses
Let nIP be the number of available IP addresses in our reduction
Let nS be the number of packets observed
pB = 1− 1
nIP
Therefore the probability of having at least one collision for nS observations is
pA = (1− pB)nS
Substituting in the appropriate values gives
0.5 =
(
1−
(
1
224
)nS)
Which resolves to around 11 million packets. That is to say, if we had 11 million
packets with random addresses passing through the system, there is a 50% chance
of having at least one collision.
The primary alternative of matching IP addresses without using indexes leads
to, for a binary search style algorithm, at most a log2 n [70] relationship between
the number of stored IP addresses and the number of necessary comparison oper-
ations, assuming a sorted list.
It is conceivable that a partial hashing algorithm could be to trade off memory
for processing efficiency. However, in our case the memory was not a significant
limit, and therefore the minimum processing solution was the most appropriate.
As the arrays used by the gatherer are of fixed size, the increase in the pro-
cessing required by the summary generator is not noticeable, increasing by negli-
gible amounts compared with the increase in packets processed. This means that
with an increase in data rate the summary generator, which may be processor
bound, can include more packets in a summary to compensate.
A side effect of this method, is that a summary period is not a fixed amount
of time, but rather a fixed number of packets. The means that during periods of
high data rate, the summary periods may be shorter. It also means, that during
a period of complete outage, a summary may not be generated.
The packet capture mechanism itself is achieved via the libpcap library with
some minor modifications; the software is compiled with the PCAP FRAMES
option set to its maximum size. The code itself is written in C, compiled under
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GCC with compiler optimisations applied, including processor specific options.
For a full listing of the gatherer C code, please see appendix B.
Figure 4.6: Software Block Diagram
The software pipes data from the summary generator to a remote database
as shown in 4.6. The main block on the left shows the 3 tasks of the gatherer
processes running as part of the gatherer machine software, a pointer to the data
is the passed to the summary generator, before the summaries are transmitted.
The piping of data to the remote database is achieved via a TCP socket connection.
From experience the major issues when dealing with high data rates are en-
countered on the capture interface, and may be overcome either through the use
of specialist cards or through tuning options in the loadable driver modules.
Experience also tells us that while architectures based in on BSD perform
quicker8 than those based on older 2.4.x Linux kernels, the support for Linux
solutions is stronger in many packages. Linux machines were therefore used for
the gatherer machines.
The final part of the software is a centralised data processor. As each summary
on each site is generated it is sent via a TCP socket9 to a central machine. This
machine uses the Clementine run-time engine to classify the data before storing
it in a database. The run-time engine provided by the Clementine package is, in
effect, a compiled neural classifier, which may be run on specified data files. This
run-time engine is retrained periodically from new data to ensure that it is match-
ing accurately, even in a constantly changing environment. Human interaction is
necessary in the re-training process.
The server software at the central processor is written in Perl, which is per-
haps a less than optimal performance choice. Perl is however extremely strong
at text based processing, and as the data rates seen at the central processor are
8The memory copy from Kernel space to user space is more efficient
9On an independent management interface
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comparably low, Perl’s performance inefficiencies were not a considered to be a
problem. The requirement to use Windows over a Unix solution comes from the
use of the Clementine data mining package.
4.3.2 A Novel Signature Detector
In this section we describe a novel signature detection mechanism developed to
allow certain payloads to be identified without recording the actual payload itself.
Signature detection is a common method for detecting security threats. It is
employed by Intrusion Detection Systems to identify known threats with fixed
payloads. While this is an effective approach it becomes difficult to utilise within
the core of an ISP network for the reasons presented previously, namely hardware
limitations and legal restraints.
While the focus of this work has been to use light weight statistical summaries
as inputs to a detection system, some signature detection is beneficial for the
accurate classification of individual packets and for the filtering of known attacks.
To circumvent the legal restrictions in the UK preventing examination of the
data portion of the packet, the checksum field in the header is used to determine
whether the contents of the packet match a given signature.
4.3.2.1 Operation
The TCP checksum field is included in the protocol to allow for detection of
transmission or reception errors in the data. The checksum field is given by taking
the 16-bit one’s complement of the one’s complement sum of the 16-bit words in
the TCP header and TCP data. As the checksum field is part of the data that is
used to calculate the checksum, it is set to zero at the point of calculation. In the
case of an uneven number of octets, the information is padded with zeros.
In this implementation, the checksum is calculated using header information
from the packet which is being tested, but using the data portion of the signature
that is to be matched for, which has been stored on the gatherer. Should this
checksum match the original checksum of the incoming packet, it would indicate
with a high probability that the data portion matches the signature.
For example, given a payload for a Code-red IIS overflow packet [71], we can
filter all packets of appropriate size (from the IP length field in the header) and
communicating on port 80 (from the port fields in the TCP header), and recal-
culate the TCP checksum. If the original checksum matches the new one, there
is a high probability the packet is an overflow attempt. This is not possible for
all worms. An infamous worm named ‘Slammer’ targeted MS SQL servers using
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Figure 4.7: Signature Detection Mechanism
a UDP 420 byte payload to perform a buffer overflow [72]. The lack of reliable
checksum would prevent this technique from detecting the attack.
To verify this technique, packets with known payloads were generated (sequen-
tial numbering as data fields). Their payloads had been entered into the detector,
and were then detected with one hundred percent accuracy. For the technique to
be more fully tested the number of false positives should be observed on an op-
erational network. Unfortunately the only way to verify whether or not a packet
has been correctly identified would mean inspecting the packet contents, break-
ing UK data privacy laws. It is however possible to approach the problem from a
mathematical point of view by making some approximations about network traffic.
Assuming that the packets have an even distribution across ports and packet
sizes, and that the checksum is evenly random in its mapping10, the probability of
a packet incorrectly matching the signature packet can simply be represented by
pFailure =
1
MSS
× 1
PortV ariance
× 1
ChecksumEntropy
In the case of a TCP packet running over Ethernet this comes to approximately
1.5 × 10−13, or one in six and a half million million packets. On the operational
network monitored, depending on the time of day, there are around three hun-
dred thousand packets per second seen on average. It would therefore observe
approximately one incorrect labelling per year across all sites.
10All are favourable assumptions
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The system has however not been used extensively in the live system, as there
is a significant performance degradation when a large number of signatures are
added. This could be somewhat alleviated by the calculation of the checksum on
the interface card.
4.3.2.2 Limitations
For this mechanism to be effective, the exact packet signature must be available.
This is a problem, particularly for TCP. It is not always possible to guarantee
particular a packet will be present. Many TCP algorithms will alter which parts
of payloads are present in which packets 11, based on a range of factors, such as
packet loss and round trip times.
This indeterminacy will mean that either several definitions would need to
be created for each potential TCP payload, or there will be a probabilistic miss-
classification of data. In some cases (where the payload we are interested in is the
first after the TCP handshake for instance) the data will be unaffected by TCP
algorithms.
The behaviour of the TCP algorithms are consistent for given network condi-
tions and the number of potential signatures is bounded, and in most cases very
small.
Checksum reliability is, for uniform data, proportional to 1/216, however on
non-uniform data the reliability drops off very rapidly. Some estimates for the
collision rate are as high as 1/210 [73].
4.4 Summary
Coping with the high volume of data present in core networks is a significant
research challenge. In this chapter a discussion of the architecture designed has
been presented. Data rates present on the monitored network have been discussed
and the legality of using this data described.
A novel signature detection mechanism has been presented which identifies
known payloads in the absence of the payload data.
The architecture based on distributed summary gatherers with a central pro-
cessor has been shown to be effective at dealing with high data rates. The signature
detection mechanism has been shown to be capable of detecting payloads in the
absence of payload data. This mechanism was not widely deployed in the system
developed because of performance concerns.
11These algorithms include Nagle which will potentially coalesce multiple messages and MTU
path discovery which may limit the size of the payload
CHAPTER 4. AN INFRASTRUCTURE FOR DATA CAPTURE 48
The next chapter will introduce the concept of data mining, the various tools
it encompasses and its application to this research.
Chapter 5
Applying Data Mining
This research was not intended to further the field of data mining itself. Instead
existing data mining techniques were applied to the field of network monitoring.
This thesis presents a novel combination of the use of traffic summaries at high
data rates, with data mining techniques for feature selection and classification.
This chapter introduces the concept of data mining, the tools used to perform
data mining functions and the simulations used to determine appropriate features
for the live system. Data mining was chosen as an appropriate set of tools for this
research because the relationship between the measurements taken, and the classi-
fication of those measurements as representative of illegitimacy, is a complex one.
Data mining tools are explicitly focussed on exploring complex data relationships
making them an obvious choice for this type of analysis.
5.1 Detection Theory
The system described in this research was primarily anomaly based. The concept
behind anomaly detection is that in some variable space, illegitimate traffic would
be separate from legitimate traffic. However, it is not possible to gather all data
associated with any traffic, for instance it is most likely to be impossible to know
the sender’s intention when creating traffic. With this in mind, an important
part of the research was to investigate to what degree it is possible to separate
legitimate and illegitimate traffic with the practically available variable space.
Figure 5.1 shows this concept, with the box representing multi-dimensional
variable space, the triangle shape representing legitimate traffic, the square shape
representing anomalous but legitimate traffic, and the circle shape representing
illegitimate traffic.
It is worth noting at this point that while it may be that illegitimate traffic
may be separate in a single axis, it is perhaps more likely that illegitimate traffic
49
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Figure 5.1: Anomaly Variable Space
will be separated from legitimate traffic through a more complex multidimensional
function.
5.2 Data Mining Tools
Many differing techniques were used to analyse the data from both test and live
networks. We describe their functionality and purpose here.
5.2.1 Clustering / Self Organising Maps
Clustering and Self Organising Map (SOM) algorithms are a subset of artificial
neural networks. A SOM organises its output in a grid, the goal of the training is
to associate similar areas of the grid with similar input patterns. The learning in a
SOM is unsupervised learning meaning there is no defined output for the network
to match.
This kind of algorithm is often used to find ‘natural’ groups in data. This type
of algorithm is particularly useful for finding relationships between data. There are
three separate algorithms used in this research for producing SOMs and Clusters.
• Kohoenen
The Kohonen network is a SOM algorithm named after its inventor, Teuvo
Kohonen. It simply arranges similar input patterns on similar areas of a
grid [74].
• K-means Clustering
This algorithm works through iterative refinement, and requires that the
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number of desired output clusters is defined. This can be useful if the inten-
tion is to find a particular number of subsets within a data set [74].
• Two-step
This algorithm is a SPSS (Clementine) proprietary one, which first determ-
ines the number of ‘natural’ clusters and then assigns data points to them.
This can be informative as it does not require prior knowledge of the group-
ing present in the data.
5.2.2 Artificial Neural Networks (ANN)
Artificial neural networks are commonly called simply neural networks (which
traditionally referred to biological neurons). These networks are a series of neurons
interconnected via mathematical functions with weightings associated with them.
Most neural networks require training of some type; this is supervised learning.
The goal of the training algorithm is to minimise the error in the output neurons
given a corresponding set of inputs. Over time the weights applied to the various
paths in the network are adjusted to minimise the output error. Some networks
also adjust their topology including any number of layers comprising of any number
neurons. There are in practice various topologies which are more effective than
others [75], and therefore the search space is considerably smaller than it can
appear.
Neural networks are often used to model complex relationships in an abstract
manner where a formal representation is difficult.
5.2.3 Artificial Neural Networks & Weighting
Varying forms of machine learning were used to directly classify data, such things
as decision trees, sequential models and logistical models [76] were all experimented
with, if only briefly. ANNs on the whole provided the most accurate classification,
therefore in order to discover which metrics were important, it was necessary to
determine how the networks were reaching their classification.
The Clementine software package used for much of the data mining activity
includes the functionality to extract the weights from an ANN and thereby cal-
culate the relative importance of the inputs. This is useful as it allows us to see
which variables are contributing most significantly to classifications.
As described above, neural networks have topologies made up of nodes, con-
nected by a mathematical function. The network adjusts weights on these nodes
to minimise the error on the output nodes for a given set of expected output data.
Once trained, these weightings may be extracted for each input node by examining
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the influence the input nodes have across the entire topology. This gives a nu-
merical representation of the input importance which is invaluable to the research
performed.
5.2.4 Graphing and Displaying the Data
Perhaps an overlooked method of mining data is to display it in various formats.
One of the simplest methods for displaying data within this research was a two
dimensional time axis graph.
Figure 5.2: Monthly Data Rate
In Figure 5.2 a complex time of day based variation in the variable plotted can
be seen (here one month’s data is plotted onto a single 24 hour x-axis). This type
of visual exploration of data can aid in the general understanding of how the data
interrelate. This type of analysis is essential in the early stages of exploring a data
set, as it provides the operator the ability to visualise large amounts of data in a
simple manner.
5.2.5 Data Preparation
This section describes the principles with which data was prepared for use in ANN
training. It is included here as it greatly influences the quality of the resultant
model.
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“In computing this idea is expressed in the familiar acronym GIGO-
Garbage in, Garbage Out” [76]p45
All data sets for training and testing were separate. This helps to prevent the
machine learning techniques from latching on to specific, insignificant items in the
test data, and preserves a more general model. Handling of data sets for neural
training is notoriously difficult. The goal of the network is simply to minimise the
error in the output, not to do this is a way that the operator considers sensible. If,
for example, the classification could be made through the use of an ID field (i.e.,
all of classification X falls between ID Y and Z), then this is likely to be the input
nodes most heavily used by the network, regardless of it’s applicability to other
data sets. By maintaining a separate training and testing data set, this type of
scenario may be partially mitigated against.
All data were balanced in terms of number of examples of desired outcomes. If
we imagine a situation where the data provided to the machine learning algorithm
had a 99% positive output field, the machine learning algorithm can simply give
a positive result for every prediction and gain a 99% prediction accuracy without
actually finding any other relationships in the matrix.
For simplicity, all data used for training was kept in a matrix form schema.
This means that for each measurement there are a set of variables, which can be
expressed as a table. This data was stored in a MYSQL database present on the
central processing machine.
5.2.6 Laboratory Emulation
As previously discussed, one of the research difficulties with classifying misuse on
a network where the data field is not available, is determining the accuracy of the
results.
As the detection mechanism eventually to be implemented would be working on
a live network, with no control over the traffic, nor any method to independently
label some classes of traffic, it was necessary to create an artificial environment to
demonstrate the principles of the detection mechanisms, and the types of variation
to later be observed in a live environment. This environment would allow for the
simulation of DDoS attacks on a controlled network, where all DDoS traffic could
be appropriately labelled and used for accurate training data.
5.2.6.1 Traffic Emulation
The purpose of the laboratory emulation activity was to provide a controlled
environment with which to generate specific data to measure. The emulation was
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built using sampled Netflow [11] measurements taken from a national network.
The experiment emulated port numbers, size, IP address ranges and protocols
found in the Netflow data. The traffic simulation was crude in the sense that
application layer flows were not emulated. This was seen to be unnecessary as the
system being proposed would not be performing flow reconstruction, and would
therefore not be aware of interaction at that level of detail. The accuracy of the
emulation directly impacts the validity of the modelling performed on the resulting
data.
A proprietary network traffic emulator was used to create the appropriate
traffic types and rates. The mix of traffic is shown in table 5.1, the network
carrying 84% TCP traffic.
Table 5.1: Emulation Traffic Mix
Protocol Percentage Port Size
TCP 25 Random 40
TCP 40 Random MSS
TCP 11 80 40
TCP 11 80 MSS
UDP 12 Random 20-300
ICMP 1 N/A 64
As networks vary significantly in traffic profile, it was difficult to acquire an
accurate picture of the commercial network without recording traffic from it, and
therefore there were several areas in which the emulation was inaccurate. The
exact operation of TCP was only loosely modelled (in terms of flags and options).
Average packet sizes were modelled, but distributions were unknown, and therefore
estimated 1.
The emulation assumes that TCP mainly operates in bulk mode, which holds
given that statistically bulk connections handle more packets than interactive
mode ones.
The packet headers were captured and entered into the Clementine data mining
package. This data was analysed using a mixture of prior knowledge and Clem-
entine’s built in machine learning templates to derive some relationships between
the packets.
Denial of service attack tools were then run with increasing traffic rates over
the network in addition to the existing traffic. An infamous DoS tool at the time of
the emulation was named ‘Stacheldraht’ [43]. The normal topology (represented
1This only applied to the UDP traffic, which was modelled as being normally distributed
between 20 and 300 bytes in length.
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in an abstract topological manner) is shown in Figure 5.3. The tool works in
a 3-tier manner. A master-server is set-up, and several zombie2 machines are
controlled from it. The attacker logs into, and gives commands, to the master-
server via an encrypted telnet like tool. The master-server communicates with
the zombies through ICMP echo (ping) replies, which are not usually blocked by
simple firewalls.
Figure 5.3: Stacheldraht Topology
The tool was configured with one controller, one handler and one zombie. The
headers were then analysed to find relationships which would identify the DoS
traffic and not the background.
It is clear that this experiment makes several key simplifications. Firstly the
Netflow data is not a complete description of the normal network traffic. Whilst
2This term refers to a machine which has been previously compromised by an attacker and
often, as in this case, forms part of a botnet.
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clearly not representative of a live network, if the only data being analysed is that
which has been given by the Netflow source or its derivatives, valid conclusions
may still be reached.
Secondly, the traffic generation in this experiment is unaffected by the denial
of service traffic added to the network. This is of course, a gross and incorrect
assumption. However, for the purposes of initial investigation, given that the
effects on a live network were to be later studied, it was taken to be acceptable.
ICMP, UDP and TCP attacks were added at one, ten, one hundred, one thou-
sand and ten thousand packets per second. Stacheldraht allows for configuration
of packet sizes (in the case of ICMP and UDP attacks), port ranges (in the case of
SYN and UDP attacks), destination address(s), attack duration and a toggle for
spoofing. Attacks in various forms were generated for each class, and the testing
data used on the network. The traffic generators were run at a constant 40Mbits/s
and had varying amounts of denial of service traffic added to them (see Table 5.2).
This set of DoS attacks is clearly limited in scope. No emulation of reflector
attacks, or more advanced CPU or memory resource based attacks was attempted,
nor were other DoS tools used at this point in the research. While this limits the
applicability of the resultant data to a live national environment, the range and
scope of potential attacks was considered too large to be evaluated exhaustively.
The attacks which were selected give a strong subset of the possible attacks present
on a live network, and were considered to be enough to provide solid data on which
to evaluate attack features.
Table 5.2: Laboratory DoS Traffic Mixes
Experiment Number Background Traffic DoS Type DoS Traffic
Rate (MBit/s) Rate (MBit/s)
1 40 UDP 0.0056
2 40 UDP 0.056
3 40 UDP 0.56
4 40 UDP 5.6
5 40 UDP 56
6 40 TCP 0.0056
7 40 TCP 0.056
8 40 TCP 0.56
9 40 TCP 5.6
10 40 TCP 56
11 40 ICMP 0.0056
12 40 ICMP 0.056
13 40 ICMP 0.56
14 40 ICMP 5.6
15 40 ICMP 56
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The resulting packet traces were converted into records with entries for header
variables. The variable names can be found in Table 5.3.
These fields were used as inputs for ANN based investigations into the data.
Table 5.3: Packet Fields
Field Name
Time of packet Capture
IP Header Length
IP Type of Service
IP Total Length
IP Identification
IP Flags
IP Fragment offset
IP Time to live
IP Protocol
IP Source IP
IP Destination IP
UDP Source Port
UDP Destination Port
UDP length
TCP Source Port
TCP Destination Port
TCP Sequence Number
TCP Acknowledgement Number
TCP Header length
TCP Type
TCP Window Size
TCP Urgent Pointer
ICMP Type
ICMP Code
ICMP Checksum
The initial investigation of the laboratory data was achieved via Self organising
maps.
Figure 5.4 and figure 5.5 show Kohonen networks of the data, with the differing
shapes representing differing DoS states. Encouragingly there is some ‘natural’
differentiation between DoS and non-DoS traffic, this is particularly evident in
ICMP and UDP based DoS (figure 5.5). The term natural is used here as this is
unsupervised learning, and therefore any resultant patterning is purely a product
of the algorithm. For these figures, and many others presented in this section,
random noise was applied to the X-axis to provide some separate for the data
points. As the clusters are discrete, this does not affect the reading of the charts.
Figure 5.6 shows another SOM algorithm output, in this case K-Means clus-
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Figure 5.4: Laboratory DoS - Kohonen Network
Figure 5.5: Laboratory DoS - Kohonen Network (2)
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tering. The cluster is represented on the X-axis with the distance from the cluster
centroid (mean) on the Y-axis. This algorithm requires the number of clusters
as an input and was given 4, one for UDP, TCP, ICMP and normal traffic which
were known to be present in the data. Cluster 3 contains exclusively UDP traffic,
Cluster 4 contains ICMP traffic close to its centroid and Normal traffic at distance.
The TCP DoS traffic is mainly present at the outer edges of Cluster 2.
Figure 5.6: Laboratory DoS - K-Means Cluster
The K-means algorithm was then fed only clean traffic samples, and configured
to form a single cluster. All records were then fed into the algorithm and the
distances from the cluster calculated, this can be seen in Figure 5.7. Of note is
that all DoS traffic appears on the outskirts of the cluster, again strengthening
our confidence that the header values, and meta data derived from them could be
a strong indicator of DoS.
We created summaries in various forms of header fields, and used these as
inputs to a neural training algorithm.
Figure 5.8 shows the amount of bandwidth taken up by attack traffic, against
the accuracy of labelling. ICMP DoS proved to be the easiest to detect, possibly
due to the small amount of ICMP traffic naturally in the data. This separation
of the ICMP traffic was also visible in the SoM outputs, where the ICMP based
DoS traffic was generally speaking well separated from the background samples.
The network weightings were then analysed to determine the more useful met-
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Figure 5.7: Laboratory DoS - K-Means Single Cluster
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Figure 5.8: Detection Rates
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rics. Table 5.4 shows the relative importance of the most significant input values
to the ANN. These values are calculated by the weightings analysis described in
section 5.2.3.
Table 5.4: DoS Relative Importance of Detection Metrics
Field Name Relative Importance
Packet Sizes 0.3093
Transport Layer Flags 0.2739
Protocol Counts 0.1822
Transport Layer Ports 0.1235
IP Address Counts 0.1109
Data Rate 0.0002
Development of statistical triggers allowed the summaries containing DoS traffic
to be detected at only 0.1% of the total traffic rate, and detected with no false
positives at 1%.
The primary conclusion from this emulation was that there was enough vari-
ance in simple network measurements with increasing volumes of denial of service
traffic to effectively detect its presence under simplified conditions. The emulation
also pointed out which fields may be useful in the analysis of the live data which
was to follow it.
It is worth noting that while TTL was ignored in this simulation 3 the denial
of service attacks were identifiable from it successfully. The use of the TTL field
is discussed in section 8.1.2.
5.2.7 Worm Traffic
To this point, there has been very little discussion of direct worm network threats.
Direct worm activity can have an extremely detrimental effect on a network’s
performance. In January 2003 networks were flooded with traffic attributed to a
worm exploiting vulnerabilities in Microsoft’s SQL Server database, the worm was
given the name Slammer [72].
Shortly after this in the summer of the same year a worm exploiting the DCOM
RPC service on Windows 2000 and Windows XP hit many users. This worm was
commonly referred to as blaster.
After a brief respite a worm named Sasser hit in May 2004, abusing vulnerab-
ilities in the Local Security Authority Subsystem Service (LSSAS, hence ‘Sasser’).
3No network data for this was available at the time; therefore any analysis would have been
purely speculative.
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In August 2004 Microsoft released their Service pack 2 for windows XP. Cru-
cially this was the first service pack to enable the firewall by default on the home
user’s machines. Our system was placed in a core network for the first time in
June 2005.
Since this date there has been a distinct lack of direct worms using new vulner-
abilities or services targeting these systems, in fact, Trojans were out numbering
worms and viruses five to one in June of 2006 [27]. A worm named ‘Zotob’ was
released targeting Windows 2000 machines, but as it functioned over port 445
(a port blocked on the monitored network) it did not appear significantly in the
traffic monitored. The data presented in this research does not include anything
more recent than April 2006, within this period of time, no significant direct worm
threats were observed.
Instead many worms now use secondary communication methods such as email,
peer-to-peer software, browser vulnerabilities and messenger clients.
This change in worm profiles has a significant impact on the network effect;
events which are inherently dependent on users have significantly slower propaga-
tion times, lack synchronisation and generally have lower numbers of compromised
hosts. Therefore they do not constitute as much of a threat to the network itself
as direct worms.
During course of this research, no major worms were released to affect the
network. Therefore to investigate their effects, test bed simulation was the only
option.
From [77] we can discuss the general characteristics of large scale worm traffic.
In this analysis the authors describe the target discovery as falling into one of
three categories; Scanning, Target List and Passive. Of interest to this project are
the scanning and target list variants, as they are most likely to cause significant
disruption to a network.
In the case that a worm actively scans for potential targets, we should expect to
see a significant increase in the number of packets of a particular size, potentially
accompanied by an increase in the number of packets on a particular transport
layer port.
Once the worm has compromised its target it may spread in one of two ways;
as part of the exploit or through a secondary channel, such as FTP. At this stage
we would expect to see an increase in the number of packets on a particular
application layer port associated with the worm transfer.
To give some validation to these predictions traffic generators were set up,
as with the DoS investigation, to generate a roughly representative background
traffic sample. A machine was set up to reply 4 on all transport layer ports for the
4The machine replies with a SYN/ACK, and does not emulate services further
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network 192.0.0.1/8 5. A machine was infected with the ‘sasser’ worm and allowed
to generate traffic on the network, which was recorded by a fourth machine, which
was running our summarisation software. This topology is shown in Figure 5.9.
Figure 5.9: Worm infection topology
In this topology there are no hosts available for exploitation. This is inten-
tional as modelling the speed of propagation and infection success rates would
be arbitrary. These parameters are variable, depending on the specific worm in
question, the network configuration (in terms of ratio of local an wide area host
availability), and a large number of other factors [23].
As can be seen in Figure 5.10 the worm scanning technique is simply a sequen-
tial search through the IP sub-network it inhabits. Scanning the network locally is
an effective strategy for worm target discovery [23], though it can limit the speed
of Internet propagation.
The scanning and infection mechanism is in this case flooding the network.
This type of activity leads to a significant change in port distribution. This stage
allows the worm to build a list of susceptible hosts. In our simulation, there are
5Ideally the whole IPv4 address space would have been emulated, however the number of
IP addresses emulated is a limitation of the software and associated PC hardware used to in
providing the services.
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Figure 5.10: Arp Packets
no vulnerable hosts, therefore a target list taken from a genuine infected machine
was used and a honeypot configured to respond to that range6.
The worm connects to machines on port 445, with the intention of comprom-
ising them. The honeypot does not respond, as it is not programmed to emulate
TCP connections past the ‘synchronise and acknowledge’ phase.
The worm steps through its pre-generated list of machines, attempting to com-
promise each machine in order.
Of note is that the connections are identical in terms of packet sizes, port
number and source address.
In the live system, wide spread worms of this type would lead to a change
in the variance of IP address counts, Port usage distributions and packet size
distributions. Though the transfer of the worm was not recorded, it may be safe
to assume that it would also take place over a fixed port 7, and would therefore
effect the relevant distributions, leading to detection.
Chapter 8 shows the effects of DoS on some of these distributions. In many
ways the effect of a mass worm on a network is similar to that of a bandwidth
based DoS attack. The worm traffic however, is distributed across the address
space, where as most DoS attacks target a small set of hosts.
6In this case the list refers to the Loughborough University Campus network
7This has historically been the case, as the services the worms have exploited have been
hosted on static ports in line with the IANA assignment
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While there were no worms observed on the live system, the laboratory re-
cording of worm activity has allowed speculation that the traffic profiles of mass
worm traffic will be similar to that of DoS traffic, but with an more even spread
destination IP addresses.
5.3 Summary
Separating legitimate and illegitimate traffic is a significant challenge. Determ-
ining appropriate metrics for the purposes of detecting malicious activities tradi-
tionally requires expert domain knowledge.
In this chapter the various data mining methods utilised in the research were
discussed, its application in a laboratory environment has been described, and the
theoretical effect of a worm on the live implementation shown.
The exploration of data through various clustering algorithms has been presen-
ted, and shown to be an effective method of separating laboratory controlled DoS
traffic from simulated legitimate network background. The use of ANN weight-
ings as a metric of the importance of input has been introduced, and shown to be
useful for evaluating the relative strengths of particular statistics in the detection
of illegitimate traffic. An example of worm behaviour has been examined and
allowed speculation of the expected effects on the distribution of key metrics in a
live environment.
The next chapter will cover the data and analysis from the live network.
Chapter 6
Operation of the System
This research relies on relationships between certain metrics in the data being
present. In order to understand the models and data relationships presented later
in the thesis, this chapter presents some of the patterns and characteristics of the
network being monitored. The work relies of a baseline network state, which while
it may contain a level of illegitimate traffic, this is not believed to be of concern.
An analogous situation may be that of human health. People encounter germs
on a constant basis, without significant illness. Only if the system becomes signi-
ficantly ill are we made aware of a specific infection through the immune system’s
response. In the context of a network, there is an ongoing level of illegitimate
traffic which may be present at any given time. This level of traffic is not of
concern unless it poses a threat to the network itself. That is to say, a degree of
illegitimate traffic may be considered to be part of the normal state of the network.
The system described in Chapter 4 was operation between September 2005
and April 2006. During this period, over 140 separate events were detected and
classified ranging from routing changes to DoS. The data was collected from 6
sites distributed across the UK.
Sites were set to generate summaries from 1,000,000 packets, which in most
sites was around 5 seconds, depending on the time of day 1. All data presented in
this chapter is taken from the live national network.
6.1 Data Rate
The data rates of national sites were of different magnitudes, however, all followed
a broadly similar pattern of variance in line with the time of day. This is to be
expected as the network utilisation is a result of the user’s routine.
Figure 6.1 shows one week of data rates plotted against time of day. The peak
1see figure 6.1 for a graph showing time of day variation on data rate
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utilisation occurs around 19:00 with the lowest utilisation occurring at 04:00. The
plateau seen in the figure occurs at 13:00.
Figure 6.1: Data Rate Variation
This would suggest that the user’s usage of the network closely mirrors their
sleep patterns, but that there is a substantial amount of network traffic that is
unaffected by this pattern. The data rate remains elevated during traditional
working hours, but peaks at 19:00 when we may reasonably expect users to be
returning from work2.
6.2 Protocols
When considering protocols, we examine the application layer only. All traffic
which concerns us in this research was spanned to our monitors over 1Gbit Eth-
ernet. The spanned traffic is almost entirely IP at layer 3. In this section, only
TCP, UDP and ICMP are examined; between them they constitute over 99% of
the total traffic.
2The monitored network was UK based and therefore is dominated by a UK time of day
variation
CHAPTER 6. OPERATION OF THE SYSTEM 68
Figure 6.2: Protocol Variation
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Figure 6.2 shows a similar pattern for protocol usage. The proportion of total
traffic for each stays relatively constant, with a slightly higher proportion of TCP
traffic in the early hours of the morning (see figure 6.3).
Figure 6.3: Protocol Variation as a Proportion of Overall Traffic
6.3 TTL
The Time to Live field is a header variable in the IP header which indicates the
number of hosts3 that may transmit the packet before it should be discarded.
Differing operating systems have differing starting values for this field, the full
range is 0-255. Chapter 8 contains a description of the TTL values and their
significance. In this section the most common values for the monitored network
are evaluated, these values are 125 and 61, which correspond to Microsoft Windows
and most Unix variants respectively. Windows defaults to a TTL of 128, meaning
125 is 3 ‘hops’ away from the monitor, Unix defaults to 64 which again, is 3 hops
away from the monitor.
3Such as a router
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Figure 6.4: TTL Packets Per Second against Hour of the Day
Figure 6.5: TTL Proportion against Hour of the Day
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Figure 6.4 shows the number of packets per second against hour of the day.
Of note, is that the TTL 125 (Windows) data appears to show a more patterned
variation than the TTL 61 (Unix) data. However, inspection of figure 6.5 shows
that the two TTL values have a fairly flat relationship compared with the time
of day. This would suggest that there is no major variation in the times that the
users of these systems are active.
6.4 Packet Sizes
In figure 6.6 the packet sizes are shown by protocol. ICMP and UDP packet sizes
show no direct relationship with time of day. TCP packet sizes however appear
to be higher during periods which are dominated by file sharing applications (see
above). This is a result of TCP bulk transfer mode, where larger quantities of
data are being transmitted, TCP will use MSS packets. On arrival of the data,
the recipient will acknowledge this data. Over Ethernet a MSS packet is 1500
bytes 4, and an acknowledgement packet (no options) will be 40 bytes. Therefore,
if all traffic were TCP bulk-mode traffic, the average packet size would be 770
bytes.
6.5 Port Usage
One of the most heavily utilised ports on many of the PoPs on the network mon-
itored was port 80. This is commonly associated with HTTP traffic. Figure 6.7
shows the count of port 80 packets plotted for several days against the hour of the
day5.
As might be expected the volume of HTTP traffic drops off rapidly in the
early morning, and peaks between 6 and 11pm. Figure 6.8 shows a similar plot
for port 4662, which is commonly associated with eMule, a popular 6 peer-to-
peer file sharing application. In contrast to port 80 traffic, this shows very little
time-of-day variation. It could be speculated that this is because the peer-to-
peer applications do not require user interaction, and therefore traffic generated
by them is somewhat independent of user activity patterns. It may be common
practice to leave computers downloading or uploading content with these tools
while the user is asleep.
Another interesting view of the data is shown in figure 6.9 which shows the
4including IP / TCP headers
5This graph shows packets which were either sent to, or came from port 80, this differs from
the data shown in Chapter 8.
6In 2005
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Figure 6.6: Protocol Variation as a Proportion of Overall Traffic
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Figure 6.7: Port 80 Packets Per Second against Hour of the Day
Figure 6.8: Port 4662 Packets Per Second against Hour of the Day
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contribution to overall traffic made by several of the highest utilised ports. There
is a trend which shows the use of the network becoming more diverse (smaller
contribution from the major ports), and dramatic drop off in use for particular
applications. The cause in this case does not appear to be the application falling
into disuse (Gnutella was reputedly the highest used file sharing software in 2007).
We can only suppose the application protocol changed behaviour, and stopped
relying on TCP port 6346 as heavily7.
Figure 6.9: Proportion of Overall Traffic from Major Ports
6.6 SMTP Monitoring
During the period in which the system described in this thesis was operating,
the issues of unsolicited email was raised. There was at the time an unknown
volume of unsolicited email being sent over the monitored network, and a desire
to understand the impact which this traffic had on the overall operation of the
network.
It was thought that it should be possible to determine differences between cer-
tain categories of SMTP generators through the use of summary statistics. To
differentiate between potential categories of SMTP generator, statistical summar-
ies of the network traffic were recorded over a 24 hour period. A total of 89,748
7Gnutella introduced UDP support and other changes during its lifespan
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hosts were observed sending SMTP traffic. Of those senders, 46 hosts were re-
sponsible for over 10,000 SMTP connections. The distribution of source addresses,
destination addresses and connection numbers varied significantly between groups
of senders. These groups were categorised theoretically as follows.
• Mail Server
Mail servers are simply agents which receive and send email messages on
behalf of users. They do not represent illegitimate use of the network. This
group was characterised by a time of day variation in the number of email
transfers alongside a relatively even distribution of sources and destinations.
• Mail Client
A mail client is a program which will send and receive email from a mail
server. Mail clients are a legitimate use of the network. This group was
characterised by a time of day variation in the number of email transfers, a
single source and a single destination.
• Open Mail Relay
An open mail relay is a device which will forward email from any source to
any destination. This is distinct from a closed mail relay in its indifference
to the sender’s identity. Open relays do not in and of themselves represent
illegitimate use of the network, however they have been abused by users
wishing to send unsolicited email [78]. This group was characterised by a
time of day variation in the number of email transfers, a small number of
sources and a large number of destinations.
• Bot
A ”Bot” is a machine which has been compromised by an attacker, with the
potential to be used for various purposes. One potential use is to generate
unsolicited email. Bot generated emails potentially represent illegitimate
use of the network. This group was characterised by a constant number
of connections throughout the day, a single source, and a large number of
destinations.
This work was published, and a more complete discussion of the findings can be
found in the paper attached to appendix A. It further demonstrates the potential
for summarised data to provide insight into complex problems.
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6.7 Summary
This chapter has described some of the characteristics of the monitored network
under periods of relative normality. The time of day variation in data rates, port
usage, protocols, TTL and packet sizes have all be examined and discussed.
Of particular note is the strong patterns in all parameters described. Each
metric follows a tight distribution for a given time of day, allowing them to be
modelled and predicted with some accuracy. This is encouraging as it suggests
that deviation from these distributions should be marked.
The next chapter will present data taken from the live national network, the
analysis of this data, and some examples of DoS attacks observed.
Chapter 7
Live Data
In the previous chapters various data mining techniques were discussed. In this
chapter they are applied to live network data and used to classify live network
events.
Once the laboratory based investigations into the statistical variances caused
by malicious activity were complete, the focus moved onto recording and analysing
a live data set.
The system described in chapter 4 was implemented in the core of a national
network. The system recorded summarised statistics derived from packet headers
continuously for a 6 month period. All summaries were stored in a MYSQL based
database. The schema for the database was simply a flat table with rows inserted
for each summary on each site. This was deemed adequate for the purposes of
this research as the volume of data produced in the summaries, even over a large
period of time, was small in database terms and quickly searched as desired.
The summaries recorded were investigated using the Clementine data mining
package, with an emphasis placed on periods of significant deviation. This devi-
ation was initially classified manually, informed by the laboratory experiences and,
in specific examples, corroborated by the ISP’s network team. The mechanism for
achieving this was to use laboratory generated neural networks to help highlight
periods of anomaly, then to visually inspect via graphs of particular fields. Later
in the research as the neural classifiers became more sophisticated the system re-
quired less manual intervention, and could be used to classify most of the data in
a semi-autonomous manner. As part of the research, reports were generated on a
monthly basis, describing the activity on the network.
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7.1 Gathering the data
Over a period of 6 months, a database was created with examples of anomaly, with
classifications ranging from large DoS attacks to network routing changes. The
data set contained over 140 non-contiguous events chosen to be representative of
the differing types of activity observed. The DoS attacks in the database included
both spoofed and non-spoofed examples of TCP-SYN flood based attacks, UDP
flood attacks, from within and outside the monitored network. Several attacks
were composite attacks, containing more than one type of traffic. The attacks
were taken from all 6 monitored sites, which had mildly different data rates, host
variance and general usage patterns. Along with the DoS samples, the surrounding
‘normal’ summaries were also included in the database.
In order to provide suitable training data, the normal samples were chosen to
be of a similar duration and number to that of the DoS attack they surrounded.
This ensured an evenly weighted data set with which to train automated models.
Different sections of this database, as well as the data in its entirety were used
as inputs for different data mining models. These models were compared using
the input weighting technique described in section 5.2.3.
7.2 Training
Initial investigation was done via self organising maps (SOMs). Two types of
SOM were used, the first is a standard SOM based on the Kohonen algorithm.
The output of this is shown in Figure 7.1. The X and Y axis represent the grid
coordinates of the output matrix; the colour indicated the presence of DoS.
As can be seen, there is a clear divide between the regions containing DoS and
Non-DoS samples. This is encouraging as it suggests there is significant variance
in the two sets.
Further investigation was done with a sub-type of SOM in which the data
passes through two phases. In the first phase, the algorithm determines the ap-
propriate number of ‘groups’ (i.e., the X,Y pairs in the standard SOM model),
and in the second phase it defines these groups.
In Figure 7.2 the Y axis shows the second of the day when the sample is taken,
this is to provide a method to separate the points. As can be seen, firstly the
algorithm selects that there should be two groups in the data, meaning that there
are two clusters in variable space. Secondly these groups appear to be divided by
DoS activity.
The research moved its focus from SOMs and Clustering algorithms to look
for which variables in the summaries were providing accurate classification. This
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Figure 7.1: Self Organising Map
Figure 7.2: Clustering Algorithm
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was achieved by analysing different classes of DoS for the highest weighted input
nodes.
We applied this technique to individual DoS attacks, DoS attacks grouped by
type and to the whole data set.
7.3 UDP DoS Example
To better illustrate the variances in the data under DoS conditions, two examples
will be discussed. The two examples chosen are an IP address spoofed, bandwidth
based UDP flood attack which existed sporadically over a one day period, and a
non-spoofed TCP SYN flood based DoS attack, which lasted for seven minutes.
The first example we examine is the UDP based attack
In the DoS database, the UDP denial of service attacks observed were exclus-
ively bandwidth attacks. Mostly they are short lived1, and of a smaller scale than
those generally reported in the media.
Discussion with the network operator and with external information assurance
bodies indicates that short lived DoS attacks are much more common than longer,
sustained attacks on this type of network.
In this example there are a short series of UDP floods. Figure 7.3 shows the
number of packets per second received overlaid with DoS Classification. As can
been seen, there is a general level variation in packets per second over the 24
hour period, This is due to the fluctuating levels of load observed on the network
based on consumer usage. The time of day variations seen are predictable, and
consistent between sites. Under the periods of DoS the packet rate increases in a
manner not consistent with the daily variation.
In this attack, IP address spoofing was used to hide the identity of the attack-
ing hosts. Figure 7.4 Shows the variation in the number of IP subnets seen per
packet sample overlaid with DoS classification. The DoS generator in this case was
sending each packet with its own unique source IP address, leading to an almost
one to one mapping of additional source addresses to additional packets.
7.4 TCP DoS Example
In this analysis an overview of the changes in the monitored summary statistics
during a SYN attack is presented. The SYN attack is a well known DoS attack
that aims to exhaust all the available connections at a particular server (see 2.3.3).
1It is possible to speculate on why this is; a home user network will have few attractive targets
for the usual extortion type DoS activities, and often is subject to petty DoS vandalism between
disgruntled users.
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Figure 7.3: UDP DoS - Packets Per Second
Figure 7.4: UDP DoS - IP Subnets Per Sample
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Figure 7.5 shows a huge increase in the number of packets per second with the
SYN flag set. This attack was relatively short lived, lasting only 7 minutes.
Figure 7.5: TCP DoS - SYN Flags Per Second
As should be expected, Figure 7.6 shows the corresponding reduction in the
average packet size observed 2.
The IP Source addresses, per second and per sample, are shown in Figure 7.7
and Figure 7.8.
While there is an increase in source addresses per second, indicating that a
larger number of hosts are sending traffic, there is a decrease in source addresses
per sample, indicating that the majority of packets are being sent from a smaller
set of hosts.
7.5 Feature Selection
This work sets out a methodology for recording lightweight statistics to detect
network anomalies, and for determining which statistical measures should be used
within a constantly changing environment.
2Syn Packets are around 40 bytes long (0 TCP data bytes), depending on which TCP options
are selected
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Figure 7.6: TCP DoS - Average Packet Size
With this in mind this section describes how data mining was used, not only to
determine periods of anomaly, but also to identify which features were significant
in this classification.
Using the DoS examples from the previous section, this analysis calculates the
relative importance of the inputs to the data mining engine. This technique works
by evaluating the ANN weightings for each input along the decision path.
Table 7.1 shows the relative importance of the inputs to the ANN used to
classify data. In the UDP flood example, the most important input into the ANN
was the IP address counts. This is no doubt due to the spoofed nature of this
attack. UDP traffic under normal conditions has a low representation on the
network (see figure 6.3), and therefore when large quantities of UDP traffic is
observed it strongly affects the distribution of protocols. Finally of note is the
variance in TTL. In the earlier laboratory based experiments, TTL had not been
a significant contributor to detection 3. However, in the live data examples TTL
becomes a strong indicator of the presence of DoS. This is discussed in chapter 7.
Moving to the TCP SYN flood example, the analysis suggests that the value
of the most commonly seen packet size is a highly significant factor in determining
3Due to the limitations of the accuracy of the experiment
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Figure 7.7: TCP DoS - Source Subnets Per Sample
Table 7.1: UDP DoS Relative Importance of Detection Metrics
Field Name Relative Importance
IP Address Counts 0.571429
Packet Sizes 0.165713
Protocol Counts 0.148571
TTL Field 0.142857
ID Ratio 0.028571
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Figure 7.8: TCP DoS - Source Subnets Per Second
the presence of this type of attack. Perhaps surprisingly, TCP flag counts were
considered only the 4th most significant input.
Since at the onset of the attack the number of packets with the SYN flag set
was still relatively small, it may be that the changes in fields such as the ID header
field, or the packet size, were more reliable indicators.
IP source address and destination address counts were also significant factors,
which was corroborated in Figure 7.7 and Figure 7.8.
Table 7.2: TCP DoS Relative Importance of Detection Metrics
Field Name Relative Importance
Packet Sizes 0.4375
ID Ratio 0.265625
TTL Field 0.140625
TCP Flags 0.09375
IP Address Counts 0.0625
The TTL field is again a prominent factor in the decision matrix here.
Figure 7.9 shows the relative importance of the inputs from the TCP, UDP and
combination Laboratory emulated DoS. TTL is insignificant in the laboratory as it
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was excluded from the analysis due to the lack of nTop data available to properly
model it in the traffic generators.
The spoofing of traffic makes the IP Address Counts the primary factor in the
UDP analysis, where as the fixed small packet sizes dominate the TCP analysis.
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Figure 7.9: Comparison of Input Weightings
7.6 Malicious Attack Summary
The data used in this thesis was gathered between September 2005 and March
2006. A summary of the attacks analysed as part of this thesis is shown in 7.3.
Of the sites monitored, Oxford shows the most activity, particularly in Novem-
ber, December and January. It is unclear whether this is because of botnets present
on this site, or whether there are hosts being targeted within it. In some periods,
several similar attacks were observed per day for extended periods (as with Oxford
in February 06). However, a more common picture for the system as a whole was
for a small number of attacks to be observed in any given week.
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Table 7.3: Network Attacks Observed, Grouped by Month
Date Site Attack Type Count
September 05 Northampton UDP Flood 3
Oxford UDP Flood 2
October 05 Brighton UDP Flood 2
Northampton SYN Flood 1
Oxford UDP Flood 2
November 05 Colchester UDP Flood 2
Northampton UDP Flood 3
Oxford UDP Flood 25
Southampton SYN Flood 1
December 05 Colchester UDP Flood 2
Northampton UDP Flood 2
Oxford SYN Flood 10
UDP Flood 22
January 06 Colchester UDP Flood 1
Oxford SYN Flood 2
February 06 Colchester UDP Flood 2
Oxford SYN Flood 52
March 06 Brighton UDP Flood 3
Northampton UDP Flood 5
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7.7 Summary
In this chapter the effect of attacks on the network were investigated using data
mining techniques. Clustering techniques were shown to useful in organising the
data into legitimate and illegitimate categories. A UDP based flood DoS attack,
and a TCP based SYN flood DoS attack were examined and analysed using an
ANN. Many of the attacks observed during the research show characteristics which
are in common with attacks observed in [22] and [35]. The weightings of the inputs
were calculated to give a relative importance value to the associated input fields.
This chapter has shown that separating DoS traffic from legitimate traffic is
possible using a statistical metric based approach and a neural classifier. Further
more, it has shown that analysis of the neural classifier allows for the evaluation
of the relative importance of metrics.
In the next chapter the significant variables as selected by the data mining
algorithms are examined to determine why they are considered significant, and to
validate their selection.
Chapter 8
Discussion of the Data Mining
Parameters
In the previous chapter the methodology for investigating the ‘normal’ network
state was discussed, and the features for detecting DoS discovered. In this chapter
the features discovered are discussed and their behaviours under anomalous con-
ditions are examined. The events described in this chapter are all taken from the
live national network.
8.1 Defining Normality (Feature Selection)
The research group at HSN Loughborough had previously shown how statistical
measures for detecting change in distributions could be combined with a neural
classifier to detect and classify changes in delay data [79]. The technique had
been used to detect routing changes, network outages and time of day patterned
changes. This concept was applied to the network in a much broader sense here.
The assumption made was that the persistent state of the network was normal.
This is a matter of semantics; one could define normal as the activity which is
non-malicious. This precludes the possible normal malicious traffic; an example of
which would be worms such as ‘Code Red’ which has been present in network traffic
for many years, and is now largely benign1. Instead we define a certain amount
of illegal or malicious activity to be normal, and look for abnormal abnormalities.
This is a key definition, as instead of trying to classify what is happening on
the network at all times, instead, we attempt to classify changes in the network
state which are indicative of network based malicious activity.
It is clear that care must be taken in selecting which features of a data set to
monitor. Which features, or fields, are selected directly affects which events and
1This virus attacks unpatched IIS servers, of which there are now very few uninfected
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with what accuracy, are detected.
Taking the technique used on laboratory data in section 5.2.3, we took pre-
classified live samples to train ANNs. Each for each event, the relative weightings
of the inputs was analysed.
8.1.1 A Note on Distributions
Many of the distributions under DoS conditions presented in this chapter are
samples of the overall distribution. For instance, in the case of the TTL field,
only the predominant five peaks of the distribution were recorded. This is to save
space in storage and does not prevent useful analysis of the data.
8.1.2 TTL Field Analysis
From the early analysis of the anomaly database, using the techniques described
in the previous chapter, it was clear that certain fields were good indicators of
general anomaly. The first example of this is the time to live field. To analyse this
field in more detail a per-packet distribution was built over time and can be seen
in figure 8.1.
Figure 8.1: TTL Distribution Under Non-Attack Conditions
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There are several observations and points of discussion to note from this graph.
Most common operating systems have default TTL values set at the transmission
of a packet. This value is often a configurable OS wide parameter, but is rarely
changed from default settings. Table 8.1 shows common operating systems and
the default TTL values associated with them.
Table 8.1: Operating System Default TTL Values
Operating System Name Default TTL Value
Windows 128
Linux (2.4 Kernels) 64
OpenBSD 64
SOLARIS 8/10 64
AIX 64
When an IP packet leaves a machine, it will have the default time to live. Each
hop2 it passes will decrement the TTL. The TTL distribution of a monitoring point
will depend on it’s distance in hops from all hosts which it monitors.
The predominant peak seen in figure 8.1 is at 126 which would be consistent
with representing all outgoing traffic from the ISP local POP from Windows based
machines. We can also see a trail of IP addresses below this which are likely to
represent incoming traffic from Windows based systems. This pattern is repeated
around TTL 62 and below, representing the Unix hosts. There are also a scattering
of maximum TTL packets (255 and a small trail) which can be associated with
less common OSs such as Cisco IOS.
This distribution is a useful one as it describes the probability of packets ori-
ginating from specific numbers of hops away from our monitor. This distribution
is disturbed by some abnormalities in the network, such as routing changes or DoS.
Should an additional router be placed between the local POP and the monitor,
we would expect to see the peak at 126 move to 125 and so on.
Figure 8.2 shows the same distribution overlayed with the distribution from
taken from a period of DoS. As can be seen, there is a new peak formed by packets
with a TTL of 40. The fact that this is a single peak suggest that the majority
of packets during this period originated either from a single host, or hosts on a
single network.
From this, and the ANN weighting analysis, it is clear that not only is the
TTL field a good indicator of the presence of DoS, but also that it is a potentially
difficult metric to obscure. For an attacker to effectively match the distribution
present on the network, they would need to have an in depth knowledge of the
2A hop in this context meaning a layer 3 device such as a router
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Figure 8.2: TTL Distribution Under DoS Attack Conditions
target network, the monitor’s position in relation to the attacking machines and
the position of the monitor in relation to the network it observes.
The combination of these factors make TTL not only an accurate indicator of
DoS traffic, but also an extremely resilient one. This type of analysis is however,
only effective for specific types of DoS or Worm attacks. In the case reflector style
attacks minimal change in distribution would be observed. Assuming that the
reflector attack used many well known web hosts, the TTL distribution entering
the network will be very similar to its natural state.
8.1.3 Packet Size Analysis
The next metric we will examine will be IP packet size. Packet sizes are an inter-
esting subject in and of themselves. The HSN research group at Loughborough
have published work on how packets sizes may be used to perform application
detection [80], and it follows that the packet size distribution on a network should
have some correlation with the applications which are running over it. As a wider
part of this work, packets size distributions were effectively used to create a snap-
shot of the applications present on the network at high data rate.
Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the packet size distribution of the network under
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Figure 8.3: Packet Size Distribution Under Non-Attack Conditions(full scale)
Figure 8.4: Packet Size Distribution Under Non-Attack Conditions(small scale)
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normal conditions. As can be seen, there are significant points around 40-60 bytes
and at 1500 bytes. The maximum transmission unit (MTU) of the network is 1500
as the network is using Ethernet v2.
TCP traffic makes up the majority of traffic on the network monitored, and
is therefore the prime contributor to this distribution. At the smaller end of the
distribution, we see peaks at 40, 44, 48, 52 and so on. The smallest TCP packet
size is 40 bytes 3, this size would typically be seen on ACK, RST type packets.
TCP also has a range of options such as Window size scaling, or time stamps.
These options all 4 have a length of 4 bytes, which explains the 4 byte intervals in
our packet size distribution.
Figure 8.5: Packet Size Distribution Under DoS Attack Conditions(small scale)
Figure 8.5 shows the same packet size distribution, overlaid with one taken
under a DoS attack. The major feature change here is a new peak at 29 bytes.
In this example, the new peak was entirely made up of UDP packets, which were
flooding the network.
Packet size distributions are determined by the types of traffic present on the
network. As discussed earlier, the traffic has a predictable distribution, which may
make it relatively simple for a potential attacker to replicate a similar distribution
at the traffic generators, making this type of detection difficult. This would be
more difficult in the case of a SYN style flood as the nature of the attack limits
3IP Length field of 40.
4With the exceptions of ‘End of Option List’ and ‘No-Operation’.
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the packet size distribution.
8.1.4 TCP Port Analysis
The final metric analysed in this section is the TCP port number. As with the
other metrics, this distribution will be strongly related to the types of traffic
present on the network. Networked applications have defined, or at least default,
ports on which they are hosted 5. The most obvious example of this would be
TCP port 80, which is most commonly associated with HTTP traffic. As can be
seen in figure 8.6 the most significant peak occurs at TCP port 80, which given
the nature of the network in question, is predictable6.
Figure 8.6: TCP Port Distribution Under Non-Attack Conditions
Table 8.2 shows the most common TCP port usage in order of significance.
This distribution shows a time-of-day variation with HTTP usage showing a large
decline in the later evening, with the ports associated with file sharing show less
deterioration. It is perhaps worth emphasising that this data shows which TCP
ports were in use, and that this is not a direct correlation to application usage.
5There are some exceptions to this.
6This is an analysis of TCP destination port at a specific point in time. For a description
of source and destination port usage over time, see Port Usage in the Operation of the System
chapter
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Table 8.2: Highest TCP Port Usage and Associated Applications
TCP Port Percentage of Total Traffic Associated Application
80 34.57 HTTP
4662 3.22 eMule (P2P File Sharing)
445 3.16 Microsoft Directory Services
6346 2.33 Gnutella (P2P File Sharing)
135 1.57 Microsoft DCOM
139 1.55 NetBios
6881 1.37 BitTorrent (P2P File Sharing)
8080 1.08 HTTP (Alternative)
6348 0.67 Gnutella (P2P File Sharing)
25 0.44 SMTP
443 0.42 HTTPS
It is reasonable to assume however that the majority of the traffic on a particular
TCP port will be attributable to the associated TCP application.
Figure 8.7 shows the distribution of ports under a SYN based DoS. The flood
was not significant enough to appear in its own right in the statistics, however,
there is a significant drop in the proportion of total traffic contributed by the well
known ports.
Figure 8.7: TCP Port Distribution Under DoS Attack Conditions
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8.1.5 IP Address Counts and IP Identification
The majority of IP traffic is bidirectional. That is to say that a client would both
send, and receive data. TCP requires that this be the case to allow data to be
acknowledged. The network monitored in this research primarily contains TCP
traffic (as can be seen in section 6.2. That nature means that we should expect
to see a similar number of source IP addresses as destination addresses. This is
because a packet travelling from a client to a server will have the client source
address, and the server destination address. In the reverse path, those addresses
would also be reversed (shown in figure 8.8), leading to 2 individual source and
destination addresses being observed on the monitor.
Figure 8.8: Bidirection Traffic
If this ratio between source and destination is not one, it means that the
monitor is not seeing traffic in one direction, or that it is not being replied to. As
can been seen in figure 8.9, the ratio between sources and destinations moves from
being centred around 1:1, to a more spread distribution, centred around 1.5:1.
Spoofed DoS attacks move this ratio significantly away from 1:1, as does large
scale network scanning. Spoofing source addresses will lead to a ratio between
sources and destinations significantly higher than 1:1, and scanning a network is
likely to lead to a ratio significantly smaller than 1:1.
IP identification numbers are used to allow fragmentation of IP packets if
necessary on the path. It is valid, though not recommended to set this number to
0. In many of the attacks observed on the ISP network, an identification number
of 0 was selected for the attack traffic, wildly moving the standard distribution of
this parameter. In some cases, the IP ID for an attack was fixed to a non-zero
number.
As can be seen in figure 8.10, the IP ID changes from the normal state where
the most commonly seen ID is 0, to 256 under DoS conditions for this attack. This
is because all of the packets which are part of the DoS attack have the IP ID set
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Figure 8.9: IP Source:Destination Ratio Under DoS Attack Conditions
to 256.
Figure 8.10: Most Common IP Identification Number Under DoS Attack Condi-
tions
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8.2 Summary
In this chapter we have examined variables which the neural network had selected
as good indicators of the presence of DoS. For each example, an explanation for
the type of change observed during DoS has been presented. This goes some
way to demonstrating that not only are neural classifiers a potential tool for the
identification of metrics, but also that the metrics selected here are robust. It
has been demonstrated that models developed in a laboratory environment apply
successfully in a live network. New metrics, such as TTL distribution, have been
shown to be useful in the detection of malicious events which were not observed
in the laboratory7.
The next chapter will summarise the research presented throughout this thesis,
draw conclusions from the data and present possibilities for future work in this
area.
7Due to limitations in the emulation.
Chapter 9
Conclusion
In Chapter 3 some of the approaches used to address the difficulties involved with
detecting malicious anomalies on large scale networks were introduced. These
issues are largely based around processing the huge quantity of data in an efficient
manner, dealing with the changing nature of network threats and providing a
mechanism to protect the network against such attacks.
Chapter 4 described the network context for this research, the system that
was implemented and the rational behind many of the design decisions made. It
was demonstrated that simple PC based architectures could potentially deal with
high speed network monitoring through the trading of memory for simplicity of
processing. A signature detector based on the TCP checksum was devised and
demonstrated to be effective in a controlled environment, this work was not taken
extensively into the live network because of performance concerns and the lack of
independent verification of its classifications. The signature detection mechanism
did however provide a method for the detection of payloads in an environment
where the payload was not available for examination.
Chapter 5 demonstrated that data mining techniques could be successfully
applied to a laboratory emulation to detect the presence of DoS in traffic samples
when the DoS traffic represented as little as 1% of the total bandwidth of the
data. The concept of calculating relative importance of input fields through the
comparative importance of their weightings within an ANN was introduced and
applied to laboratory data.
Chapter 6 presented a summary the operational data recorded by the system.
It was shown that the network monitored had strong time of day variation in
metrics such as data rate and port usage. This cements the concept that the
network behaviour should be predictable, and therefore possible to model.
Chapter 7 showed that data mining techniques could be applied to network
data to successfully distinguish malicious network traffic from non-malicious data.
Further more, it was demonstrated that these techniques could identify which
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characteristics were the most significant in terms of divergence between the groups
of data. Of particular interest was the selection of fields such as the IP TTL
field distribution, IP Identification distribution and IP address counts as a strong
indicators of the presence of DoS.
Chapter 8 examined the parameters selected through the ANN weighting ana-
lysis and evaluated them to demonstrate their suitability as detection metrics. It
was shown that the data mining approaches selected extremely effective metrics,
and further, metrics which may have been non-obvious to a casual observer. This
is a particular strength of the research, as not only was a system developed for the
detection of illegitimate traffic, a process by which the system could be trained
and adapted to new threats has been proven. The IP TTL field in particular may
prove a difficult metric to mask for a potential attacker due to the requirement
for a large amount of information specific to the relative locations of the intended
victim and monitoring station.
The internet forms an integral part of much of modern life. As people are
becoming increasingly dependent on the Internet, the underlying infrastructure
needs to becoming increasingly resilient to attack. DoS has consistently been a
problem over an extended period of time, showing that the mitigation of this type
of attack is a non-trivial problem.
Analysis network traffic at core network data rates is a significant challenge.
This research has shown that meta data in the form of statistical summaries is a
powerful tool for the detection of network attacks such as DoS and direct Worm
propagation. These events, due to the level of traffic required for them to be
effective, have an impact on the statistical landscape of a network. Leveraging
this has been shown to be an efficient way of detecting their presence. The system
developed detected the presence of DoS constituting as little as 0.1% of the total
traffic volume in traffic emulations.
Feature selection for network security has traditionally relied on expert domain
knowledge. This work has implemented data mining techniques for the classifica-
tion of malicious network events. Further more, it has shown that these techniques
can be used to identify the key features in the summarised data. Features such as
TTL distribution and the ratio of source and destination IP addresses have been
shown to be effective indicators of the presence of DoS.
Validating laboratory work is often a difficult endeavour; this research took
data mining from a laboratory environment into a multi-gigabit national network,
where it detected many network security events. Areas of similarity and areas
of divergence between the controlled emulation and the live network were shown.
Several ‘real-world’ attacks were analysed, and their impact on the summaries
shown to be consistent with the neural classifier’s relative importance.
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The system developed as part of this research operated in a live national con-
sumer network for an extended period of time, monitoring data rates of up to
5Gbit/s across 6 sites, with hundreds of millions of connections being processed
daily on standard PC architectures. The system adapted to the increasing traffic
volume observed through the increasing of summary periods, demonstrating the
power of summary statistics in providing scalable detection. The system developed
was also flexible enough to be applied to high-speed application detection of VoIP
traffic and to the detection of unsolicited SMTP generators.
9.1 Further Work
The ultimate aim of this type of research was to mitigate against the impact of
malicious activity on the network. It is the author’s view that filtering traffic local
to the target is only effective against certain types of attack. To fully protect
a target the filtering of traffic should be done as close to the source as possible.
With this in mind, when a system like the one described here detected DoS on the
network, research into automatically identifying parameters of the traffic in ques-
tion would allow a more advanced use of push-back[64] or equivalent techniques.
This is advantageous as, while push-back can control the traffic upstream, it is
still necessary to drop a proportion of legitimate traffic.
If it were possible to provide a DoS filter with a more specific description
of the features of a specific DoS, it would allow more a targeted throttling of the
upstream data. For instance, metrics such as UDP port, or IP address are likely to
be subject to a large number of false positives, leading to a degraded performance
for legitimate users. If that specification were to be extended to be throttling UDP
packets of size 1500 bytes heading for a specific IP address with a TTL of 58, the
number of false positives and therefore the amount of performance degradation
for legitimate users would be reduced.
This avenue of research was not explored as part of this thesis; the research was
carried out on a live commercial national network, and therefore any experimental
mitigation techniques would have had to be laboratory based. It should be possible
to demonstrate this type of filtering in a test-bed environment.
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Abstract 
Research into preventing spam is an ongoing 
concern.  Much of the effort to date has focused on 
filtering email at the receiving end using techniques 
such as content filters.  Techniques that could prevent 
spam from initially being sent would be beneficial 
and contribute to the preventative effort.  In practice 
much spam is sent from compromised hosts.  These 
can potentially be detected by ISPs using simple 
monitoring techniques.  This monitoring takes place 
in the core of an ISP’s network and provides a 
periodic summary of email activity.  Relatively simple 
post-capture analysis can then identify the most 
significant spam relay machines. 
Keywords 
Spam, Spam Relays, Network Monitoring, Data 
Summaries 
Introduction 
In January 2004 Bill Gates claimed that, “Spam 
will soon be a thing of the past” [1].  Two years later 
and unsolicited email continues to proliferate, clogging 
up mailboxes and consuming bandwidth.  The evils of 
spam range simply from unwanted advertising to 
propagating pornography or fraud attempts known as 
phishing.  The extent of the problem has led some 
commentators to describe email as becoming ‘almost 
unusable’ [3]. 
Various techniques have been developed and 
deployed to try and prevent spam from being delivered.  
These techniques include the use of content filters, 
blacklists, whitelists and collaborative filters.  
Predominantly these approaches focus on spam 
mitigation at the receiving end.  Pressure is growing 
however for ISPs to mitigate against spam at the 
sending end.  This is difficult because senders can 
continually re-register, establishing multiple identities 
which make it difficult for ISPs to prevent users from 
sending spam.  A further problem exists due to the use 
of spam relays.  In addition to open relays, spam relays 
may be established on compromised hosts enabling 
spammers to continually change the IP address of the 
spam source. 
This paper proposes a traffic monitoring based 
approach to identify hosts on an ISP network that are 
being used as spam relays. Importantly, this approach 
does not involve the capture or analysis of the email 
content itself, only of the packet header information. 
The technique involves recording the number of SMTP 
connections established by each host on the monitored 
network segment, and the number of mail servers each 
host connects to.  Although at an early stage of the 
work, a prototype tool has been used to provide 
information to network operators, informing them of 
the hosts that are operating as spam relays.  The 
approach could however, be incorporated in to an 
autonomous system that would prevent spam relays 
sending unwanted email from the monitored network. 
The paper is organized as follows.  First an 
overview of current spam prevention techniques is 
given.  Our spam relay detection technique is then 
presented together with details of its experimental 
implementation within a national ISP’s network.  Some 
results of its use on this network are then presented. 
Preventing Spam 
Various strategies are employed to try and filter 
spam.  Predominantly, these focus on identifying spam 
at the receiving end.  An overview of these strategies is 
presented here.  A more in depth treatment is available 
in [6]. 
One simple technique that may be used to combat 
spam functions by filtering email through the use of 
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blacklists [11].  These are maintained either on a 
commercial or voluntary basis and contain the IP 
addresses of hosts that are known to have sent spam.  
Mail clients can use DNS style queries to see if the 
source IP address of incoming mail appears on the list.  
Whilst this technique can help to filter spam it is both 
limited and crude.  Lists tend to go out of date very 
quickly due to constant changes in the source IP 
addresses of spam.  A further limitation is that many 
blacklists do not distinguish between hosts in the same 
domain resulting in many legitimate emails being 
filtered.  The use of blacklists has contributed to 
pressure on ISPs to prevent spam being sent from their 
IP address space, as in one scenario 900,000 addresses 
from a single ISP network were listed [2]. 
A related concept to blacklists is that of a whitelist.  
As the name implies this works in exactly the opposite 
way to a blacklist.  Instead of listing hosts that are 
known to send spam, a whitelist contains hosts that are 
trusted.  The obvious disadvantage of this approach is 
that it presents greater complexity for the many 
legitimate cases where an email is sent to a new 
contact.  A solution to this requires the sender to 
confirm their address.  This can lead to a number of 
problems however as the scheme requires the 
automatic generation of a reply to email from source 
addresses not on the users whitelist (for a fuller 
explanation of why this is bad practice see [6]). 
The use of heuristic methods for identifying spam 
is a mature research area.  Various analysis techniques 
have been proposed to evaluate the content of an email 
(e.g. [5][8]).  An advantage of this type of content 
filtering is the potential for transparent deployment.  
Unfortunately, while impressive accuracy rates have 
been reported, too many false positives prevent email 
from being discarded automatically after having been 
flagged as spam.    Furthermore, such a large quantity 
of spam is propagated that even accuracy rates of 
99.9% still miss a significant amount of spam.  
SpamAssassin [10] is a widely used open source tool 
that employs heuristic techniques to identify spam.  
Like other solutions, while SpamAssassin has been 
shown to effectively filter a high percentage of 
unsolicited email, it is still far from perfect.  Studies 
have shown that not only does it miss a small 
percentage of spam; it may also incorrectly filter 
legitimate email [7]. 
A further technique that may be used in 
conjunction with other systems is termed collaborative 
filtering.  This approach exploits the fact that multiple 
spam emails are generally sent unchanged (or with 
minor changes) to a large number of email addresses.  
Through the use of ‘spam traps’ (unused email 
addresses, deliberately placed on the internet to be 
harvested by spam software), the content of spam 
emails is recorded and then shared with participating 
spam filters.  A commercial example of this type of 
approach is BrightMail [4]. 
The general consensus is that a single technical 
solution that is able to prevent the propagation of spam 
is unlikely to be found given the constraints of the 
current Internet architecture [6].  A composite 
approach, incorporating many of the techniques 
described above, can and does help alleviate the 
problem and reduce the amount of spam.  Techniques 
to date tend to focus on filtering spam at the receiving 
end, although some of the techniques may be deployed 
by mail servers to prevent spam from being sent.  A 
specific problem however, exists due to the presence of 
spam relays installed on compromised hosts.  These 
allow the propagation of large quantities of spam from 
constantly changing sources.  The ability to reliably 
identify machines that are acting as spam relays, often 
as the result of being infected by a worm or virus, is 
another approach with which to reduce the amount of 
spam distributed over the network.  This paper presents 
such an approach which can be used by a network 
operator such as an ISP. 
Detecting Spam Relays 
In the approach to be described spam relay 
detection is conducted alongside other security tasks 
and makes use of a shared monitoring system.  This 
system collects various network traffic statistics by 
passively monitoring core network links.  The system 
consists of six gatherers (sometimes referred to as 
monitors or sniffers) and a central processor located 
within the ISP’s network.  A further 
analysis/development host is also located at a remote 
site, in this case Loughborough University.  The 
gatherers are based on Dell Dual 3GHz Intel Xeon 
servers with Intel Pro 1000 network interface cards to 
allow monitoring at data rates of in excess of 1 
Gigabit/second.  The gatherers are located at six 
distributed PoP (Points of Presence) sites and monitor 
all network traffic either from or to the local broadband 
network.  The monitoring software gathers light weight 
summary statistics that are used for further security 
purposes [9]. 
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Figure 1:  The Monitoring Architecture 
 
To provide information regarding the 
location of spam relays, the gatherers log TCP/IP 
packet header summaries which have the SYN 
flag set and a destination port value of 25 (this 
indicates SMTP).  These packets are closely 
correlated to TCP connections with mail servers.  
Home users on a commercial ISP network may 
quite legitimately contact a number of mail 
servers on which they have accounts, although 
many home users access email through an HTTP 
interface.  The number of connections to mail 
servers expected through legitimate usage is 
however relatively small in comparison to the 
number of connections established by spam 
relays.  Whereas a home user might connect to a 
mail server a few times an hour, spam relays 
send thousands of emails every hour to hundreds 
of mail servers.  This large disparity between 
legitimate home users and machines that have 
been compromised and are being used as spam 
relays suggests simple traffic analysis may be a 
means of identifying those machines that are 
sending spam.  The ISP can then take action to 
either block SMTP traffic from these machines, 
or, more realistically, ensure that the machines 
are ‘cleaned up’ and reconfigured with 
appropriate levels of security. 
The marked difference in profile between 
compromised hosts acting as spam relays and 
legitimate users contacting mail servers is aided 
by the absence of legitimate mail servers hosted 
on the monitored network.  Where customer 
service agreements allow mail servers to be 
present, the scenario does become more 
complex.  In this instance it is still possible to 
distinguish between legitimate mail servers and 
spam relays by examining the distribution of port 
25 connections rather than simply the quantity.  
For instance, legitimate mail servers would tend 
to exhibit a daily pattern that reflects the habits 
of the users of that mail server.  Spam relays by 
contrast, normally do not exhibit this profile.  
Instead they may send at a constant rate 24 hours 
a day, or may send many thousands of emails 
over a short period of time and then nothing at 
all.  Examples of these profiles are given in the 
following results section. 
Of further note is that open relays are not 
permitted on the monitored ISP’s network.  In 
the case where open relays were used 
legitimately, distinguishing them from relays 
installed on compromised hosts may prove 
difficult.  In this instance it may be necessary to 
maintain a list of the legitimate relays to feed in 
to the detection process.  It should be noted 
however, that legitimate open relays are still 
used to send spam. 
Results 
Figures 2 – 7 provide examples of hosts 
sending unusual numbers of SMTP packets.  In 
the current configuration logs show the number 
of SMTP packets seen in a 24 hour period, 
plotted in an hourly bar chart.  This allows 
network operators to quickly assimilate which 
hosts have been acting as spam relays.  The 
target destinations for each spam relay may be 
displayed by double clicking on the source 
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address of interest (e.g. Figure 4).  These appear 
in order of frequency.  Common targets typically 
include popular mail providers such as hotmail 
and yahoo. 
All the examples shown come from a single 
24 hour period during September 2005.  Note 
that for reasons of confidentiality, the actual IP 
addresses have been obscured.  Figure 2 shows a 
host which has established in excess of 58,000 
SMTP connections within the 24 hour period.  
As can be seen from the plot, these have been 
established at a constant rate of around 2500 
thousand connections an hour.  The particular 
ISP network being monitored provides 
broadband and dialup services to home users.  
As this service does not provide a static IP 
address, hosting mail servers is impractical.  On 
networks where mail servers are hosted it is clear 
that both the quantity and the profile of SMTP 
connections shown below would still distinguish 
this host as a spam relay.   
A mail server would show a variation in the 
number of connections established per hour, 
consistent with a daily usage pattern whereas this 
host has sent at a consistent rate throughout the 
24 hour monitoring period.  A further 
demarcating factor would be the host name, 
which in this case, indicates that this host is a 
home user. 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
In contrast to Figure 2, Figure 3 shows a 
host that has established close to 25,000 SMTP 
connections in a single hour but none at any 
other time during the day.  Although this host 
exhibits quite different characteristics to the one 
previously shown, it is again immediately 
obvious that this profile does not fit that of a 
legitimate mail server.  Compromised hosts may, 
in addition to being used as a spam relay, be 
used to send ‘mail bombs’ or to scan for 
vulnerable hosts.  ‘Mail bombs’ occur where 
very large quantities of email are sent to the 
same address rendering the address unusable.  In 
this instance however, the plot is of a host being 
used to scan multiple addresses.
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 shows a section of a table which 
relates the destination addresses to the source 
address for the traffic displayed in Figure 3.  As 
in the other Figures, the IP addresses are 
obfuscated but in this case sufficient text is left 
to show the source has systematically scanned 
hosts, possibly across a number of other ports. 
 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 5 shows a host that has made over 
3000 SMTP connections in a single hour but 
none at any other point in the 24 hour period.  A 
profile of this type does not fit that expected of 
either a mail client or a mail server. 
Whereas a mail client might be expected to 
make a few connections an hour to one or two 
mail servers, this host has established a new 
connection every second to over one thousand 
mail servers.  The profile is also clearly different 
from that of a mail server.  This host appears to 
have been compromised and used to send spam.  
A possible explanation for the host only sending 
email during one hour of the day is that the host 
may have been switched off at other times. 
 
 
 
Figure 6 
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In figures 6 & 7 hosts are shown that have 
sent large quantities of email to multiple mail 
servers.  The distribution of SMTP connections 
per hour is not constant, but is markedly 
different to that which would be expected of a 
mail server.  In figure 7, high numbers of 
connections are established throughout the 24 
hour monitoring period.  In figure 6, the host 
appears to have been switched off for part of the 
day although such a profile could also be 
attributed to an IP address that is reassigned to a 
spam relay.  In both figures 6 & 7 the quantity of 
connections established is very large.  The 
sending host shown in figure 7 established over 
160,000 connections during the 24 hour period, 
with almost 30,000 connections established in 
one hour alone. 
In total 89,748 hosts were observed sending 
SMTP traffic on the monitored network segment.  
46 hosts had established over 10,000 thousand 
SMTP connections per host during the day.  4 
hosts had each established over 50,000 
connections. 
 
Figure 7 
 
Conclusions 
It seems unlikely, given the restraints of the 
current Internet architecture, that a single 
approach or technology will be found that is able 
to totally eliminate unsolicited email.  Several 
technologies exist that contribute to the reduction 
of the quantity of spam that users receive.  These 
tend to focus on filtering mechanisms as the 
email is received.  The ability to prevent spam 
from initially being sent from compromised 
hosts used as spam relays would contribute to the 
effort to reduce the quantity of spam seen in the 
Internet.  This paper has shown how spam relays 
installed on compromised hosts could be 
identified by the ISP networks on which they are 
hosted.  At present, the identification process is 
achieved by visual inspection of the data.  
However, given the large disparity between the 
SMTP connection profiles of legitimate mail 
clients and servers and spam relays, an 
automated process could easily be developed to 
detect spam relays based on the quantity and 
profile of SMTP connections, and the destination 
addresses. 
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Appendix B
Gatherer C Code
1 /∗ Etherne t header ∗/
2 struct s n i f f e t h e r n e t
3 {
4 u in t16 t packet type ; /∗ Packet Type : 0 ( to us ) , 1 ( b r oad ca s t ) , 2 ( mu l t i c a s t
) , 3 ( e l s e to e l s e ) , 4 s en t by us ∗/
5 u in t16 t ARPHRD; /∗ Linux va l u e f o r t h e l a y e r d e v i c e t ype . ∗/
6 u in t16 t s l i n k l e n g t h ;
7 u in t16 t bytes [ 4 ] ;
8 u in t 16 t e the r type ; /∗ IP? ARP? RARP? e t c ∗/
9 } ;
10
11 /∗ IP header ∗/
12 struct s n i f f i p
13 {
14 #i f BYTEORDER == LITTLE ENDIAN
15 u in t 8 t i p h l : 4 , /∗ header l e n g t h ∗/
16 ip v : 4 ; /∗ v e r s i o n ∗/
17 #i f BYTEORDER == BIG ENDIAN
18 u in t 8 t ip v : 4 , /∗ v e r s i o n ∗/
19 i p h l : 4 ; /∗ header l e n g t h ∗/
20 #end i f
21 #end i f /∗ not IP VHL ∗/
22 u i n t 8 t i p t o s ; /∗ t ype o f s e r v i c e ∗/
23 u in t16 t i p l e n ; /∗ t o t a l l e n g t h ∗/
24 u in t16 t i p i d ; /∗ i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ∗/
25 u in t16 t i p o f f ; /∗ f ragment o f f s e t f i e l d ∗/
26 #de f i n e IP RF 0x8000 /∗ r e s e r v e d fragment f l a g ∗/
27 #de f i n e IP DF 0x4000 /∗ dont f ragment f l a g ∗/
28 #de f i n e IP MF 0x2000 /∗ more f ragment s f l a g ∗/
29 #de f i n e IP OFFMASK 0 x 1 f f f /∗ mask f o r f ragmen t ing b i t s ∗/
30 u i n t 8 t i p t t l ; /∗ t ime to l i v e ∗/
31 u i n t 8 t ip p ; /∗ p r o t o c o l ∗/
32 u in t16 t ip sum ; /∗ checksum ∗/
33 struct in addr i p s r c , i p d s t ; /∗ source and d e s t add re s s ∗/
34 } ;
35
36 /∗ TCP header ∗/
37 struct s n i f f t c p
38 {
39 u in t16 t th spo r t ; /∗ source po r t ∗/
40 u in t16 t th dport ; /∗ d e s t i n a t i o n po r t ∗/
41 u in t32 t th seq ; /∗ sequence number ∗/
42 u in t32 t th ack ; /∗ acknowledgement number ∗/
43 #i f BYTEORDER == LITTLE ENDIAN
44 u in t 8 t th x2 : 4 , /∗ ( unused ) ∗/
45 t h o f f : 4 ; /∗ data o f f s e t ∗/
46 #end i f
47 #i f BYTEORDER == BIG ENDIAN
48 u in t 8 t t h o f f : 4 , /∗ data o f f s e t ∗/
49 th x2 : 4 ; /∗ ( unused ) ∗/
50 #end i f
51 u i n t 8 t t h f l a g s ;
52 #de f i n e TH FIN 0x01
53 #de f i n e TH SYN 0x02
54 #de f i n e TH RST 0x04
55 #de f i n e TH PUSH 0x08
56 #de f i n e TH ACK 0x10
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57 #de f i n e TH URG 0x20
58 #de f i n e TH ECE 0x40
59 #de f i n e THCWR 0x80
60 #de f i n e TH FLAGS (TH FIN |TH SYN |TH RST |TH ACK|TH URG|TH ECE |THCWR)
61 u in t16 t th win ; /∗ window ∗/
62 u in t16 t th sum ; /∗ checksum ∗/
63 u in t16 t th urp ; /∗ urgen t p o i n t e r ∗/
64 } ;
65
66 /∗ UDP header ∗/
67 struct s n i f f u dp
68 {
69 u in t16 t uh sport ; /∗ Source Port ∗/
70 u in t16 t uh dport ; /∗ Des t i n a t i on Port ∗/
71 u in t16 t uh len ; /∗ Udp l e n g t h ∗/
72 u in t16 t uh check ; /∗ Checksum ∗/
73 } ;
74
75
76 /∗ ””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””
77 Name : n e t h a c k d e t e c t
78 Vers ion : 2 .80 Beta
79 Author : Pete Sandford
80 Date : 26 th o f November 2003
81 Last Rev : 3 Feb 2006
82
83 Des c r i p t i on : This program i s d e s i gned to be run
84 on a s i n g l e machine u s ing l i n u x . The
85 program has 2 p r o c e s s e s .
86
87 One p ro c e s s works on the cap tu red packe t s ,
88 s t o r i n g data in r e a l t ime . The o t h e r p r o c e s s
89 works in a batch−s t y l e manner c r e a t i n g
90 s t a t i s c t i a l summaries in a quas i−r e a l t ime
91 manner .
92
93 The f i r s t p r o c e s s i s memory i n t e n s i v e , bu t
94 e f f o r t has been made to ensure t h e p r o c e s s i n g
95 per pack e t i s k e p t to a minimum .
96
97
98 ”””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””””” ∗/
99 #define LIBNET BIG ENDIAN 1
100
101 #include <pcap . h>
102 #include <s t d i o . h>
103 #include <s t d l i b . h>
104 #include <errno . h>
105
106 #include <sys / socket . h>
107 #include <ne t i n e t / in . h>
108 #include <arpa/ i n e t . h>
109 #include <s i g n a l . h>
110 #include <net / i f . h>
111 #include <ne t i n e t / i f e t h e r . h>
112 #include <ne t i n e t / tcp . h>
113 #include <math . h>
114 #include <time . h>
115 #include <sys /shm . h>
116 #include ” nethack types . h”
117 #include <sys / types . h>
118 #include <unis td . h>
119 #include <s t r i n g . h>
120 #include <getopt . h>
121 #include < l i b n e t . h>
122
123 #define BSD SOURCE 1
124 #define FILE SIZE 10000
125 #define SMTP FILE SIZE 10000000
126 /∗ Smtp t r i g g e r l e v e l (0−1000) ∗/
127 #define SMTP TRIGGER 600
128 /∗ I n t e r f a c e s ∗/
129 #define INTERFACE1 ” eth1 ”
130 #define INTERFACE2 ” eth2 ”
131 /∗ Def ine t h e header s i z e s ∗/
132 #define e t h s i z e 14
133 #define i p s i z e 20
134 /∗ IP RANGE i s t h e maximum number o f s u bn e t s ( t h i s i s a l o o s e d e f i n i t i o n , s imp ly 2ˆ24 , xxx . xxx
. xxx . f i x e d ) ∗/
135 #define IP RANGE 16777216
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136
137 /∗ Funct ion d e f i n i t i o n s ∗/
138 void proce s s ( u char ∗ us e l e s s , const struct pcap pkthdr∗ pkthdr , const u char∗ packet ) ;
139 void u s e r e x i t ( int ) ;
140 void r epor t (void ) ;
141 int a l e r t (void ) ;
142 f loat ks ( f loat ∗ , f loat ∗ , int , int ) ;
143
144 /∗ A l e r t i n g Module L imi t s ∗/
145 f loat a l e r t i n g v a r s [ 3 0 ] ;
146
147 /∗ Sw i t ch e s to c o n t r o l which s e t o f memory i s b e i n g addre s s ed by t h e w r i t e / read p r o c e s s e s ∗/
148 int memswitchread=0;
149 int memswitchwrite=0;
150
151 /∗ s i t e number ∗/
152 int s i t e =1;
153
154 /∗ Shared memory i d ∗/
155 int shmid ;
156
157 /∗ F i l e ou t pu t s ∗/
158 FILE∗ smtp ;
159 FILE∗ a l e r t f i l e ;
160
161 /∗ Shared memory segment ∗/
162 struct shmid ds∗ shmid ds ;
163
164 /∗ The p ro c e s s ID o f t h e c h i l d p r o c e s s ∗/
165 int pid ;
166
167 /∗ The S i z e o f t h e sample o f p a c k e t s to t a k e b e f o r e r e p o r t i n g ∗/
168 u in t32 t packet sample = 0 ;
169
170 /∗ The t o t a l number o f p a c k e t s cap tu red by t he program ∗/
171 u in t32 t packet count = 0 ;
172
173 /∗ SMTP Counter ∗/
174 u in t32 t smtp f i l e c oun t =0;
175 u in t32 t smtp packet count=0;
176
177 /∗ The l o g number to s t a r t w i th ∗/
178 u in t32 t f i l e c o u n t =0;
179 /∗ S t r u c t u r e to ho l d t h e inpu t s i g n a t u r e s ∗/
180 struct s i g
181 {
182 /∗ L i s t o f p o r t s w i th s i g n a t u r e s on them (Maximum o f 10 on any 1 pack e t s i z e , cou l d be more
than 1 i n s t an c e on a po r t ) ∗/
183 int p o r t l i s t [ 1 0 ] ;
184 /∗ L i s t o f t h e s i g n a t u r e s f o r each o f t h e po r t ’ s f i n g e r p r i n t s ∗/
185 char s i g l i s t [ 1 0 ] [ 1 6 0 0 ] ;
186 /∗ The number o f s i g n a t u r e s f o r t h i s po r t ∗/
187 short number ;
188 } ;
189
190 struct share mem
191 {
192 /∗ An array o f f l a g s , i n d i c a t i n g whether an IP has been seen by t h e a p p l i c a t i o n or not . ∗/
193 char i p s r c a r r a y [ IP RANGE ] ;
194 char i p d s t a r r a y [ IP RANGE ] ;
195
196 /∗ An array , w i th an e lement f o r each pack e t s i z e . ∗/
197 u in t16 t i p p a c k e t s i z e [ 1 5 3 8 ] ;
198 u in t16 t udp packe t s i z e [ 1 5 3 8 ] ;
199 u in t16 t t c p pa c k e t s i z e [ 1 5 3 8 ] ;
200 u in t16 t i cmp packe t s i z e [ 1 5 3 8 ] ;
201
202 /∗ An array wi th an e lement f o r each TCP por t number ∗/
203 u in t16 t t cp spo r t [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
204 u in t16 t tcp dport [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
205 u in t16 t i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
206 u in t16 t checksum [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
207
208 /∗ An array wi th an e lement f o r each TTL f i e l d ∗/
209 long t t l [ 2 5 6 ] ;
210 long udp t t l [ 2 5 6 ] ;
211 long t c p t t l [ 2 5 6 ] ;
212 long i cmp t t l [ 2 5 6 ] ;
213
214 /∗ SMTP v a r i a b l e s ∗/
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215 long smtp count ;
216 long smtp t o t a l b i t s ;
217 long Non NTL smtp count ;
218 long Non NTL smtp total bits ;
219
220 /∗ Skype v a r i a b l e s ∗/
221 long skype count ;
222 long s k y p e t o t a l b i t s ;
223
224 /∗ An array wi th an e lement f o r each UDP por t number ∗/
225 u in t16 t udp sport [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
226 u in t16 t udp dport [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
227
228 /∗ Counters f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o t o c o l s ∗/
229 long cTCP,cUDP, cTotalIP , cICMP, cUnknownIP ;
230
231 /∗ Counters f o r t h e TCP f l a g s ∗/
232 long FIN , SYN, RST, PUSH, ACK,URG;
233
234 /∗ Average pac k e t s i z e s f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o t o c o l s ∗/
235 long saTotal , saTCP , saUDP, saICMP ;
236
237 /∗ Flag s to i n d i c a t e whether t h e shared memory has been w r i t t e n / read (0 f o r no , 1 f o r yes )
∗/
238 short wr i t t en ;
239 short read ;
240 } ;
241
242 /∗ A po i n t e r to t h e shared memory ∗/
243 struct share mem ∗ sharept r ;
244
245 /∗ Nasty Fudge:− There i s a bug somewhere in t h e program which cause s a f r e e ( ) prob lem . This
workaround a l l ow s t h e memory a t t h e s h a r e p t r l o c a t i o n to be f r e e d . ∗/
246 struct share mem ∗ s h a r e p t r f r e e ;
247
248 /∗ A s e t o f S i gna tu re s , s t o r e d f o r each pack e t s i z e ∗/
249 struct s i g de tec t mat r ix [ 1 5 3 8 ] ;
250
251 /∗ S i gna tu r e i npu t and ou tpu t f i l e s ∗/
252 FILE∗ s i g ou tput ;
253 FILE∗ s i g i n pu t ;
254
255 /∗ Mode v a r i a b l e s ∗/
256 int l =0;
257 int a=0;
258 int p=0;
259 int s=0;
260 int f =0;
261 int c=0;
262 int v=0;
263 int h=0;
264 int n=0;
265
266 int main ( int argc , char ∗∗argv )
267 {
268 /∗ Var i a b l e De c l a r a t i on s ∗/
269 char ∗dev ; /∗ Device to be l i s t e n e d on ∗/
270 char e r rbu f [PCAP ERRBUF SIZE ] ;
271 pcap t∗ desc r ;
272 pcap t∗ descr1 ;
273 pcap t∗ descr2 ;
274 short pa c k e t s l o s t =0;
275 int i , r t rn ;
276 FILE∗ a l e r t i n ;
277 u in t32 t pa ck e t t o t a l ;
278 int opt ;
279 char c u r r e n t l i n e [ 1 0 0 0 ] ;
280 int pos ;
281
282 /∗ op t i on s
283 a − spam
284 f − f i l e
285 c − cap tu r e sample s i z e
286 v − v e r b o s e
287 p − pa c k e t s t o t a l t o cap tu r e
288 l − Log s t a r t number
289 h − h e l p
290 n − t r i g g e r
291 r − s i t e number ∗/
292 while ( ( opt = getopt ( argc , argv , ” ads f : c : vihp : l : nr : ” ) ) !=EOF){
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293 switch ( opt ){
294 case ’ a ’ :
295 a=1;
296 break ;
297 case ’ s ’ :
298 s=1;
299 break ;
300 case ’ f ’ :
301 f =1;
302 s i g i npu t = fopen ( optarg , ” r ” ) ;
303 break ;
304 case ’ c ’ :
305 c=1;
306 packet sample = a to i ( optarg ) ;
307 break ;
308 case ’ v ’ :
309 v=1;
310 break ;
311 case ’ h ’ :
312 p r i n t f ( ”Options :\n−n Enable A l e r t ing Module\n−f < f i l e > Enable Checksum module with
s p e c i f i e d f i l e \n−a Enable Spam Module\n−c <sample> Set sample S i z e \n−v Enable
Verbose output\n−p <packets> Set the number o f Packets to capture\n−a SMTP
logge r \n−r S i t e number\n−h Help − You ’ re l ook ing at me baby !\n” ) ;
313 e x i t (0 ) ;
314 break ;
315 case ’ p ’ :
316 p=1;
317 pa ck e t t o t a l = a to l ( optarg ) ;
318 break ;
319 case ’ l ’ :
320 l =1;
321 f i l e c o u n t = a to l ( optarg ) ;
322 break ;
323 case ’ n ’ :
324 n=1;
325 break ;
326 case ’ r ’ :
327 s i t e = a to i ( optarg ) ;
328 break ;
329 }
330 }
331
332 /∗ Attempt to a l l o c a t e t h e memory f o r t h e shared memory array (˜80 MB) ∗/
333 i f ( ( sharept r = malloc (2∗ s izeof ( struct share mem ) ) ) == NULL)
334 {
335 p r i n t f ( ”Error A l l o ca t i ng Memory\n” ) ;
336 e x i t (1 ) ;
337 }
338
339 /∗ Copy the shared memory p o i n t e r to a l l ow us to fudge i t l a t e r ∗/
340 s h a r e p t r f r e e = sharept r ;
341
342 /∗ Create a shared memory segment ∗/
343 shmid = shmget ( ( key t ) IPC PRIVATE, 2∗ s izeof ( struct share mem ) , IPC CREAT) ;
344 i f ( shmid < 0)
345 {
346 per ro r ( ” shared memory a l l o c a t i o n f a i l u r e \n” ) ;
347 e x i t (1 ) ;
348 }
349
350
351 /∗ Attach t he paren t p r o c e s s to t h e memory ( c h i l d w i l l i n h e r i t ) ∗/
352 i f ( ( sharept r = ( struct share mem ∗) shmat ( shmid , 0 , 0 ) ) == ( struct share mem ∗)−1)
353 per ro r ( ”Can ’ t attach to shared memory\n” ) ;
354
355 /∗ Handle User Ex i t ∗/
356 s i g n a l (SIGINT , u s e r e x i t ) ;
357
358 p r i n t f ( ”∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗\n∗ Network T r a f f i c Analyser ∗\n∗
Vers ion : 3 .10 Beta ∗\n∗ Author : Peter Sandford ∗\n∗ Date :
March 2005 ∗\n∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗∗\n\n” ) ;
359
360
361 /∗ Set t h e sample s i z e ∗/
362 i f ( ! c )
363 {
364 packet sample = 300000;
365 p r i n t f ( ”Defau l t packet sample s i z e used : %u\n” , packet sample ) ;
366 }
367
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368 /∗ I f we are in a l e r t i n g mode ∗/
369 i f (n){
370 i =0;
371 /∗ Open the f i l e s ∗/
372 a l e r t i n = fopen ( ” a l e r t v a r i a b l e s . txt ” , ” r ” ) ;
373 /∗ I f we have an e r r o r opening ∗/
374 i f ( a l e r t i n==NULL)
375 {
376 p r i n t f ( ”Error A l e r t ing f i l e \n” ) ;
377 e x i t (1 ) ;
378 }
379 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , a l e r t i n ) ;
380 while ( ! f e o f ( a l e r t i n ) )
381 {
382 a l e r t i n g v a r s [ i ]= a to f ( s t r t ok ( cu r r en t l i n e , ”\n” ) ) ;
383 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , a l e r t i n ) ;
384 i++;
385 }
386 }
387
388 /∗ I f we are comp i l i n g t h e Checksum ve r s i o n ∗/
389 i f ( f ){
390 /∗ Open the f i l e s ∗/
391 p r i n t f ( ”Opening output and input f i l e s \n” ) ;
392 s i g ou tput = fopen ( ”Attacks . txt ” , ”w” ) ;
393 f p r i n t f ( s i g output , ”This i s the Attack Log\n” ) ;
394 /∗ I f we have an e r r o r opening ∗/
395 i f ( s i g i n pu t==NULL)
396 {
397 p r i n t f ( ”Error opening s i g i npu t f i l e \n” ) ;
398 e x i t (1 ) ;
399 }
400 /∗ Get a l i n e ∗/
401 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , s i g i n pu t ) ;
402 /∗ Read in a l l v a r i a b l e s and s t o r e in t h e d e t e c t i o n matr ix ∗/
403 while ( ! f e o f ( s i g i n pu t ) )
404 {
405 pos = a to i ( s t r t ok ( cu r r en t l i n e , ” \n” ) ) ;
406 p r i n t f ( ”%d\n” , pos ) ;
407 de tec t mat r ix [ pos ] . p o r t l i s t [ de t ec t mat r ix [ pos ] . number ] = a to i ( s t r t ok (NULL, ” \n” ) ) ;
408 s t rcpy ( de tec t mat r ix [ pos ] . s i g l i s t [ de t ec t mat r ix [ pos ] . number ] , s t r t ok (NULL, ” \n” ) ) ;
409 p r i n t f ( ”Added ’%s ’ at %d to l i b r a r y at r e f e r e n c e %d\n” , de t ec t mat r ix [ pos ] . s i g l i s t [
de t ec t mat r ix [ pos ] . number ] , pos , de t ec t mat r ix [ pos ] . number ) ;
410 de tec t mat r ix [ pos ] . number++;
411 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , s i g i n pu t ) ;
412
413 }
414 }
415 dev=”any” ;
416 /∗ Check to see i f we found a d e v i c e ∗/
417 i f ( dev == NULL)
418 {
419 p r i n t f ( ”%s\n” , e r rbu f ) ; e x i t (1 ) ;
420 }
421
422 descr1 = pcap open l i v e (INTERFACE1,64 ,1 ,−1 , e r rbu f ) ;
423 descr2 = pcap open l i v e (INTERFACE2,64 ,1 ,−1 , e r rbu f ) ;
424 /∗ Open the d e v i c e ∗/
425 desc r = pcap open l i v e ( ”any” ,64 ,1 ,−1 , e r rbu f ) ;
426 i f ( desc r == NULL)
427 {
428 p r i n t f ( ” pcap open l i v e ( ) : %s\n” , e r rbu f ) ; e x i t (1 ) ;
429 }
430
431 p r i n t f ( ”Enter ing Capture , l i s t e n i n g on %s\n\n” , dev ) ;
432
433 /∗ Allow the p ro c e s s to w r i t e to t h e shared memory ∗/
434 sharept r [ 0 ] . wr i t t en = 0 ; /∗ [ 0 ] i n d i c a t e s t h e f i r s t b l o c k o f memory 0 i n d i c a t e s NOT wr i t t e n
∗/
435 sharept r [ 0 ] . read = 1 ; /∗ [ 0 ] i n d i c a t e s t h e f i r s t b l o c k o f memory 1 i n d i c a t e s read p ro c e s s
has f i n i s h e d ∗/
436 sharept r [ 1 ] . wr i t t en = 0 ; /∗ [ 1 ] i n d i c a t e s t h e second b l o c k o f memory 0 i n d i c a t e s NOT
wr i t t e n ∗/
437 sharept r [ 1 ] . read = 1 ; /∗ [ 1 ] i n d i c a t e s t h e second b l o c k o f memory 1 i n d i c a t e s read p ro c e s s
has f i n i s h e d ∗/
438
439 /∗ Create a new pro c e s s ∗/
440 i f ( ( pid = fo rk ( ) ) < 0)
441 {
442 per ro r ( ” fo rk ” ) ;
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443 ex i t (1 ) ;
444 }
445
446 /∗ I f we are t h e c h i l d ∗/
447 i f ( pid == 0)
448 {
449 repor t ( ) ;
450 }
451
452 i f ( ! p )
453 {
454 pa ck e t t o t a l=−1;
455 }
456 i f ( a ){
457
458 smtp=fopen ( ” smtp log000000 . csv ” , ”w” ) ;
459 }
460 i f ( v )
461 {
462 p r i n t f ( ”Sample s i z e :%d\n” , packet sample ) ;
463 }
464 /∗ Main l oop . Ca l l s p r o c e s s ( pac k e t ) when a pa c k e t s i s i n t e r c e p t e d ∗/
465 i f ( p a ck e t t o t a l != −1)
466 {
467 i f ( v ){
468 p r i n t f ( ”Capturing f o r %u packets\n” , pa ck e t t o t a l ) ;
469 }
470 for ( i =0; i<( pa ck e t t o t a l / packet sample )+1; i++)
471 {
472 /∗ I f t h e memory i s not c u r r e n t l y b e i n g read ∗/
473 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . read == 1)
474 {
475 /∗ Set t h e w r i t i n g f l a g to p r e v en t t h e c h i l d r ead ing ∗/
476 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . wr i t t en =0;
477 /∗ Check f o r l o s t p a c k e t s ∗/
478 i f ( p a c k e t s l o s t ==1)
479 {
480 p r i n t f ( ” Po t en t i a l l y dropped 1 or more Packets\n” ) ;
481 p a c k e t s l o s t = 0 ;
482 }
483 /∗ Capture pa c k e t s ∗/
484 pcap loop ( descr , packet sample , process ,NULL) ;
485 /∗ Fin i shed wr i t i n g , so a l l ow the c h i l d to read ∗/
486 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . wr i t t en =1;
487 /∗ Move to t h e second b l o c k o f memory ∗/
488 memswitchwrite = ! memswitchwrite ;
489 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”Memswitchwrite = %d\n” , memswitchwrite ) ;}
490 }
491 else
492 {
493 /∗ I f we are unab l e to read c u r r e n t l y ∗/
494 pa c k e t s l o s t = 1 ;
495 i−−; /∗ Decrement to ensure t h e r e q u i r e d number o f p a c k e t s i s s t i l l c ap tu red ∗/
496 }
497 }
498 }
499 else
500 {
501 while (1 )
502 {
503 i f ( v ){
504 p r i n t f ( ”Capturing Continuously\n” ) ;
505 }
506
507 /∗ I f t h e memory i s not c u r r e n t l y b e i n g read ∗/
508 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . read == 1)
509 {
510 /∗ Set t h e w r i t i n g f l a g to p r e v en t t h e c h i l d r ead ing ∗/
511 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . wr i t t en =0;
512 /∗ Check f o r l o s t p a c k e t s ∗/
513 i f ( p a c k e t s l o s t ==1)
514 {
515 p r i n t f ( ” Po t en t i a l l y dropped 1 or more Packets\n” ) ;
516 p a c k e t s l o s t = 0 ;
517 }
518 /∗ Capture pa c k e t s ∗/
519 pcap loop ( descr , packet sample , process ,NULL) ;
520 /∗ Fin i shed wr i t i n g , so a l l ow the c h i l d to read ∗/
521 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . wr i t t en =1;
522 /∗ Move to t h e second b l o c k o f memory ∗/
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523 memswitchwrite = ! memswitchwrite ;
524 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”Memswitchwrite = %d\n” , memswitchwrite ) ;}
525 }
526 else
527 {
528 /∗ I f we are unab l e to read c u r r e n t l y ∗/
529 pa c k e t s l o s t = 1 ;
530 }
531 }
532 }
533
534 p r i n t f ( ”Leaving Capture\n” ) ;
535
536 /∗ Close cap tu r e ∗/
537 pcap c l o s e ( desc r ) ;
538 pcap c l o s e ( descr1 ) ;
539 pcap c l o s e ( descr2 ) ;
540
541 /∗ Ensure t h e c h i l d r e c i e v e s t h e e x i t command ∗/
542 sharept r [ 1 ] . wr i t t en = −1;
543 sharept r [ 0 ] . wr i t t en = −1;
544 /∗ Ca l l f u n c t i o n to show a l l s t a t i s t i c s ∗/
545 i f ( shmdt ( sharept r )<0)
546 {
547 per ro r ( ”Detach Fa i l ed \n” ) ;
548 }
549
550 p r i n t f ( ”Clos ing Capture\n\n” ) ;
551 p r i n t f ( ” Exi t ing Normally\n\n” ) ;
552 /∗ Wait f o r t h e c h i l d p r o c e s s to e x i t ∗/
553 s l e ep (10) ;
554 /∗ Free t h e memory us ing a s e pa r a t e p o i n t e r ∗/
555 p r i n t f ( ”Free Memory\n” ) ;
556 f r e e ( s h a r e p t r f r e e ) ;
557 p r i n t f ( ”Memory Free\n” ) ;
558 f c l o s e ( s i g i n pu t ) ;
559 f c l o s e ( s i g ou tput ) ;
560 /∗ Re lease t h e shared memory segment ∗/
561 i f ( ( r t rn = shmctl ( shmid , IPC RMID , shmid ds ) ) == −1)
562 {
563 per ro r ( ” shmctl : shmctl f a i l e d ” ) ;
564 e x i t (1 ) ;
565 }
566 else
567 {
568 p r i n t f ( ”Shared Memory Released\n” ) ;
569 }
570
571
572
573 return 0 ;
574 }
575
576
577 void proce s s ( u char ∗ us e l e s s , const struct pcap pkthdr∗ pkthdr , const u char∗ packet )
578 {
579 const struct s n i f f e t h e r n e t ∗ e the rne t ; /∗ The e t h e r n e t header ∗/
580 const struct s n i f f i p ∗ ip ; /∗ The IP header ∗/
581 const struct s n i f f t c p ∗ tcp ; /∗ The TCP header ∗/
582 const struct s n i f f u dp ∗udp ; /∗ The TCP header ∗/
583 int sum ; /∗ Checksum c a l c u l a t e d ∗/
584 char ∗data ; /∗ A po i n t e r to t h e data f i e l d o f t h e pack e t ∗/
585 char new sig [ 3 0 0 0 ] ; /∗ F in g e r p r i n t da ta ∗/
586 int data length , i , j , k , l , s ig number ;
587 char sm tp f i l e [ 2 0 ] ;
588 struct t imeval smtp time ;
589 struct timezone smtp zone ;
590 l =0;
591
592 /∗ Map the e t h e r n e t and IP header s over t h e pack e t ∗/
593 int s i z e i p = s izeof ( struct s n i f f i p ) ;
594 int s i z e e t h e r n e t = s izeof ( struct s n i f f e t h e r n e t ) ;
595 /∗ u i n t 3 2 t count , i p c o un t =0;
596 Check we have a v a l i d s i z e d pack e t ∗/
597 i f ( s t r l e n ( ( char∗) packet )>1600)
598 {
599 p r i n t f ( ”ERROR: Packet Exceeded Maximum Size : %d bytes ” , s t r l e n ( ( char∗) packet ) ) ;
600 }
601
602 /∗ Use a s t r u c t u r e mask to d e v e l o p e v a r i a b l e s ∗/
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603 ethe rne t = ( struct s n i f f e t h e r n e t ∗) ( packet ) ;
604 ip = ( struct s n i f f i p ∗) ( packet + s i z e e t h e r n e t ) ;
605 tcp = ( struct s n i f f t c p ∗) ( packet + s i z e e t h e r n e t+s i z e i p ) ;
606 udp = ( struct s n i f f u dp ∗) ( packet + s i z e e t h e r n e t+s i z e i p ) ;
607
608 /∗ I f we have an IP e t h e r n e t pac k e t ∗/
609 i f ( ethernet−>e the r type == ( u in t16 t ) 8)
610 {
611
612 /∗ I f we have not seen t h i s source IP b e f o r e ∗/
613 i f ( ! sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i p s r c a r r a y [ ( u in t 32 t ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p s r c . s addr ) /256) ] )
614 {
615 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i p s r c a r r a y [ ( u in t 32 t ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p s r c . s addr ) /256) ]=1;
616 }
617
618 /∗ I f we have not seen t h i s d e s t i n a t i o n IP b e f o r e ∗/
619 i f ( ! sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i p d s t a r r a y [ ( u in t 32 t ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) /256) ] )
620 {
621 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i p d s t a r r a y [ ( u in t 32 t ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) /256) ]=1;
622 }
623
624 /∗ Increment t h e TTL f o r t h e v a l u e in t h e pack e t ∗/
625 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . t t l [ ip−> i p t t l ]++;
626
627 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e new packe t s i z e ∗/
628 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i p p a c k e t s i z e [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ]++;
629
630 /∗ Increment t h e t o t a l IP pack e t coun te r ∗/
631 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTotalIP++;
632
633 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n ∗/
634 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ ntohs ( ip−>i p i d ) ]++;
635
636 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e checksum ∗/
637 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . checksum [ ntohs ( ip−>ip sum ) ]++;
638
639 /∗ Determine t h e p r o t o c o l o f t h e new packe t ∗/
640 switch ( ip−>i p p )
641 {
642 /∗ TCP ∗/
643 case ( char ) 6 :
644 i f ( f ){
645 i f ( de t ec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . number != 0)
646 {
647 data l ength = ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) − (4∗( int ) ip−>i p h l ) ;
648 data = ( char∗) ( packet + s i z e e t h e r n e t+s i z e i p + 8) ;
649 sum = ntohs (udp−>uh check ) ;
650
651 for ( j =0; j<detec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . number ; j++)
652 {
653 i f ( de t ec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . p o r t l i s t [ j ]==ntohs (udp−>uh dport ) )
654 {
655 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ”Checking f o r ’ ” ) ;
656
657 for ( i =0; i<(data l ength − 8) ; i++)
658 {
659 for ( k=0;k<2;k++)
660 {
661 i f ( ( char ) ∗( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ l ) !=(char ) 0)
662 {
663 i f ( ( int ) ∗( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ l )<59)
664 {
665 sig number += (( int ) (∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j
]+ l ) )−48)∗pow(16 ,(1−k ) ) ;
666 }
667 else
668 {
669 sig number += (( int ) (∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j
]+ l ) )−55)∗pow(16 ,(1−k ) ) ;
670 }
671 }
672 l++;
673 }
674 ∗( new s ig+i ) = ( char ) s ig number ;
675 sig number=0;
676
677 ∗( data+i ) = ∗( new s ig+i ) ;
678 f p r i n t f ( s i g output , ”%c” ,∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+
i ) ) ;
679 }
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680 l =0;
681 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ” ’\n” ) ;
682 l ibnet do checksum (( u char ∗) ip , IPPROTO TCP, data l ength ) ;
683
684 i f ( ntohs (udp−>uh check )==sum)
685 {
686 f p r i n t f ( s i g output , ”Virus I d e n t i f i e d \n” ) ;
687 }
688 }
689 }
690 }
691 }
692 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTCP++;
693 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTCP −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTCP − ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n )
) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTCP) ;
694 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal − ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTotalIP ) ;
695 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . t cp spo r t [ ntohs ( tcp−>th spo r t ) ]++;
696 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . t cp dport [ ntohs ( tcp−>th dport ) ]++;
697
698 /∗ Check f o r SMTP ∗/
699 i f ( a ){
700 i f ( ( ntohs ( tcp−>th dport )==25))
701 {
702 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”Got SMTP Packet\n” ) ;}
703 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . sm tp t o t a l b i t s += ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ;
704 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH SYN){
705 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”Got SMTP Syn\n” ) ;}
706 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . smtp count++;
707 /∗ p r i n t f (”\nSMTP Syn\n”) ; ∗/
708 i f (
709 ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) !=(0x5005B6C1 ) ) &&
710 ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) !=(0x5167DD0B) ) &&
711 ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) !=(0xD4DAA208) )
712 ){
713 /∗ f p r i n t f (”PACKET SMTP HEADING WRONG WAY\n”) ; ∗/
714 /∗ p r i n t f (”%u.%u : %x ,%x\n” , n t o h l ( ip−>i p d s t . s add r ) ) ; ∗/
715 /∗ f p r i n t f ( smtp ,”%x ,%x\n” , n t o h l ( ip−>i p s r c . s add r ) , n t o h l ( ip−>i p d s t . s add r ) ) ;
∗/
716 gett imeofday(&smtp time , &smtp zone ) ;
717 f p r i n t f ( smtp , ”%i .%06 l i ,%d.%d.%d.%d,%d.%d.%d.%d\n” , smtp time . tv sec , smtp time
. tv usec , ( u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p s r c . s addr )>>24) , ( u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>
i p s r c . s addr )>>16) , ( u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p s r c . s addr )>>8) , ( u char ) ( ntohl
( ip−>i p s r c . s addr ) ) , ( u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr )>>24) , ( u char ) (
ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr )>>16) , ( u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr )>>8) , (
u char ) ( ntohl ( ip−>i p d s t . s addr ) ) ) ;
718 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . Non NTL smtp total bits += ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ;
719 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . Non NTL smtp count++;
720 smtp packet count++;
721 i f ( smtp packet count > SMTP FILE SIZE){
722 smtp f i l e c oun t++;
723 f c l o s e ( smtp ) ;
724 s p r i n t f ( smtp f i l e , ” smtp Log%06d . csv ” , smtp f i l e c oun t ) ;
725 smtp = fopen ( smtp f i l e , ”w” ) ;
726 smtp packet count=0;
727 }
728 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”SMTP Not heading f o r NTL Serve r s \n” ) ;}
729 }
730 }
731
732 }
733 }
734
735 /∗ Increment t h e TTL f o r t h e v a l u e in t h e pack e t ∗/
736 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . t c p t t l [ ip−> i p t t l ]++;
737
738 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e new packe t s i z e ∗/
739 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . t c p pa c k e t s i z e [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ]++;
740
741 /∗ Check f o r s e t Se t f l a g s w i th a l o g i c a l operand ∗/
742 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH FIN)
743 {
744 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . FIN++;
745 }
746 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH SYN)
747 {
748 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . SYN++;
749 }
750 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH RST)
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751 {
752 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . RST++;
753 }
754 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH PUSH)
755 {
756 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . PUSH++;
757 }
758 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH ACK)
759 {
760 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] .ACK++;
761 }
762 i f ( tcp−>t h f l a g s & TH URG)
763 {
764 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] .URG++;
765 }
766
767 break ;
768 /∗ ICMP ∗/
769 case ( char ) 1 :
770 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cICMP++;
771 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saICMP −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saICMP − ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cICMP) ;
772 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal − ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTotalIP ) ;
773
774 /∗ Increment t h e TTL f o r t h e v a l u e in t h e pack e t ∗/
775 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i cmp t t l [ ip−> i p t t l ]++;
776
777 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e new packe t s i z e ∗/
778 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . i cmp packe t s i z e [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ]++;
779 break ;
780 /∗ UDP ∗/
781 case ( char ) 17 :
782 i f ( f ){
783 i f ( de t ec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . number != 0)
784 {
785 data l ength = ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) − (4∗( int ) ip−>i p h l ) ;
786 data = ( char∗) ( packet + s i z e e t h e r n e t+s i z e i p + 8) ;
787
788 sum = ntohs (udp−>uh check ) ;
789
790 for ( j =0; j<detec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . number ; j++)
791 {
792 i f ( de t ec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . p o r t l i s t [ j ]==ntohs (udp−>uh dport ) )
793 {
794 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ”Checking f o r ’ ” ) ;
795
796 for ( i =0; i<(data l ength − 8) ; i++)
797 {
798 for ( k=0;k<2;k++)
799 {
800 i f ( ( char ) ∗( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ l ) !=(char ) 0)
801 {
802
803 i f ( ( int ) ∗( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ l )<59)
804 {
805 sig number += (( int ) (∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+
l ) )−48)∗pow(16 ,(1−k ) ) ;
806 }
807 else
808 {
809 sig number += (( int ) (∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+
l ) )−55)∗pow(16 ,(1−k ) ) ;
810 }
811 }
812 l++;
813 }
814 /∗ ∗( da ta+i ) = ∗( d e t e c t ma t r i x [ n tohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ i ) ; ∗/
815 ∗( new s ig+i ) = ( char ) s ig number ;
816 sig number=0;
817
818
819 ∗( data+i ) = ∗( new s ig+i ) ;
820 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ”%c” ,∗ ( de tec t mat r ix [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ] . s i g l i s t [ j ]+ i )
) ;
821 }
822 l =0;
823 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ” ’\n” ) ;
824 l ibnet do checksum (( u char ∗) ip , IPPROTO UDP, data l ength ) ;
825
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826 i f ( ntohs (udp−>uh check )==sum)
827 {
828 f p r i n t f ( s ig output , ”Virus I d e n t i f i e d \n” ) ;
829 }
830 }
831 }
832 }
833 }
834 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cUDP++;
835 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saUDP −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saUDP − ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n )
) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cUDP) ;
836 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal − ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTotalIP ) ;
837 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . udp sport [ ntohs (udp−>uh sport ) ]++;
838 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . udp dport [ ntohs (udp−>uh dport ) ]++;
839
840 /∗ Increment t h e TTL f o r t h e v a l u e in t h e pack e t ∗/
841 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . udp t t l [ ip−> i p t t l ]++;
842
843 /∗ Increment t h e coun te r which cor r e sponds to t h e new packe t s i z e ∗/
844 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . udp packe t s i z e [ ntohs ( ip−>i p l e n ) ]++;
845 break ;
846 default :
847 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cUnknownIP++;
848 sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal −= (( sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . saTotal − ntohs ( ip−>
i p l e n ) ) / sharept r [ memswitchwrite ] . cTotalIP ) ;
849 break ;
850 }
851 }
852 /∗ Increment t h e t o t a l pa c k e t coun te r ∗/
853 packet count++;
854
855 }
856
857 void r epor t (void )
858 {
859 u in t32 t count , ip count=0, ip countd=0;
860 int d i f f e r e n c e s e c ;
861 long d i f f e r e n c e u s e c ;
862 u in t16 t t t l p o s i t i o n [ 5 ] ;
863 long t t l v a l u e [ 5 ] ;
864 u in t16 t udp t t l p o s i t i o n [ 5 ] ;
865 long udp t t l v a l u e [ 5 ] ;
866 u in t16 t t c p t t l p o s i t i o n [ 5 ] ;
867 long t c p t t l v a l u e [ 5 ] ;
868 u in t16 t i cmp t t l p o s i t i o n [ 5 ] ;
869 long i cmp t t l v a l u e [ 5 ] ;
870 char f i l e [ 1 0 0 ] ;
871 char∗ i p s t r ;
872 char c u r r e n t l i n e [ 2 0 1 ] ;
873 struct in addr in ;
874 FILE∗ output ;
875 FILE∗ Dist ;
876 int h i gh e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ 5 ] ;
877 int h ighe s t packe t count [ 5 ] ;
878 int udp h i gh e s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ 5 ] ;
879 int udp h ighes t packet count [ 5 ] ;
880 int t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ 5 ] ;
881 int t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [ 5 ] ;
882 int i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ 5 ] ;
883 int i cmp h ighes t packet count [ 5 ] ;
884 int i , j ;
885 int h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [ 1 0 ] ;
886 int h ighe s t udp por t f r equency [ 5 ] ;
887 int h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [ 1 0 ] ;
888 int h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [ 5 ] ;
889 int p o r t l i s t [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
890 int po r t l i s t udp [ 6 5 5 3 5 ] ;
891 int x ;
892 /∗ Time v a r i a b l e s ∗/
893 struct t imeval s ta r t , end ;
894 struct timezone tpz ;
895 struct t imespec t ;
896 char output s [ 5 0 ] ;
897 char output s t [ 9 5 0 0 ] ;
898 char command [ 5 0 0 ] ;
899
900 int h i ghe s t i d , h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o n , h ighe s t idb , h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o nb ;
901 f loat h i g h e s t i d r a t i o ;
902
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903 int highest sum , h ighe s t sum loca t i on , highest sumb , h i ghe s t sum loca t i onb ;
904 f loat h i ghe s t sum ra t i o ;
905 f loat normal [ 2 5 6 ] ;
906 f loat cur rent [ 2 5 6 ] ;
907 f loat packet norm [ 1 5 0 0 ] ;
908 f loat packe t cur r [ 1 5 0 0 ] ;
909 f loat ks packet , k s t t l ;
910
911 Dist = fopen ( ”TTL Distr ibution . csv ” , ” r ” ) ;
912 i f ( Dist==NULL){
913 p r i n t f ( ”Error Opening TTL Di s t r i bu t i on F i l e \n” ) ;
914 e x i t (1 ) ;
915 }
916
917 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , Dist ) ;
918 x=1;
919 while ( ! f e o f ( Dist ) ){
920 normal [ x ] = ato f ( s t r t ok ( cu r r en t l i n e , ” \n” ) ) ;
921 i f ( v ) p r i n t f ( ”Added ’% f ’ at %d to TTL Di s t r i bu t i on \n” , normal [ x ] , x ) ;
922 x++;
923 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , Dist ) ;
924 }
925 f c l o s e ( Dist ) ;
926 Dist = fopen ( ” Packe t D i s t r i bu t i on . csv ” , ” r ” ) ;
927 i f ( Dist==NULL){
928 p r i n t f ( ”Error Opening Packet S i z e D i s t r i bu t i on F i l e \n” ) ;
929 e x i t (1 ) ;
930 }
931 x=0;
932 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , Dist ) ;
933 while ( ! f e o f ( Dist ) ){
934 packet norm [ x ] = ato f ( s t r t ok ( cu r r en t l i n e , ” \n” ) ) ;
935 i f ( v ) p r i n t f ( ”Added ’% f ’ at %d to Packet S i z e D i s t r i bu t i on \n” , packet norm [ x ] , x ) ;
936 x++;
937 f g e t s ( cu r r en t l i n e , 200 , Dist ) ;
938 }
939 f c l o s e ( Dist ) ;
940
941
942 s p r i n t f ( f i l e , ”Log%u” , f i l e c o u n t ) ;
943 f i l e c o u n t = f i l e c o u n t ∗ FILE SIZE ;
944 a l e r t f i l e=fopen ( ” a l e r t . csv ” , ”a” ) ;
945
946
947 /∗ Check to see i f we have r e c e i v e d a s t op command ∗/
948 while ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . wr i t t en != −1)
949 {
950 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . wr i t t en==1)
951 {
952 /∗ Set t h e r ead ing f l a g , t o p r e v en t t h e paren t from wr i t i n g in t h i s memory ∗/
953 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . read = 0 ;
954 i f ( v ){
955 p r i n t f ( ”Child Proces s ing Data\n” ) ;
956 }
957
958 /∗ Get t h e s t a r t t ime o f t h e nex t cap tu r e ∗/
959 gett imeofday(&end , &tpz ) ;
960 nanos leep(&t ,NULL) ;
961 d i f f e r e n c e s e c = end . t v s e c − s t a r t . t v s e c ;
962 d i f f e r e n c e u s e c = ( end . tv usec − s t a r t . tv usec ) ;
963 s t a r t . t v s e c = end . t v s e c ;
964 s t a r t . tv usec = end . tv usec ;
965
966 /∗ Reset Va r i a b l e s ∗/
967 ip count = 0 ;
968 ip countd = 0 ;
969
970 /∗ Packet S i z e Counts ∗/
971 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
972 {
973 h i gh e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = 0 ;
974 h ighe s t packe t count [ i ] = 0 ;
975
976 t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = 0 ;
977 t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [ i ] = 0 ;
978
979 udp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] = 0 ;
980 udp h ighes t packet count [ i ] = 0 ;
981
982 i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] = 0 ;
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983 i cmp h ighes t packet count [ i ] = 0 ;
984
985 t t l v a l u e [ i ] = −1;
986 udp t t l v a l u e [ i ] = −1;
987 i cmp t t l v a l u e [ i ] = −1;
988 t c p t t l v a l u e [ i ] = −1;
989
990 h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [ i ] = 0 ;
991 h i ghe s t udp por t f r equency [ i ] = 0 ;
992 }
993
994 for ( i =0; i <10; i++){
995 h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [ i ] = 0 ;
996 h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = 0 ;
997 }
998
999 /∗ IP I d e n t i f i c a t i o n ∗/
1000 h i g h e s t i d = 0 ;
1001 h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o n = 0 ;
1002 h i ghe s t i db = 0 ;
1003 h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o nb = 0 ;
1004 h i g h e s t i d r a t i o = 0 ;
1005
1006 /∗ IP Checksum ∗/
1007 highest sum = 0 ;
1008 h i ghe s t sum loca t i on = 0 ;
1009 highest sumb = 0 ;
1010 h ighe s t sum loca t i onb = 0 ;
1011 h i ghe s t sum ra t i o = 0 ;
1012
1013 for ( i =0; i <65535; i++)
1014 {
1015 p o r t l i s t [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t cp spo r t [ i ] + sharept r [ memswitchread ] .
t cp dport [ i ] ;
1016 po r t l i s t udp [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp sport [ i ] + sharept r [ memswitchread ] .
udp dport [ i ] ;
1017 }
1018
1019 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e t ime ∗/
1020 i f ( d i f f e r e n c e u s e c < 0)
1021 {
1022 d i f f e r e n c e u s e c = d i f f e r e n c e u s e c + 1000000;
1023 d i f f e r e n c e s e c −−;
1024 }
1025
1026 st rcpy ( output st , ”” ) ;
1027 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d” , s i t e ) ;
1028 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1029 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%lu , ” , end . t v s e c ) ;
1030 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1031 /∗ f p r i n t f ( smtp ,”% lu , ” , end . t v s e c ) ; ∗/
1032 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”%i .%06 l i \n” , d i f f e r e n c e s e c , d i f f e r e n c e u s e c ) ;}
1033 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%i .%06 l i , ” , d i f f e r e n c e s e c , d i f f e r e n c e u s e c ) ;
1034 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1035
1036
1037
1038 /∗ Count t h e number o f sub−ne t s cap tu red and r e s e t ∗/
1039 for ( count=0; count<IP RANGE; count++)
1040 {
1041 ip count += sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p s r c a r r a y [ count ] ;
1042 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p s r c a r r a y [ count ] = 0 ;
1043 ip countd += sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p d s t a r r a y [ count ] ;
1044 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p d s t a r r a y [ count ] = 0 ;
1045 }
1046
1047 for ( i =0; i <256; i++){
1048 cur rent [ i ]= sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t t l [ i ] ;
1049 }
1050 /∗ perform KS on the TTL d i s t r i b u t i o n ∗/
1051 k s t t l = ks ( normal , current , 256 ,256) ;
1052 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”KS f o r TTL was %f \n” , k s t t l ) ;}
1053
1054 /∗ perform KS on the Packet s i z e d i s t r i b u t i o n ∗/
1055 for ( i =0; i <1500; i++){
1056 packe t cur r [ i ]= sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p p a c k e t s i z e [ i ] ;
1057 }
1058 ks packet = ks ( packet norm , packet curr ,1500 ,1500) ;
1059 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”KS f o r Packet S i z e s was %f \n” , ks packet ) ;}
1060
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1061 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e v a l u e and p o s i t i o n o f t h e l a r g e s t TTL ∗/
1062 for ( count=0; count<256; count++)
1063 {
1064 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1065 {
1066 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t t l [ count ] > t t l v a l u e [ i ] )
1067 {
1068 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1069 {
1070 t t l v a l u e [4− j ] = t t l v a l u e [4− j −1] ;
1071 t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j ] = t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1072 }
1073
1074 t t l v a l u e [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t t l [ count ] ;
1075 t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1076 i =5;
1077 }
1078 }
1079
1080 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1081 {
1082 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp t t l [ count ] > udp t t l v a l u e [ i ] )
1083 {
1084 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1085 {
1086 udp t t l v a l u e [4− j ] = udp t t l v a l u e [4− j −1] ;
1087 udp t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j ] = udp t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1088 }
1089
1090 udp t t l v a l u e [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp t t l [ count ] ;
1091 udp t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1092 i =5;
1093 }
1094 }
1095
1096
1097 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1098 {
1099 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p t t l [ count ] > t c p t t l v a l u e [ i ] )
1100 {
1101 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1102 {
1103 t c p t t l v a l u e [4− j ] = t c p t t l v a l u e [4− j −1] ;
1104 t c p t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j ] = t c p t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1105 }
1106
1107 t c p t t l v a l u e [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p t t l [ count ] ;
1108 t c p t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1109 i =5;
1110 }
1111 }
1112
1113 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1114 {
1115 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp t t l [ count ] > i cmp t t l v a l u e [ i ] )
1116 {
1117 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1118 {
1119 i cmp t t l v a l u e [4− j ] = i cmp t t l v a l u e [4− j −1] ;
1120 i cmp t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j ] = i cmp t t l p o s i t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1121 }
1122
1123 i cmp t t l v a l u e [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp t t l [ count ] ;
1124 i cmp t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1125 i =5;
1126 }
1127 }
1128
1129 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t t l [ count ] = 0 ;
1130 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp t t l [ count ] = 0 ;
1131 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p t t l [ count ] = 0 ;
1132 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp t t l [ count ] = 0 ;
1133 }
1134
1135
1136
1137 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e most common IP s i z e s ∗/
1138 for ( count=0; count<1538; count++)
1139 {
1140 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
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1141 {
1142 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p p a c k e t s i z e [ count ] > h ighe s t packe t count [ i ] )
1143 {
1144 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1145 {
1146 h ighe s t packe t count [4− j ] = h ighe s t packe t count [4− j −1] ;
1147 h i gh e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [4− j ] = h i gh e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1148 }
1149
1150 h ighe s t packe t count [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p p a c k e t s i z e [ count ] ;
1151 h i gh e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1152 i =5;
1153 }
1154 }
1155
1156 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1157 {
1158 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp packe t s i z e [ count ] > udp h ighes t packet count [ i ] )
1159 {
1160 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1161 {
1162 udp h ighes t packet count [4− j ] = udp h ighes t packet count [4− j −1] ;
1163 udp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [4− j ] = udp h i gh e s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [4− j −1] ;
1164 }
1165
1166 udp h ighes t packet count [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp packe t s i z e [ count ] ;
1167 udp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] = count ;
1168 i =5;
1169 }
1170 }
1171
1172
1173 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1174 {
1175 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p pa c k e t s i z e [ count ] > t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [ i ] )
1176 {
1177 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1178 {
1179 t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [4− j ] = t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [4− j −1] ;
1180 t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [4− j ] = t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [4− j −1] ;
1181 }
1182
1183 t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p pa c k e t s i z e [ count ] ;
1184 t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1185 i =5;
1186 }
1187 }
1188
1189 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1190 {
1191 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp packe t s i z e [ count ] > i cmp h ighes t packet count [ i ] )
1192 {
1193 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1194 {
1195 i cmp h ighes t packet count [4− j ] = i cmp h ighes t packet count [4− j −1] ;
1196 i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [4− j ] = i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [4− j −1] ;
1197 }
1198
1199 i cmp h ighes t packet count [ i ] = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp packe t s i z e [ count ] ;
1200 i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] = count ;
1201 i =5;
1202 }
1203 }
1204 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i p p a c k e t s i z e [ count ] = 0 ;
1205 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp packe t s i z e [ count ] = 0 ;
1206 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t c p pa c k e t s i z e [ count ] = 0 ;
1207 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i cmp packe t s i z e [ count ] = 0 ;
1208 }
1209 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e most common UDP po r t s ∗/
1210 for ( count=0; count<65535; count++)
1211 {
1212
1213 for ( i =0; i <5; i++)
1214 {
1215 i f ( p o r t l i s t udp [ count ] > h ighe s t udp por t f r equency [ i ] )
1216 {
1217 for ( j =0; j<4− i ; j++)
1218 {
1219 h ighe s t udp por t f r equency [4− j ] = h ighe s t udp por t f r equency [4− j −1] ;
1220 h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [4− j ] = h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [4− j −1] ;
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1221 }
1222
1223 h ighe s t udp por t f r equency [ i ] = po r t l i s t udp [ count ] ;
1224 h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [ i ] = count ;
1225 i =5;
1226 }
1227 }
1228
1229 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp sport [ count ] = 0 ;
1230 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . udp dport [ count ] = 0 ;
1231 po r t l i s t udp [ count ]=0;
1232 }
1233 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e most common t cp Por t s ∗/
1234 for ( count=0; count<65535; count++)
1235 {
1236
1237 for ( i =0; i <10; i++)
1238 {
1239 i f ( p o r t l i s t [ count ] > h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [ i ] )
1240 {
1241 for ( j =0; j<9− i ; j++)
1242 {
1243 h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [9− j ] = h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [9− j −1] ;
1244 h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [9− j ] = h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [9− j −1] ;
1245 }
1246
1247 h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [ i ] = p o r t l i s t [ count ] ;
1248 h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [ i ] = count ;
1249 i =10;
1250 }
1251 }
1252
1253 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t cp spo r t [ count ] = 0 ;
1254 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . t cp dport [ count ] = 0 ;
1255 p o r t l i s t [ count ]=0;
1256 }
1257
1258
1259 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e Id numbers ∗/
1260 for ( count=0; count<65535; count++)
1261 {
1262
1263 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ count ] > h i gh e s t i d )
1264 {
1265 h i g h e s t i d = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ count ] ;
1266 h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o n = count ;
1267 }
1268
1269 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . checksum [ count ] > highest sum )
1270 {
1271 highest sum = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . checksum [ count ] ;
1272 h i ghe s t sum loca t i on = count ;
1273 }
1274 }
1275
1276 for ( count=0; count<65535; count++)
1277 {
1278 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ count ] > h i gh e s t i db && count !=
h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o n )
1279 {
1280 h i ghe s t i db = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ count ] ;
1281 h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o nb = count ;
1282 }
1283 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . i d e n t i f i c a t i o n [ count ] = 0 ;
1284
1285 i f ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . checksum [ count ] > highest sumb && count !=
h ighe s t sum loca t i on )
1286 {
1287 highest sumb = sharept r [ memswitchread ] . checksum [ count ] ;
1288 h ighe s t sum loca t i onb = count ;
1289 }
1290 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . checksum [ count ] = 0 ;
1291 }
1292
1293
1294 /∗ i f ( a ){∗/
1295 /∗ Pr in t out SMTP Tr a f f i c f o r bot−net a n a l y s i s ∗/
1296 /∗ i f ( s h a r e p t r [ memswitchwri te ] . smtp count > SMTP TRIGGER)
1297 {
1298 f o r ( count =0; count<s h a r e p t r [ memswitchwri te ] . smtp count ; count++)
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1299 {
1300 in . s add r = s ha r e p t r [ memswitchread ] . smtp mach ine ip [ count ] ;
1301 i p s t r = i n e t n t o a ( in ) ; ∗/
1302 /∗ p r i n t f (” IP was %i .%6 l i ,%s\n” , d i f f e r e n c e s e c , d i f f e r e n c e u s e c , i p s t r ) ; ∗/
1303 /∗ f p r i n t f ( smtp ,”% i ,%s\n” , end . t v s e c , i p s t r ) ;
1304
1305 }
1306 }
1307 }∗/
1308
1309
1310 /∗ Ca l c u l a t e t h e r a t i o between i d numbers ∗/
1311 h i g h e s t i d r a t i o = ( ( f loat ) h i g h e s t i d /( f loat ) h i gh e s t i db ) ∗100 . 0 ;
1312
1313 h i ghe s t sum ra t i o = ( ( f loat ) highest sum /( f loat ) highest sumb ) ∗100 . 0 ;
1314
1315 /∗ Output s t u f f t o f i l e ∗/
1316 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%u , ” , ip count ) ;
1317 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1318 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%u , ” , ip countd ) ;
1319 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1320 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i g h e s t i d l o c a t i o n ) ;
1321 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1322 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%f , ” , h i g h e s t i d r a t i o ) ;
1323 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1324 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i ghe s t sum loca t i on ) ;
1325 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1326 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%f , ” , h i ghe s t sum ra t i o ) ;
1327 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1328
1329 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%lu , ” , t t l v a l u e [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;}
1330 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%hu , ” , t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st , output s )
;}
1331 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%lu , ” , udp t t l v a l u e [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st , output s )
;}
1332 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%hu , ” , u dp t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1333 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%lu , ” , t c p t t l v a l u e [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st , output s )
;}
1334 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%hu , ” , t c p t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1335 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%lu , ” , i cmp t t l v a l u e [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st , output s
) ;}
1336 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%hu , ” , i cmp t t l p o s i t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1337 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1338 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i ghe s t packe t count [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1339 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , udp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t (
output st , output s ) ;}
1340 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , udp h ighes t packet count [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1341 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , t c p h i g h e s t p a c k e t l o c a t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t (
output st , output s ) ;}
1342 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , t cp h i ghe s t packe t coun t [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1343 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , i cmp h i ghe s t pa ck e t l o c a t i on [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t (
output st , output s ) ;}
1344 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , i cmp h ighes t packet count [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st
, output s ) ;}
1345 for ( i =0; i <10; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i g h e s t p o r t l o c a t i o n [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1346 for ( i =0; i <10; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i gh e s t po r t f r e quency [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st ,
output s ) ;}
1347 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i gh e s t udp po r t l o c a t i on [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t ( output st
, output s ) ;}
1348 for ( i =0; i <5; i++){ s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%d , ” , h i ghe s t udp por t f r equency [ i ] ) ; s t r c a t (
output st , output s ) ;}
1349
1350
1351 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cTotalIP ) ;
1352 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1353 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saTotal ) ;
1354 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1355 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cTCP) ;
1356 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1357 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saTCP) ;
1358 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1359 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cUDP) ;
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1360 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1361 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saUDP) ;
1362 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1363 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cICMP) ;
1364 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1365 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saICMP) ;
1366 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1367 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cUnknownIP) ;
1368 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1369 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN) ;
1370 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1371 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . SYN) ;
1372 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1373 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . RST) ;
1374 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1375 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] .PUSH) ;
1376 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1377 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] .ACK) ;
1378 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1379 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] .URG) ;
1380 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1381 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . smtp count ) ;
1382 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1383 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . sm tp t o t a l b i t s ) ;
1384 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1385 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . Non NTL smtp count ) ;
1386 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1387 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%l i , ” , sharept r [ memswitchread ] . Non NTL smtp total bits ) ;
1388 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1389 s p r i n t f ( output s , ”%f ,% f ” , k s t t l , k s packet ) ;
1390 s t r c a t ( output st , output s ) ;
1391
1392 i f (n)
1393 {
1394 i f ( a l e r t ( ) )
1395 {
1396 p r i n t f ( ” A l e r t ing Module Tr iggered\n” ) ;
1397 }
1398 }
1399
1400 p r i n t f ( ”Log%d\n” , f i l e c o u n t ) ;
1401 p r i n t f ( ”End Report\n\n\n” ) ;
1402 /∗ Counters f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o t o c o l s ∗/
1403 packet count = 0 ;
1404 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cTCP = 0 ;
1405 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cUDP = 0 ;
1406 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cTotalIP = 0 ;
1407 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cICMP = 0 ;
1408 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . cUnknownIP = 0 ;
1409 /∗ Average pack e t s i z e s f o r t h e v a r i o u s p r o t o c o l s ∗/
1410 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saTotal = 0 ;
1411 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saTCP = 0 ;
1412 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saUDP = 0 ;
1413 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . saICMP = 0 ;
1414 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN =0;
1415 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . SYN =0;
1416 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . RST =0;
1417 sharept r [ memswitchread ] .PUSH=0;
1418 sharept r [ memswitchread ] .ACK=0;
1419 sharept r [ memswitchread ] .URG=0;
1420 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . smtp count=0;
1421 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . sm tp t o t a l b i t s =0;
1422 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . skype count=0;
1423 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . s k y p e t o t a l b i t s =0;
1424 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . Non NTL smtp count=0;
1425 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . Non NTL smtp total bits=0;
1426
1427 /∗ f o r ( i =0; i <1000; i++)
1428 {
1429 s h a r e p t r [ memswitchread ] . smtp mach ine ip [ i ] = 0 ;
1430 }∗/
1431
1432
1433 /∗ Allow the paren t to read t h i s memory ∗/
1434 f i l e c o u n t++;
1435 /∗ p r i n t f (”%s ” , o u t p u t s t ) ; ∗/
1436 s p r i n t f (command , ” . / a l e r t c l i e n t 62 . 253 . 167 . 161 7113 \”%s \”” , output s t ) ;
1437 system (command) ;
1438
1439 sharept r [ memswitchread ] . read = 1 ;
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1440 /∗ Operate on the o t h e r b l o c k o f memory ∗/
1441 memswitchread = ! memswitchread ;
1442 }
1443 }
1444 /∗ We are on l y eve r here i f t h e c h i l d has not r e c i e v e d t h e e x i t command ∗/
1445 p r i n t f ( ”\nChild Exi t ing Under Parent Request Condit ions\n\n” ) ;
1446 i f ( shmdt ( sharept r )<0)
1447 {
1448 per ro r ( ”Child Detach Fa i l ed \n” ) ;
1449 }
1450
1451 p r i n t f ( ”Child Exit\n” ) ;
1452
1453 p r i n t f ( ”Free Memory\n” ) ;
1454 f r e e ( s h a r e p t r f r e e ) ;
1455 p r i n t f ( ”Memory Free\n” ) ;
1456 f c l o s e ( smtp ) ;
1457 i f ( f ){
1458 f c l o s e ( s i g i n pu t ) ;
1459 f c l o s e ( s i g ou tput ) ;
1460 }
1461 ex i t (0 ) ;
1462
1463 }
1464
1465 void u s e r e x i t ( int i )
1466 {
1467 int r t rn =0;
1468
1469 i f ( pid !=0)
1470 {
1471 p r i n t f ( ”\nExit ing Under User Request Condit ions\n\n” ) ;
1472 p r i n t f ( ”\nExit Command Recieved\nClos ing Down Capture\n\n” ) ;
1473 }
1474 i f ( pid==0){
1475 i f ( a )
1476 {
1477 f c l o s e ( a l e r t f i l e ) ;
1478 f c l o s e ( smtp ) ;
1479 }
1480 }
1481 /∗ Ensure t h e c h i l d r e c i e v e s t h e e x i t command ∗/
1482 sharept r [ 1 ] . wr i t t en = −1;
1483 sharept r [ 0 ] . wr i t t en = −1;
1484
1485
1486 i f ( shmdt ( sharept r )<0)
1487 {
1488 per ro r ( ”Detach Fa i l ed \n” ) ;
1489 }
1490
1491
1492 p r i n t f ( ” Re leas ing Memory\n” ) ;
1493
1494
1495 /∗ Re lease t h e Shared memory segment ∗/
1496 i f ( ( r t rn = shmctl ( shmid , IPC RMID , shmid ds ) ) == −1)
1497 {
1498 per ro r ( ” shmctl : shmctl f a i l e d ” ) ;
1499 p r i n t f ( ”%d\n” , pid ) ;
1500 }
1501 else
1502 {
1503 p r i n t f ( ”Shared Memory Released\n” ) ;
1504 }
1505
1506 i f ( pid !=0){
1507 s l e ep (5) ;
1508 }
1509 /∗ Re lease t h e memory ∗/
1510 i f ( pid != 0)
1511 {
1512 f r e e ( s h a r e p t r f r e e ) ;
1513 p r i n t f ( ”Memory Freed\n” ) ;
1514 i f ( f ){
1515 f c l o s e ( s i g i n pu t ) ;
1516 f c l o s e ( s i g ou tput ) ;
1517 }
1518 }
1519
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1520 ex i t (0 ) ;
1521 }
1522
1523 int a l e r t (void )
1524 {
1525 struct t imeval tp ;
1526 struct timezone tpz ;
1527 char a l e r t [ 6 0 0 ] ;
1528 char command [ 8 0 0 ] ;
1529 /∗ P l a c e ho l d e r f o r a l e r t i n g c on d i t i o n s ∗/
1530 i f ( ( ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . SYN / ( f loat ) ( sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN +
1531 ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . RST) )>a l e r t i n g v a r s [ 0 ] | | ( ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . SYN
/
1532 ( ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN + ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . RST) ) < a l e r t i n g v a r s
[ 1 ] )
1533 {
1534
1535 gett imeofday(&tp , &tpz ) ;
1536 f p r i n t f ( a l e r t f i l e , ”Alarm t r i g g e r ed Syn/Fin+Rst o f : %f at %u.%06u\n” , ( f loat ) ( ( ( f loat )
sharept r [ memswitchread ] . SYN / ( ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN + ( f loat )
sharept r [ memswitchread ] . RST, tp . tv sec , tp . tv usec ) ) ) ) ;
1537 s p r i n t f ( a l e r t , ”Alarm : Sin to Fin r a t i o o f : %f \n” , ( f loat ) ( ( f loat ) ( sharept r [
memswitchread ] . SYN / ( ( f loat ) sharept r [ memswitchread ] . FIN + ( f loat ) sharept r [
memswitchread ] . RST + 1) ) ) ) ;
1538 s p r i n t f (command , ” . / a l e r t c l i e n t a r i a l 7111 \”%s \”” , a l e r t ) ;
1539 system (command) ;
1540 return 1 ;
1541 }
1542 return 0 ;
1543 }
1544
1545
1546 f loat ks ( f loat ∗normal , f loat ∗ current , int l normal , int l c u r r e n t )
1547 {
1548 int x ;
1549 f loat ks max=0;
1550 int s cu r r en t =0;
1551
1552 /∗ Get t h e t o t a l v a l u e o f t h e array so we can norma l i s e ∗/
1553 for ( x=0;x< l c u r r e n t ; x++){
1554 s cu r r en t += current [ x ] ;
1555 }
1556
1557 /∗ Make the d i s t r i b u t i o n cumu la t i v e ∗/
1558 current [ 0 ] = ( cur rent [ 0 ] / s cu r r en t ) ;
1559
1560 for ( x=1;x< l c u r r e n t ; x++){
1561 cur rent [ x ] = current [ x−1] + ( cur rent [ x ] / s cu r r en t ) ;
1562 }
1563
1564 for ( x=0;x<l c u r r e n t ; x++){
1565 i f ( v ){ p r i n t f ( ”At %d , va lues were %f and %f \n” ,x , cur rent [ x ] , normal [ x ] ) ;}
1566 // p r i n t f (”At %d , v a l u e s were %f and %f \n” , x , cu r r en t [ x ] , normal [ x ] ) ;
1567 i f ( fabs ( cur rent [ x]−normal [ x ] )>ks max ){
1568 ks max = fabs ( cur rent [ x]−normal [ x ] ) ;
1569 }
1570 }
1571
1572 return ks max ;
1573 }
